Evening Post. SATURDAY, AUGUST 4, 1917. THREE YEARS OF WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 30, 4 August 1917, Page 6

Evening Post. SATURDAY, AUGUST 4, 1917. THREE YEARS OF WAR

The-'three years of war,,, concluded today, have been spread into four calendar years, 1914 to 1917 inclusive, and each one .(jf^ these has been marked by distinctive milestones-orrthe road to-a goal as yet unreached. In the'first place, the year 1914 saw the rapid decease of all possible hope of a-short war. The Battle of the MaTne negatived for ever .the German idea of capturing Paris at a single blow; the. subsequent race to the sea introduced into western warfare- the semi-sta: 'tionary front; and thereafter it became evident that not in the west, but on the unstable line' eastward and south-east-ward, was centred the last German hope ■of decisive offensive warfare. Consequently, from 1914 onward it is found that all enemy advances of importance ,'were made, not in the narrow west, but iii the spacious east. 1n.'1915 came tire Hindenburg drive of the Russians beyond 1 the Vistula. The folio-wing year, after sustaining serious defeats in France at Verdun and on the Somme, Germany, pulled her reputation out of the,fire by sweeping over luckless Rumania, who had relied on the Tsar; and in 1917—50 much of'it as has elapsed to date—Russia has again presented the enemy with such successes as ho may claim, these being entirely due to internal weakness consequent on the Revolution. Confronted with this peculiar situation—a waxing foe on one side, a waning one on-the other—Germany has made adroit ■use of her interior lines, and has postponed final, or even semi-final, action. Three years of ■ the great war have not ■eliminated the enemy's " lead on points," nor—considering the advent of America '—bays they diminished the certainty 4nat the Entente Allies will win if the fight is fonght to a finish; that is, rf they have "the will to conquer/ rAs 'Sir William Robertson tersely puts . it ;/ '•' considering the respective numbers And resources, it is fair to conclude .'that the Entente Allies,' if they aTe steadfast and Bound-hearted, will compel the Central •Powers to submit sooner or later." It is '"■a test of racial qualities." p.

Excluding moral considerations, and. starting from the . basis that the Entente's strength is numbers and resources, and the enemy's strength superior preparation and interior lines, the 1 drama of the war unfolds itself-, simply enough. Only ai portions of'?the ./wonderful opportunity offered tty military • preparation was lest by Germany- at th©' Marne, and the whole advantage of interior lines ami united control remained. 'Germany, immediately saw the. necessity of denying that same advantage to heii foes, by keeping them asunder. To saving, her own armies between east and west —thus countering numbers with mo-T)ility—-was not more important than to; ..prevent'the Entente nations from doing i& similar thing ; hence the forcing of war upon Turkey, and hence also the' 'trapping of Rumania, (through, th-e proGerman Stunner' Government) into a wai which resulted in the straightening of the enemy line, from the Baltic to the Black 'Sea. Turkey in 1914, Bulgaria in. 1915, and the Rumanian drive in. 1916; all contributed to the isolation of, Russia, the sundering: of lihe Entente" forces, and the discounting of the Anglo-French, strategical position aft Salonikaf For the Central Powers it was of the utmost : importance that hostile armie&in Russia, ..at Salonika., in Italy, and in France* ■(Should not effectively Jink as their own . armies linked. By , the time they had finished with Rumania in 1916, shortening their front and consolidating their Balkan position, it looked as if this policy of M divide ted conquer"- was; well safeguarded ; and in the present year it has received new and unexpected aid from the internal trouble in Russia. What Germany most feared in. 1917 was: an effective redistribution of;the Russian,: French, and British millions-so that,, act 1 ing collectively, they would simultaneously apply irresistible pressure to both, sides of the cup, and overwhelm the'possessor of-the inner lines by the force- of; superior external weight. Thanksi-to the-: ■wedges which sSe has driven in.'the-Bal-kans, thanks to the- submarine campaign, and thanks lastly '4o>i"ibe post-Re-volution weakness of .Russia, the- Central•Alliance believes that in 1917 it has? postponed the Russo-Wrench-British-isqueeze, perhaps; for.; ever.

The-enemy's-gain pin thisrrespectrfis-irtTi tensified by tha geographical position... At the moment, the /remaining power^ofr' ;resistance in Russia and ln.LSnstria-Htui-< . gary issmore ■or less. an: ariknown. factor,. but it may be conceded thaiy of the* :major Powers, Austria-Hungary is: the-weak-point on the enemy side, jrist as.. Russia is (at present), on the Entente side. In fact, the one promises to.'bemore or less a- compensation for the other. Now, geographical facts make- it possible for a two-Power strength (Germany . plus * Austria-Hungary) ( to bet brought to bear to-beat.down-a weakening. Russia, bnt not for-a similar force to» be exerted by the Entente against a; weakening Austria-Hungary. It -,;s .true* ■that the latter is attacked at two.points* by two major Powers, bnt Italy's»cramp- : edcampaign in- jor near the. mountains has never promised or accomplished anything" to elevate it to a dc■cisive importance, or: yet to .'such importas belongs to * German-Austrian., ■s-weoping attack on. the lengthy and ■ open Russian frontier, Austria-Hungary; is sheltered from tho western blast by-. Switzerland and the mountains, wiicli'' ,shut out France,, and- offer Italy, •buiwaj

square to the full hurricane farce of two Great Powers and two lesser-ones, from the-Baltic to the Black Sea, beyond ■that -into Asia. No wonderj then, that Germany grasps eagerly atwthe Revolution the final line -of clea-vage between. her eastern and western enemies, and as the- reviving hop© of her-' tottering ally. !0n the unstable eastern line Mittel Europamay yei'be<rescued-fromthe fires xifi;a war--that has been rendered other-. iwise- unprofitable, by-the unexpected; re-; distance of an outragjed-'democraey.

Fortunately, 1917 brings to th© Entente something more than the hope- of: a .Russian recovery; it brings the cer-. tainty of Americanvassistance'onthe bat-» tlefields of France. Then, despite Ger-<-many!a isolatiomiof • Russia., despite the enemy attempts to " divide and v con--quer," the Entente- will achieve, that which it has not attained .hitherto—a close co-operation: o£ three major Powers in one decisive theatre»of war. Think what that means,! Britain, America, and Franc© can do together,- on the Western front, what the divided .efforts of the Entente Powers on severah fronts ha,v« failed to *do; in which case German high strategy must collapse. It is for this reason that the war " waits on America."- In that fact is found the explanation of "local successes" like Messines and the fourth Ypres, instead of a prolonged struggle for a.decision— such a struggles might have taken place in 1917 had Russia stood 1 firm. The new political and military situation created by the Russian Revolution, has modified the Entente's 1 margin of superiority, to such an extent that, until American, armies have come to bear their part, Britain and France are not warranted in-. undertaking prolonged offensives expen-. sive in human life. Germany's 'Western 1 iront may be breakable by a blow, or ft may be breakable only by attrition; but, in either case, so long as Russia continues doubtful, American aid is essential. Meanwhile, the enemy pursues in the farther west the same strategy as on the; European Continent—he must try to keep; his foes from effectively uniting; and ass it is a sea and not a land task, he employs for the purpose submarines. Hence, 1917 already casts to the surface of its;history three great events—the Russian. Revolution, the entry of America into the' war, and the super-submarine phase of; the policy of division. From a strictly military point of view, the American advent will ouSweigh both the other factors, provided that America, Britain, and France have the will to continue the war'

to a victorious issue. If these three Powers are determined that the goal is worth.the sacrifice^ not all the U boats of the enemy, nor the internal strife or hesitations of their Allies, can. permanentiy^ stop their concentration in overwhelming and decisive strength. Only—' the way may be long, and Ine price will be high. That is why Sir William Robertson defines the issue as " a test of racial qualities. . ... character- being the deciding factor."