DEFENCE OF THE PACIFIC

Evening Post, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27, 2 February 1915, Page 6

DEFENCE OF THE PACIFIC

— *» Tn the letter which we publish to-day our London correspondent performs an excellent service by collecting some representative expert opinions on the defence of the Pacific. To what extent have the dangers to which British interests in this ocean were exposed in tho first four months of the war and the immunity which they have enjoyed since Admiral Sturdee's victory modified the contending theories of naval policy? Two of the authorities whom our correspondent consulted had 'discussed at length in the pages of United Empire the naval lessons of the war in their

navies while the Emden, the Scharnhorst, and the Gneisenau were still at large. Mr. Archibald Hurd, one of the staunche&t champions of centralism, was then satisfied that the value of a permanently centralised control of all the naval forces of the Empire had been confirmed by the experience of the war. Mr. Richard Jebb, champion and pioneer of "Colonial Nationalism," was equally clear that that experience had vindicated the policy of Dominion navies. Nor has the dramatic extinction of German naval power in the Pacific changed the opinions of either of the disputants. The fundamental principles of sea power, have not been changed, says Mr. Hurd to our correspondent. He even goes so far as to say that if the coasts of Australia or New Zealand had been treated like Scarborough and Whitby, he would still have been unrepentant. "The whole of the British Empire is being dsfended from the North Sea," says Mr. Hurd, "and it is New Zealand's peculiar pride and glory that she alone of all the Dominions is represented by a,firstclaas fighting sMp which she has provided out of her own resources, and in part at least manned." New Zealand is proud, and with good reason, of the part that her battle-cruiser has played in the North Sea, and she is fully aware the defence of Wellington and Melbourne, no less than that of London and Liverpool, turns ultimately upon the operations in that strategic centre. But New Zealand is not satisfied that it was essential to the success of those operations that she should have been left even temporarily without naval protection, nor would the academic faith of many of her true-blue Imperialists in the unity of the sea have survived the bombardment of Wellington as cheerfully as Mr. Hurd seems to do. In drawing a parallel between Scarborough and the coasts of Australasia in this respect, Mr. Hurd has, however, grossly understated the difficulties of his position. The bombardment of Scarborough was necessarily of the nature of a runaway knock, but if the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau had once reached New Zealand Wellington .might have been in ruins, and thousands of tons of shipping sunk, and all our cables cut, and the Dominion saddled with an enormous indemnity, before it was worth the raiders' while to depart. It is no doubt true that even the capture of New Zealand by the enemy, would not have altered the is3ue of the war. A decisive victory in the North Sea would have restored it in due course, but even this triumphant vindication of the unity of the sea and of the indivisibility of sea power would have failed to convince the people of New Zealand that all was as it should be. How is it that New Zealand has escaped from the dangers to which, despite the overwhelming naval superiority of the Empire in the North Sea, the presence of powerful hostile cruisers in the Pacific exposed her? "I have not the slightest doubt," aays Mr. H. W. Wilson in his communication to our correspondent, " that what prevented Admiral yon Spec from bombarding or holding up to ransom all the exposed cities and towns on the Australian and New Zealand seaboard- was the presence in the South Pacific of H.M.A.S. Australia. Before help could have arrived from Europe the mischief would have been done and the Empire would have suffered a tremendous blow." That, as we know, is also the opinion of the New Zealand Government. If the Commonwealth had followed New Zealand's example and put its battle-cruiser in the North Sea, of what use would she have been? She would not have strengthened Admiral Jellicoe's Fleet, for she would merely have taken the place of one that the British taxpayer has actually given him; and she would have left the coasts of Australasia open to the German cruisers. Another point made by Mr. Wilson is that if the Dominions go in for ships at all they should be big ones. The Australia and New Zealand are, in his opinion, not big enough; they should have been of the Lion class. Yet, according to the " one big navy " school, the only fault of the Australia is that she is too big for the Pacific. " Quite likely," saya Mr. Jebb in his article in United Empire, "this school had been explaining to us that there was no occasion to provide Dreadnoughts or even ' Bristol ' cruisers for the Pacific, because there was no probability of their meeting ' like ' ships in that quarter. • We wero not all convinced—some of us having got it into Our heads that the invariable aim in strategy is to meet the enemy with superior rather than equal strength." It is fortunate for New Zealand that on this point of doctrine Australia also was among the heretics.