THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCII, Issue 90, 13 October 1916, Page 6

THE WAR

The long-delayed despatch by Sir Percy Lake on the Mesopotamian operations which immediately preceded the fall of Kut-el-Amara is described as "a depressing record of'most gallant efforts by an inadequate force to cope with almost insuperable difficulties." . The essence of t3ie failure on the Tigris was the Jack of proper transport facilities. A Commission of Enquiry is now being held in England, and when it. reports the world may know more fully than it does now who was to blame for the shortsighted policy that failed to see the need for a great transport »ystem in such a region, and in the presence of plainly enormous difficulties sent an army out on a campaign that had no practical strategic object and left the army more and move vulnerable aa it advanced. As Mr. John Buchan and many others have pointed out, it would haye been impossible to stop at Bagdad, had that city been reached. The- British would have beeti forced to go on and on, "finding no natural end to- their work save exhaustion," which actually overtook them on the hither side of their first, ostensible objective. But granting the neci'Msity for reaching Bagdad, it is amazing that the effort was not made in a way marked by generalship, instead of by nothing but the wasted suffering and heroism of the troops. To quote Mr. Buchan again: "It was the war in the Sudan undertaken under far more difficurt conditions . . . and no Sirdar had planned' a Sudan railway to bring supplies and reserves more quickly than the route of the winding river.5' Not only was the Tigris, on account of its difficult navigation, a bad substitute for a railway, but the craft available—a heterogeneous collection of the modern and the ancient, from up-to-date motoi--boats to circular skin coracles like those used in the days of the Pharaohs—were hopelessly inadequate in quantity and suitability, and every difficulty of commissariat and sanitary service was hugely increased by that fact.' It is true that to build a railway through the Tigris basin is no light, or quick task, but no-thing else would have served, and the expedition failed and had to come back and begin all over again in the proper way. In its failure it suffered, at the hands of a second-rate enemy, a defeat which, if only small in proportion to the standards of this war, is yet one of the greatest suffered by Britain in all her military history.

The Italians have struck another heavy blow at the Austrians, and have inflicted upon them "the heaviest reverse since General Cadbma's offensive in August" (when Gorizia was captured). A message from Rome commenting upon this operation does not claim that it has any local' or immediate strategic object, such as the capture _of Trieste; it describes it as intended to assist Rumania and to prevent the removal of troops to the Lemberg front. That is to say, theItalian strategy is simply a link -in that united "super-strategy" which is now being practised by the Allies. The offensive was not confined to one point; attacks were made in the .Southern Tren tino the Julian Alps (north of the Ison-. zo line), and the Carso plateau; but the last-named sector was the one mainly attacked. It is the only one on which the Italians can expect to advance with anything approaching- facility towards an important objective, in this- case Trieste. They are now said to be within thirteen miles of the city. It may be doubted whether the Italians would have much hope of reaching Trieste if the .Austrians were- able to offer a reasonably strong defence, for the town is admirably protected by both art and nature.

But the Aus-Erians are in a very serious position for want of men. They are at present busy with two enormous tasks— repelling the Bamonian invaders in Hun. gar-y and holding the Russian offensivo in Galicia. It was largely the stripping of the Isonzo front for purposes of aggression in the Trentmo that assisted General Gadoraa to capture Gorizia; but the troops used in the Trentino offensive are not available for the present operations ; such of them as could be removed wero sent to fight the Russians. Consequently, the prospects of reaching-Triesto are abnormally good. The recent attack, which allowed the Italians to make a notable advance on the Carso, which is everywhere the natural defence of Trieste, Vas preceded by an intense bombardment for five days. This fact adds significance to -the'-re-port a few days ago that the Austrians were explaining how valueless Trieste is. As a matter of fact, it is of extraordinary value in time of peace, however much the AUies' blockade may have nullified its advantages for the present. Too much dependence cannot be placed upon such enemy devices; but it seems clear that the Austrians thought the danger sufficient to warrant their being "fore-handed," and started to prepare their public far a disaster that might not occur but, on the other hand, might.

• The Rumanian situation has never been very clear; it is not very clear now. All that can be said at present of the position in Transylvania is that the enemy hns gathered sufficient forces to compel part of the Rumanian armies to retire; and that apparently fresh forces reached the Rumanians sufficient to check this retirement, at least in one place. It seems that only the southern part of the Transylvania in olTectod by thnaa counteroperatious at the eaewx... very .likely be-

cause this was the region of the main Rumanian advance. Towards the north the invaders are probably little more than a heavy screen working among the forest-clad mountains.

In the Dobrudja, where the enemy is upon Rumanian soil, the position is plainer. General yon Mackensen is said to have failed to hold his line, although it is, or was,' only about thirty-five miles long (stretching across the Dobrudja from the Danube to the Black Sea). His left, on the river, is manned by Bulgarians, who, though open to flank fire from and over the Danube, are giving ground but slowly. On his right, however, yon Mackensen is losing more rapidly, and as against the eight-mile retirement of the left, the right is said to have gone back twenty-five miles. The result of any enemy retirement in the Dobrudja is to lengthen the front very rapidly, owing to the.course of the Danube, which is here almost easterly. The failure of the enemy to hold his short line is plainly due to a lack of strength; and the Bnlgars are not likely to have many reserves available to fill the longer front up to full power. On the other hand, there should be plenty of Russo-Rumanian troops available, so that the Dobrudja campaign seems to ■have-taken a satisfactory turn.

The West front supplies news of a- new French attack south of the Somme, immediately north of Cliaulnes. During the three weeks or so since the last advance in this region -the line has run from Vermandovillers to Denicourt and Berny (all in French hands), then along the road to. Barleux and thence to Biaches. There was thus left a marked salient between Chaulnes and Berny, and the French have wiped this bulge out. They are now on, or close upon, the Chaulnes-Barleux road all along its length, and bold positions on the north and north-east of Chaulnes. ■ That town, which is roughly about the size of Combles, is therefore partly surrounded, and is the new peg upon which the German line hangs to resist the French pressure, as it has hung at times upon Ovillers and Thiepval on the British front and upon Estrees, Soyecourt, and Vermandovillers on the French.