BETTING IN HOTELS

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 16, 18 July 1918, Page 7

BETTING IN HOTELS

IT IS NOT GAMBLING

SUPREME COURT DECISION,

A judgment of considerable importance and public interest was delivered in the Supreme Court this morning. It was in the case of an appeal by F. J. Oakes, licensee of. the Duke of Edinburgh Hotel, from a conviction by the Magistrate for permitting gambling on his premises. In giving judgment, ' his Honour the' Chief Justice (Sir Robert Stout) said the evidence did not disclose that the appellant was personally present when the betting took place, but there was "betting" on horses on his premises to the knowledge of his barman, and a bet was made with his barman. The appellant had issued to his employee's in 1916 an order which waa

afterwards kept in a book open to his employees. There was a direction that no betting should be permitted on the premises, and if such took place, the appellant was at once to be notified thereof. That order was not obeyed by the barman. There were two questions raised by the appellant : (1) Is betting on a horse race "gambling" within the meaning of the section? (2) was the appellant liable for the act of his barman? There, were provisions' in England regarding the conduct of licensed houses. The difference was that the word "gaming" was used in the English section, whereas in the New Zealand section the word "gambling" was used. An Appellate Court decided in England that "betting" did not come within the term "gaming." There had been two- decisions in New Zealand on the section ; all that ' was determined was that the words "gambling" and "gaming" were synonymous, dnd that the playing of a game for money was gambling. It was not determined that betting; was gambling, nor w;is it determined that it was not gambling. In the Gaming Act, 190S, "gaming-house" was stated to include "betting-house," but there was no definition of "gambling" in the Licensing Act. The proper meaning must therefore he applied to the -word, and, after quoting the definition of "gamble" in Webster's and Murray's Oxford Dictionaries, his Honoiu- said that in neither of those dictionaries was it said that the word "gambling" included "betting-." Colloquially it was used in this colony no doubt in a way that would include betting, but it would also include other transactions that were of a risky nature, such as tlfe purchasing of shares in companies or even trafficking in land. Was the Court in this statute justified in holding_ that the primary and ordinary meaning of the .word* "gambling" was to be departed from and a wider meaning applied? If-the wider meaning was applied, then all things called in a loose way "gambling," such as wild and speculative transactions on the Stock Exchange, rash purchases of land or goods. "Wheat options"—to use an American phrase—would all come under the term, " gambling," and an innkeeper would be • liable if he knew of men in his hotel rashly buying shares or personal property, etc. Where .tfce. Legislature had thought " betting " should be deemed "gaming," it had made provision, as in the Gaming Act. There was no such provision in the Licensing Act. As to the' second question, there was authority for holding that if an innkeeper entrusted the management of his hotel to a servant he would be liable if that servant committed a breach of the Statute. Mere orders to the servant not to break the law would not destroy that liability. It was unnecessary to deal with the second question, further than to say that, in his opinion, the barman might not have been entrusted with the management of the hotel so as to make the innkeeper liable. Further, he saw no reason to doubt the bona fides of the innkeeper in his desire to prevent betting in his licensed house. The appeal, in his opinion, should be allowed, and the conviction quashed. Mr. Justice Chapman and Mr. Justice Herdman concurred, and judgment was entered accordingly.