THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XC, Issue 82, 5 October 1915, Page 6

THE WAR

Th* position leading up to the issue of the Russian ultimatum to Bulgaria — and the special reason why the Entente Powers should depute Russia to carry out thia task — is dealt with in the leading columns. The' question now is whether the Bulgarian Government (not the Bulgarian people) will back down and dismiss the German officers. Failing that, Bulgaria must face the prospect of fighting Servia, Greece, and the Entente, with a friendly Turkey in her rear, and a not friendly Rumania on her flank. But Rumania, in turn, is confronted with Austro-German armies, and is said to have been warned by the Central Powers that she will be attacked even if she merely follows Bulgaria's example and orders a general mobilisation. Rumania is completely isolated from the Entente countries except Russia, and a good deal depends upon the Russian Government's military readiness in the south. Russia should be prepared to assist Rumania just as the Western Allies are ready to land troops at Salonika to help the Greeks and Serbs. On general grounds, it was high time that the Entente took the initiative in the Balkans per medium of the Russian ultimatum. There may also have been a special reason. Some little time ago Berlin reported that 110,000 Allied troops had arrived at Mudros Bay, in the Island of Lemnos, an advanced base of the Gallipoli expedition. Whether these troops were Italian, British, on French,i or mixed, Berlin did not say. If the statement is £rue (and it is quite feasible), those troops cannot be kept indefinitely at Mudros. The question is whether they will be most needed in Gallipoli to fight the Turks, or in Macedonia to fight the Bulgars. An answer to that question would be desired by the Entente, and the best way to secure it promptly would be the Russian ultimatum forcing Bulgaria's hand. If action against Bulgaria, either via Salonika or by a landing on Bui-" garia's own Sea front, is pending, it should not now be very long delayed. After the ultimaimm, the most im portant features of the cablegrams are Sir John French's report on the western offensive, and_ the statement of The Times concerning the eastern campaign and its relation to the decisive issue. As Russia must now be considered in close relation with Rumania and the Balkans, the Russian situation may be dealt with first. The Times admits that the German idea of holding the west defensively with much machinery and less men, while using both men and machinery to batter Russia on the east ? has been seriously shaken by the initial success of the Franco-British offensive. The Times admits also that, politically, Russia has sounded the best possible counterblast, to the idea of a separate Russian ' peace — by appointing the Tsar to command the army and by delivering an ultimatum to Bulgaria. But, nevertheless, The Times appears to be by no means optimistic concerning the military situation in Russia, notwithstanding the relief- that ought to accrue (and, according to the cablegrams, is accruing) from the western offensive. One might have hoped to see The Times build something on the counter-successes xjf Ivanoff in the south, the pushing back of the Germans in the centre, and the German failure in the north to force the Dvina. But there is nothing in this newspaper's comments to suggest the swing of the pendulum and' the development of a Russian offensive. Instead, there is more talk about "the Volga, if necessary," and a statement that the German higher command, though surprised by the autumnal outburst in the west, will probably continue their attack in the east "at any cost, until the destruction of the Russian armies has been achieved, because the danger of giving Russia- time to recuperate; would be too deadly a risk to face." ' Consequently, The Times still figures on the possibility of " the practical elimination of Russia from the contest," which would mean an extra recruiting requirement in Britain. The Kaiser, it will be remembered, boasted that his blow at Russia would put her out of action for six months. Sir John French's report refers to "the 10th French Army on our right." There is no reference to any French army on his left, and the chances are that all the country between Lens and the sea is now held by British and Belgians, the Belgian line commencing somewhere north of Ypres. General d'Urbal's French Army (which used to fill a gap between the British and the Belgians) has probably been taken away, and the 10th French Army (General Maoid'huy) is certainly further south than it was. These changes are due to reinforcement of the British line by units of Kitchener's Army, who are quickly learning their business; and the British line will continue to extend southward. Meanwhile, it is good to learn from Sir John French's report not only that the British finally captured Hill 70 (north of Lens) but that the co-operating French under Maud'huy secured the Vimy ridge (south of Lens). The French "have pierced the enemy's last line of entrenchments, and have effected large captures" ; and the British "have established and consolidated a strong line in close proximity to the German third and last line." It is also clear how the two first lines were carried. Once again the famous Ist Corps, wliicli has such a glorious record under Sir Douglas Haig, opened the fight, along with the 4th Corps. Later, the 11th Corps and two divisions (3rd division cavalry mxS SOfch division infantry) -wera tWttwn in. and t,ka . .fflMqfflf flfoft rfrfrn

Hill 70, was taken. Other troops, including the Indians, assisted with subsidiary attacks. The holding attack at Ypres (which resulted in a partial advance south of the Menin-road) was carried out by the sth Corps. Particularly encouraging is the satisfactory baptism of the new troops, and the co-operation of the air-fleet and the guns, which blasted a passage and later held up the enemy's supports.