The Daily Telegraph. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1900. THE OUTSIDE WORLD.

Daily Telegraph (Napier), Issue 9938, 8 December 1900, Page 4

The Daily Telegraph. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1900. THE OUTSIDE WORLD.

Once more the cable messages referring to the Transvaal war raise the question of the strength of the Boer forces. Probably most persons will remember the positive manner in which the Agent-General for New Zealand, during the most successful period of the Boer's military operations, and when they were maintaining strong forces in half-a-dozen areas widely removed from each other, asserted that the enemy could not have at the outside more than thirtyfive thousand men in the field. We took the liberty of arraigning the Agent-General's judgment and his sources of information, stating our conviction that the Boers had nearer seventy thousand men finder arms than thirty-five thousand. There is now absolutely no room for doubt that the Agent-General was wrong, and that if the estimate we ventured to oppose to his erred at all it did so on the side of understating the Boer forces instead of exaggerating them. There would be, therefore, no necessity to refer to the matter now if it were only a question of Mr Reeves and his arithmetic, he and it being both discredited in connection with this matter in the minds of all who have cared to know the facts. We draw attention to the subject now in consequence o? the cable message in to day's issue which tells us what the Boers as their present fighting strength. They set it dorm at twenty thousand. Probably there is some exaggeration here. It would be to their interest now, if they still entertain any hope that continued resistance may lead to foreign intervention, to magnify their actual military strength. On the other hand it is open to doubt whether there is any exaggeration of a substantial character. During the last few days the cables have told us of fighting at centres far removed from each other, and in each case the Boers seem to have been fairly numerous. When definite numbers are given we are told of four thousand Boers being engaged in such a fight, of two thousand five hundred in another, of two thousand in yet another, and of marauding bands ranging in strength trom a hundred and fifty up to several hundred mounted men raiding districts separated by considerable distances. In trying to arrive at the probable numbers of the Boer forces at their highest, some importance attaches to the proportion of the British and Boer casualties respectively. In the early days of the fighting the enemy had a formula of " three killed and five wounded " which did duty for news in Pretoria and Bloemfontein when it came to admitting that they had suffered any losses at all. Wherever it became possible for the British to obtain anything like accurate count of Boer casualties they always exceeded those sustained by the British except in three notable instances. Those were Magersfontein, Colenso, and Spionkop. In other battles the losses of the Boers have largely exceeded ours. Many fights gave results approximating to that which took place recently at Reitfonteia, in which the British losses were thirteen killed and fifty-nine wounded, The number of th? Boer wounded is not known,ktit eighty dead Boers were found on the lield, and, as cabled to-day, since then thirty graves containing Boer dead have been found. On the whole it seems a moderate computation to suppose that throughout the whole campaign the Boer casualties have equalled those of the British. To avoid any possibly source of error we will assume that the Boer casualties were only half those sustained by our forces. We had up to the end "of September, in round numbers, forty thousand men placed hors de combat, of whom close upon ten thousand died. If we credit twenty thousand casualties to the Boers, and add to them the sixteen thousand men now prisoners at St. Helena, Ceylon, and in gaol camps in South At'riea, we get a total of thirty-six thousand combatants But then , are now, throughout the T>nsvaal and the Orange River Colon*'~=}x sa J' nothing , of Cape rebels who haCe' ceeded in scuttling home afier against us-—fal!y thirty thousand men not at present fighting, but the bu.'k of whom have borne arms during the last twelve months. Some are on parole, more are deserters-. If we aesutne that there is any ap proaeh to truth in the claims of the Boers now as to their fighting strength, it becomes absolutely c\n ; iaia that the Boers have had during the campaign a total of seventy thou riand men fighting. This view is supported incidentally by the cable message to-day which gives us part of the contents of a rather extraordinary letter found in the Landdrost's office at Bloemfontein, and which speaks of forty-six thousand Transvaalers being sworn to achieve independence or die. By the way, Mr Blignaolt's testi- , ruony is woithy the attention of those , who professed to see in Mr Chamber- ; lain's method of conducting the nego- ■ tiations which preceded the war a desire , to precipitate it. In this connection we may call to mind another important letter, that written by Mr • De Villier.s prior to the war, in which ; he referred to " Chamberlain holding } out the olive branch." This attitude < nn the. part of Mr Chnmbcrlain scorns ,

to have givenjVlr De Yilliers pleasure, although he was surprised that Mr Kruger did not seize the opportunity thus, afforded of ensuring a peaceful settlement. Blignault seems to be a schemer of quite another complexion. He also came to the conclusion that Mr Chamberlain was holding out the olive branch, but he seems to have looked upon that as something to be deprecated, since it threatened to " cheat" the Transvaal Boers out of the war they had set their hearts on as a means for annexing Natal and Cape Colony. Probably Mr Blignault is now of opinion that it would have been a very fortunate thing for the Boers if they had been "cheated" out of their war. In any case his letter is splendid testimony to the bona fides of Mr Chamberlain.

Papers by the last mail- from Europe enable us to state bfiefly but distinctly what is involved in the Anglo-German agreement so far as its provisions have been made known to the various Continental Chancelleries. That it doubtless involves more than is made known is likely enough, bat that aspect of the case must perforce wait. What isgiven publicity to is shortly, as follows :—The British and German Governments, having concluded that it is their duty to maintain their interests in China, and their rights under existing treaties made with the Government of that country, have arrived at an understanding by which they agree to observe, in regard to their mutual policy in China, certain principles. First, it is a matter of joint and permanent interest that the ports on the rivers and littoral of China should remain free and open to trade and to every other legitimate form of economic activiy for the subjects of all countries without distinction, and the two Government agree to uphold the same for all Chinese territory so far as they can exercise influence. Secondly, the two Governments will not make use of the present complication to obtaiu for themselves any territorial advantage in Chinese dominions, and will direct their policy towards maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire. Thirdly, in case of another Power making use of the complications in China to obtain, under any form whatever, such territorial advantages, the two Governments reserve to themselves the right to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be laken for the protection of their own interests in China.

Apart from the clear enunciation of the Open Door policy, the most notable aspects of the agreement are those which relate to the acquisition of territory. It is agreed that the two Governments will not make use of the present complications in China as an excuse for annexation, but that they will on the other hand seek to maintain the territorial integrity of China. So far, so good. But the plain reference to Russia is sufficiently startling. If that Power—or any Power, as the diplomatic wording of the Note embodying the terms of the agreement runs—should utilise th*e present complications for the purpose of obtaining territorial advantages, Germany and Britain reserve to themselves the right to take steps for the preservation of their own interests in China. This leaves it an open question whether Germany and Britain are threatening Russia with war in the event of that country continuing to hold the territory it bad annexed at the time the terms of the agreement were mode public,- or whether Russia Is merely told that if she keeps Manchnria Germany and Britain will please themselves as to trhat share of China they will demand.- The lattei seems the most probable view of the situation, fof that Russia means to remain in Mancbaria* seems as certain as it does that that it would be suicidal policy for Germany and Britain to precipitate a great war in order to try to oust the Czar.