THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XC, Issue 83, 6 October 1915, Page 6

THE WAR

If, as now appears, the Russian ultimatum to Bulgaria was delivered at Sofia at 4 p.m. on Monday, there is, at the moment of writing, still 'a possibility (allowing for distance and difference of time) that we may hear of Bulgarian compliance with the ultimatum — that is, of the dismissal from Sofia of the German officers. But such compliance seems oq be highly unlikely. Indeed, the situation is immensely deepened in intensity by the reported disembarkation in Greece (at the Vardar railway port, Salonika) of a division of Entente troops. These reports are not official, but as they come independently from the Athens correspondents of two prominent newspapers, they are probably true. What is not clear is whether the Entente has legally broken the neutrality of Greece. Some time ago the German Chancellor alleged that Britain had violated .Greek neutrality by occupying certain of the Aegean islands as bases for the Gallipoli Expedition. Considering that, ever since the Tripo--litan and Balkan wars, t-he title to cer* tain Italian-occupied and Greek-occu-pied islands in the Levant and the Aegean has been obscure — a matter of possession rather than of law — no particular heed was paid to this German allegation. But if the Entente has, without Greece's permission, placed troops on indisputably Greek territory, such as Salonika, a legal breach of neutrality is undeniable. It may be that the reported protest of the Greek Government is onlyj formal ; it may be that the Greek people really welcome the Entente troops, and that in this respect (as in others too obvious to mention) the disembarkation in Greece is not parallel with the sanguinary march through Belgium. Nevertheless, even a legal breach, by the Entente, of Greece's neutrality, is to be regretted. Let us still hope that further messages will present this incident in a more regular light. It may be that a breach of International Law by one belligerent practically compels the other belligerent to do likewise. But most people would prefer, if possible, to base our case on something higher than military necessity, even though the fashion was set in the first place by the enemy. Until official news is to hand concerning the relation of the Entente action to the neutrality of Greece, comments on this phase must be largely conjectural. But the conclusion forces itself that Greece is not uniformly sound in her attitude against Bulgaria and the German plot. If she was, no real difficulty about welcoming the Entente force would have arisen. The Premier, M. Venizelos, is no doubt sound enough, • but the German Queen and the other Germanophile influences round the Greek King are a source of great danger. If, by a virtual coup d'etat, the throne can sway the nation id Bulgaria, why not in Greece? In each case the throne is unmistakably Germanophile or Austrophile. An intervention by the King of Greece might swing the Greek mobilisation not for, 'but against, Servia and the Entente. Germany, it is well known, has spared no effort to nobble not only Bulgaria but also Greece, and even Rumania, holding the view .that Bulgaria and Greece could both be territorially bribed at the expense of Greece's ally, Servia. The Sofia correspondent of the Petit Parisian says that "Germany, in order to obtain the intervention of Bulgaria, guaranteed the neutrality ,of Greece and Rumania, without really knowing the attitude of either." But was Germany really so ignorant as this? Is it not at least possible that German intrigue has secured great secret influence in official circles, both in Athens and Bucharest? And is it not also possible that the Entente's sudden energy — the Russian ultimatum and the Salonika landing — is due to the urgent necessity of stopping the German intrigue not only in Sofia, but in other Balkan capitals too? Surely some special motive was required to precipitate this dramatic coup at Salonika. The withdrawal of the Greek troops from th© Bulgarian frontier is capable of two constructions. It may be done in the spirit of the French ■withdrawal from the German frontier in July, 1914, or it may. be an ominous sign of Greek weakness. It has been pointed out already that the Bulgarian frontier comes very close to the line of the Vardar River, which Is the line of the important railway from Salonika to Servia. North of Karasuli the railway is west of the xiver, but river fronts are not impregnable. If Servia's communications with Salonika are cut, the situation for Servia and th* Entente becomes several dftjtrapg worse, a^id Britain 'jywid-.nakJmu&f tea .tha pttsaaaut at.

losing touch with her brave naval contingent now fighting alongside the Serbe on the Danube. Bulgaria, it has been already pointed out, has two sea-fronts, one to the and the other to the Black Sea. The alternative to a landing on her .^Sgean coast is a march through Greece (to which a disembarkation at Salonika is an essential preliminary) ; and the alternative to a landing on her Black Sea coast is a march by Russia througb Rumania. According to one message, the Russians contemplate a landing at the Bulgarian ports of Varna and Burgas, not a march through Rumania; but a sudden crystallisation of the Rumanian popular desire to fight for the Entente might change the situation along the lines of what is occurring in Greece. The increasing demand in Rumania for general mobilisation is, therefore, of the highest importance. All through the Balkans there is evidence of a quickening of action "in order to defeat German intrigne. Recently it was estimated in" these columns {on the strength of good authorities) that Bulgaria could put in the field 550,000 soldiers (this was in accord with subsequently cabled figures) and that Rumania could call to the colours half a million. This latter figure is in excess of some contemporary estimates. As the Rumanian army was not really in action in the Balkan Wars of 1912 13, there is a lack of convincing data concerning how many men Rumania can mobilise at an urgent call. In the Second Balkan War of 1913 Rumania intervened and invaded Bulgaria, but as the Bulgarian army was already beset by the Serbs and Greeks, the success of the Rumanians and of the Turks (who at the same time re-occupied Adrianople) was bloodies*. To find the Rumanian army really under the test of fire one has to go back as far as the Russo-Tur-kish war of the 'seventies. In recent years it has been reorganised. The artillery, it is stated,_ has Krupp field guns and Schneider howitzers, using the same ammunition. Evidence of military up-to-dateness in Rumania is found in the fact that considerable attention has been paid to aerial warfare. The capital, Bucharest, is defended by a circle of six forts — but, since the advent of the Austrian howitzer, permanent forts, unaided by mobile batteries and field works, are at a discount. The new Rumanian frontier is within striking distance of the Bulgarian Black Sea port Varna. Reverting to the time factor in connection with the Russian ultimatum, it would seem that the twenty-four hours allowed to Bulgaria expired at 1.30 a.m. to-day. New Zealand mean time is 9£ hours ahead of time as observed in Bulgaria; therefore, 4 p.m. in Bulgaria would be "£3O a.m. of the next day; in Wellington.