NAVAL POLICY

Evening Post, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27, 2 February 1915, Page 3

NAVAL POLICY

THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC EFFECT OF THE WAR NEW ZEALAND'S POSITION. (FROM OCR OWN CORRESPONDENT.) LONDON, 23rd December. When the career of the German Navy in th« Pacific had been brought to an end by th» destruction of Admiral yon Spec's squadron, I approached & number of well-known authorities on naval matters, with a view to ascertaining how, in their opinion, the experience of the war had reacted on the naval policies of the Pacific Dominion*, and whether previously held views of naval policy were likely to be modified by what had happened during the last four months. On th© facts of the case there was no dispute. Germany, at the opening of the war, had in the Pacific a fleet of considerable strength which kept the sea and harried commerce for four months ; bombarded several weak enemy stations ; met and destroyed a. British squadron of not inconsiderable importance; and yet forbore to molest two of the richest of th» British Dominions. Meanwhile, in the other theatre of operations, the contest between the German, and British main fleets was being worked out tot a slow but sur* conclusion. THE CENTRAL ' FLEET. Mr. Archibald Hurd, the naval writer of the Daily Telegraph and author of "How the Navy is Run" and "Command of the Sea," is one of the "strongest supporters of the single navy policy which New Zealand has followed in the past. He kindly writes, in answer to my query :— "I cannot see that anything has occurred to change any of the fundamental principles of eea power. [f the. coastfi of New Zealand or of the Australia* had been bombarded by Germain men-of-war as Scarborough, Whitby, and Hartlepool have been bombarded, I should still be of the same opinion. The whole of the British Empire is beingdefended from the North Sea, and it is New Zealand's peculiar pride and glory that there ehe alone of all the DominI ions is represented by a first-class fighting ship which she has provided out of her own resources, and, in part at least, manned. Nothing that has happened or can happen outside th« main strategical theatre can affect the iseiwi of the struggle. The words of St. Paul may, without irreverence, be said to sum up naval strategy— 'This one thing I do.' We are going to win because we have concentrated on on« end, which it. th« defeat of the enemy's main fleet. Our success will depend upon concentration of force in time and place and concentration of highly-trained energy. If the ships which are now containing the enemy in the North Sea and preventing him from injuring the Dominions were not manned on the same principle, and had not trained continually in association in time of peace, they could not today b© acting in co-operation with, the assurance of eventual victory." THE 1909 POLICY VINDICATED. Mr. Richard Jebb writes to me from the headquarters of the King's Shropshire Light Infantry, which he rejoined on mobilisation. Mr. Jebb has for long supported the local navy policy of Australia, and he recently discussed the new position in "United Empire," ?rguing that events had completely vindicated the policy of the agreement of 1909, which both Great Britain and Canada shelved. He adds: "Later events seeni to me to enforce the conclusions reached in the article. i The Valparaiso disaster illustrated the practical difficulties of the plan of relying upon the detachment during war of a sufficiently powerful squadron to clear the Pacific of hostile cruisers before a decisive victory had been achieved in European waters. Not only is there a natural reluctance to part with the best cruisers, but a sqnadron thus sent out it likely to lack the benefit of the intimate local knowledge which can be acquired by the officers of a 'local navy.' The Falkland Islands victory was a great relief to some of us here. Had it been left to our gallant friends, the Japanese, to 'wipe our eye' by sinking Yon. Spec, Britannic prestige in the Pacific might have never recovered. I suspect that in India the exploit* of the Emden shook public confidence to an extent never realised by most people here. But if the 1909 Agreement had been carried out, the careers of the Emden and Yon Spee'g Squadron would probably have been brief, and good for our prestige. If we win this war, surely the obvious Britannic policy will be to revive and enlarge the 1909 scheme. As to the question of control, the example of the Australian Na.vy, coupled with the standing offer of the British Government to afford complete facilities of continuous consultation to every Dominion Minister appointed- to reside in London for that purpose, points the way to a solution in accordance with the established principles of our Britannic Commonwealth, which is now presenting so marvellous an example of effective solidarity under the supreme test." WHY NEW ZEALAND ESCAPED. Mr. H. W. Wilson, author of "Ironclads in Action" also strongly supports this view. He says : "The events of the naval war up to the present seem to me to have vindicated in the most striking manner the Australian policy of maintaining a separate Australian fleet. I have not the slightest doubt that what prevented Admiral Yon Spec from bombarding or holding up to ransom ■ all the exposed cities and towns on the Australian and New Zealand seaboard was the presence \ in the South Pacific of H.M.A.S. Aus- j tralia. Before help could have arrived from Europe the mischief would have been done and the Empire would have suffered a tremendous blow. The Australians were right in understanding that naval raids on a large scale are possible and in providir/g a force io meet them. I admire their insight and their patriotism. "New Zealand behaved magnificently. Understanding the risk— as I have not the smallest doubt her Ministers and people did— they none the less allowed the British Admiralty to withdraw from the Pacific and use for work in Europe the splendid battle-cruiser New Zealand, ■which they have provided afc their own cost. But the actual result of that proceeding should be considered. When the New Zealand was withdrawn from the Pacific and employed in Europe, Mr. Churchill claimed that he had added another battlesliip to the navy. That is to say, that but for this withdrawal of the New Zealand, the British Admiralty would have laid down and provided another ship of the same or superior class for work in Europe. So that had the New Zealand people and Government shown more selfishness and refused to let the ship go, the Empire would have had two Dreadnoughts where now it has only one, namely, ono extra ship in the North Sea and the New Zealand in the Pacific. Another point on which I feel very strongly, and which should be borne in mind by th» people of the Dominions should they resolve — as they 1 will if. they are wise—to keep ileet* of ,

their own, is that the ships constructed for them should be the very best and most powerful of each class. This the Australia and New Zealand were not, owing to Ehe reinissness of the British Admiralty. At the date when they were laid down there were far more powerful battle-cruisers building, namely, the Lion class for Great Britain, the Moltke class for Germany, and the Kongo class for Japan. "It is not a sound military principle, and every incident in this war is confirming this statement, to rest content with ships inferior in gun-power and speed to possible antagonists. There has been far too much of this in the past in, the British Navy. The defeat of Admiral Cradock in the Pacific was in large part due to the miserable undergunning of our ships down to the Dreadnought era." THE MEN ON THE SPOT. Commander Carlyon Bellairs, R.N., another well-known authority, writes : — "New Zealand's policy is right if you have a perfect Admiralty and a democracy in the United Kingdom which never forgets and will always apply the lesson of its past history. New Zealand's contribution was meant to represent additional* strength. It was used merely as relief to the British taxpayer. "As for the Admiralty, it gave very bad advice to Australia in 1907. In 1909 it came to an agreement with Australia and New Zealand about a Pacific fleet unit which was on very sound lines. In 1912, and subsequently, it repudiated that agreement, and in 1914 the whole Empire suffered as the result of that repudiation through an inadequate force in the Pacific. The men on the spot are more likely to show a proper appreciation of the need of protecting the extremes of Empire. Having their ships on the spot, they can clear up the business quicker, and so are able to tender the services of their ships the sooner so as to reinforce near the enemy's main fleet. We have had a tremendous division of force to or near to the Pacific simply because in the allimportant critical period of crisis prior to war — the crisis began on 23rd July, the war on 3rd August — we did not have enough ships on this station."