THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON. (FROM THE "TIMES.")

Daily Southern Cross, Volume XIX, Issue 1977, 17 November 1863, Page 5

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON. (FROM THE "TIMES.")

Apart from the interest naturally excited by a struggle bo gallantly supported, we find in the incidents of the siege of Charleston many lessons of the utmost im port'ince to military and naval science. While we are theorizing, the Americans are practising. Our speculation and experiments proceed side l>y side with the actual woik of war across the Alhntip, and it befyqyes us to logo no opportunity qf testing our conclusions by til* results of the experience there gained. Unfortunately, this is not so easy a task as infant be supposed. The American*, from the very beginning of the war, have adhered to one particulm system with little deviation, and this system happens to hive no parallel in ourexperiinents. The comparison fails, therefore, for w nit of homogeneous qualities, Th,e Aineiiqans hiyta not tried our models, and we have mide no trial \\t theiis. Besides this impediment, it is aliqo?t impossible to obtain from the scene of war details of such absolute acmunay M ar<" required for calunlations^ike these. Before we could balance the powers of attack and defence as exemplified in any particular operation, we should demand an exict description of the aima n}»pfc on on.c sic|e and tljo protecting works pi] the Otheri whereas it if usually 'nntertaju wh,at giins aie employed., qr against what defence 1 ! they are directed. We learn the remit* in gemrnl terms, but nothing more. Just noie, however, ue h.ive received ft repo.it which, although jf»vl«g much to be conjectured or inferred, does undoubtedly come} .v remaikable piece of intelligence. It it announced, on the autlioiity of the general in command of the besiegers, that one of the Clmileßton forti — the famous Fort Siuuter— l|{\s bepn prfccf.cally demolished by the flic of batteries at a range of two miles or upward*. This is an eitiaordinai y fent, and as such, perhaps, it seems to li ivebeen regarded by th<- combatant! on both sides. The Feder.d General, Gllmoje makes a special report of it toxins Government, and communicates also an opinion of General Benim gard — a most competent judge — to the effect th it the projectiles employed weip tljo moot destructive ipissilts ever uspd in warfare. But we are not told •What those missiles were. Beyond the genei.il cm pliinent to their effjeiency, «c get little direct iiufoimation, From the terms jn which they are spoken of, we infer that tliey,we.re sheila of sqtne kind, and. not Bi)lj(| •hot, and we also lenm that the bombardment lasted seven days. We collect, too, th it some at least, if not all, of the batteries were armed with 200 pounder Parrott duns, but it is not certain what class or classes of ordnance are coroprixrd in that designation. Of the nuinher of pieces actuary employed a'.'.iinsj the fqi t, jrcjiri day to day, we. bays no authentic return, and though we know that a poweiful squadron took part in the attack, we oannot tell exactly to what extent this Co operation was carried. Above all, we have no sufficient account of the defences of Fmt Sumter. We know that it was in itself an "Id fashioned piece of brickwork, and that it had been recently stiengthened liy ol} tljp additions am) xuppniis, which t]j« ingen,iijty pf tl)e Confederate enginoeiit conld devise. Still, though cotton bales and similar coverings were doubtless nsefiil t *-they could not turn a weak place into a strong one,' and the shells from the Fedeial batteries appear to have pierced the walls through and through. Before we offer any remaika on the operations thus reported, wo «?>*}» tq giye some acpount of another event of the war to which attention has not been sufficiently direoted. A month or two ago a new Confederate ironclad, called the ' Atalanta, 1 came out from Savannah to engage two of the Monitors — the ' Weehauken ' and ' Nehant ' — engaged in the blockai'e of Charleston. The ' Atalanta' was a larger and fjeayiei ves.-e} tf}an «it|)er nf her opponepts, anc) carried six guns, whereas tfye Monitors euicied two each. But the ' Atlanta's ' guns were only Gin. and 7i». g«"^. mounted two on each broadside and two fore and aft, wliilo the guns of the Monitors, carried in turrets, were 15in. pieces, throwing solid «h,otof 4401b.. wek'hr. The Confederate ship commenced the action confidently with her pivot guns, and fired three sl]o£s ftt tfie i Weebauken, 1 liuj; fo Jittle pi^rpose. T^he f Weehaulfan' then replied with one of her monstrous cannon, and this first shot, we are told, '' virtually deoided the action." It tore right through the 'AtalantaY •ide, and knocked down forty of her crew. Four other shots followed, but at the filth discharge the Southerner ran up a white flag, and the liattle w^« ovefi Tt lasted scarcely fifteen minutes, M)(\ was finished before the 1 Ifehant' could get up to take part in it. The incident is reqtirded ji|,t only with a natural gratification on the part of the Federals, but as a convincing proof of the efficiency — which has been somewhat stubbornly contested—of the Bahlgren gun. We cannot deny that the story is a striking one; l>i|^ we happen, OH occasion, t-P knovv something of its Other side, The victors gave a specification of the armament and defences of the captured ship, and it turns out that the four inches of wrought iron plating with which she was armed mean only two layers of iron bars, 2in. thick, placed one over the other. In shoit, she was a teflond Merrimac. and though or-editable, we dare «ay. to the •kill of ehipwright* working under difficulties, can hardly bo regarded as an efficient iron clad. To return, however, to the general question, we find two great principle* steadily preserved in American practice. In artillery, the calibre of the gun and the weight of the shot are made as great as possible ; in shipbuilding, the turret pattern prevails over every other. Theio prinoiplei, too, would appear to be in gome measure connected, if we are to assume— what has not yet been proved —that only turret ships can carry heavy guns. But neither one principle nor the other has yet been recognised in this country. We are building turret ships, it is true, among other models, but we have not given them any preference, while such % thing as a 400-pounder or 500 pounder gun has not oonaeived. Our artillerists, indeed, have explicitly condemned the rlocrine on which the Dahlgren system of ordnance if based— that of throwing heavy projectiles with low velocities— and prefer to lely on velocity 1 rather than weight. It must be remembered, however, ' as explanatory in some degree of the contrast between the two systems, that the Americans are shaping all their efforto acponjjng to Hie exceptional requirements -of » special emergency. They buil'Wheir fehips for coast work and harbour service only. It is by no means ceitain that any one of the ironclads engaged in the seige of Charleston could be sent, to sea with safety. They were intended only for such work' as they have been performing ; wliereas the condition* of «ur experiments are far more extensive, Nevertheless, until our enquiries have been aided by f Hi tl»er evidence, \f would '»P unwise to assume that we a.re right, or that the Americans are wrong. The iron, olads wer« once" beatun off by the Charleston forts. TbtTuar«aovrb«mm»r«*nooeuful; but it itimsas

il the shore batteries left them onhyuriuferiot^ in, the performance. Before we canTorin, however, «mv safo concluiion , it "will he necessty to ascertain, with accuracy, what . means were employed on ench occfisitm hy eithcv siilo, and in what lespocti either tho Attack or defence had improved or degenerated between the first assault juhl the second. ,A t pretent wo see that the assailant* have not only gained considerable advantages, but; have achieved a very remarkable foat. If Fort Smnter were a good specimen of a modern fort, we should say Mint forts had been faiily beaten by guns ; but we know that the fort wa» only a, piece of p itchworlc, and we are by no means sure that it was effectively armed. We therefore »uspend our judgement, and content ourselves with indicating the successive incidents which this war produce* for our insti uction and guidance.