HUNGARY AND EUROPE. (From the Saturday Review.)

Daily Southern Cross, Volume XVII, Issue 1377, 22 February 1861, Page 4

HUNGARY AND EUROPE. (From the Saturday Review. )

There can be very little mistake as to tho meaning of Garibaldi's announcement that Italy must stiain every noive to meet the war which next spring will bring with it, and that a million of Italians will be wanled'in the field. It means war with Austria., a despeiate struggle for "Venetia, and a revolution in Hungary. No programme of the future could be moie openly announced or moie umeaeivedly acted on by all the pai ties whom it concerns. The Italian army, it is said, will Boon contain upwards of two hundred legiments, and every man m every legiment, except peihaps in some of the Neapolitan corps, has only one thought by day and night — how to drive the hated foreigners out of the Quadiilateral. The Continental journals which, m the language current abroad in such niatteis, aie held to be best insphed," agree in asserting that although the Conference at Wai'saw ended in no agreement for immediate action, the Sovereigns disenabled theie came to an understanding that, in the event of a French war and a general insurrection of their subject races, they would go so far in rendering each other aid as to occupy strategical positions in temtories not be longing to the occupying Sovereign. There has been no bargain, we may feel sure, for any intervention like that of Russia in Hungaiy in 1849, but it is not improbable that the allies of Austria have agreed to hold important fortresses for her if she is piessed by a conjunction of the Fiench army and revolutionary troops. Francejis making preparations on a scale nearly equal to that which she adopted on the eve of a great war, when Lord Mnlmosbury expressed himself satisfied that she was doing nothing, and the world was expected to believe that a force sufficient to baffle Austria was going to Cochin China. Everywhere are keaid the rumoui3 of war ; and, unless something as yet unfoieseen occurs to avert it, a war between Austria and Italy is as likely an event as any that can be assigned to 1861. Whether Fiance or the Northern Powers will take part in it is much more difficult to foresee. At first probably both sides may feel inclined to see how Austria will deal with Italy and Hungary. That Italy would have no chance m such a war unless aided by Hungary is freely conceded by the Italians themselves. The very possibility of war, therefoie, lests with Hungary ; and Europe is naturally inclined to ask at this crisis what Hungary wants by war, and how fat her demands aie justifiable. It seems now to be nearly certain that the Austrian charter has failed to conciliate the body of the' Hungapeople. They are filled with a settled conviction that everything conceded by an Austrian Emperor must necessarily be a delusion, and is only intended to obtain by stiatagem what cannot be obtained by force. There was, however, one test of sincerity which they were prepared to accept. Let Hungary be once more what it was before 1848 — let it regain it old Constitution and its old boundaries — and even an Austrian Emperor should be trusted. This was the one simple standard by which all Imperial concessions were to be judged ; and as the concessions actually made fall short of the standaid, the Hungariads have agreed to think themselves deceived. They also think that nothing but the fear of the junction of Hungary and Italy has won any concessions at all, and the stionger they can make this fear the more likely they are to have all they ask. The history of the Hungarian Legion at Naples, and the union of interests between the two countries which so famaus a man as Garibaldi has proclaimed, will add new foice to the ties which bind them to Italy. It u not, indeed, piobable that they really care much for the Italians. If they conld have their own way at home, they would not much unnd trying the chances o! another campaign on the plains of Lombardy. But think that they cannot separate their political cause from that of Italy, and that the two great foes of Austria must stick close to each other. Common opposition will cement the alliance ; and the Hungarians, when their Diet meets, will, on the one hand, use the friendship of Italy to extort new concessions, and on the other hand, will feel bound, both by honour and interest, not to forget the nation that is assisting them If Italy is used to help Hungary in regaining the old Constitution, the old Constftution can scarcely be accepted without means being taken, sooner or latei, to secure the cession of Venetia Europe will not blame either party to the alliance very severely. It is a subject ot great legret that the Austrian Empire deseives veiy little credit for sincesity, but it is a fact, and no one can find fault with the Hungarians for taking precautionj against deception. On the other hand, it will seem very natural that Hungary should aid m the restoration of Venetia Supposing Austria accepts the combat, the world will look on, and only think Austria uncommonly luck if bhe escapes utter destiuction. But it may not impiobably happen that Austna will bend bsfoie the stoim. A veiy gieat and imminent clanger may tempt her to let the Hungarians have their own way, and, in time, perhaps to cede Venetia If this happens, and if Hungary neveitheless insists on hei advantage so as to bieak up the Austrian Emphe, the moial feeling and sound judgment of Euiope will be strongly against her. No criticism has substantially shaken the position that, supposing the Imperial Government had been perfectly smceie, and that honest effoits were made to cairy out a liberal system, the anangement for the Austrian Empire sketched out in tde charter is the best anangement M. Weiss, in his recent Essays on Huugaiy, has, ws think, established this conclusively. Aftei it had been once conceded that a great change in the internal government of Austria was necessary, all the pioposals foi change worth discussing fell vindei thiee heads. Either the old constitutions of the provinces might be lestored unaltered ; or there might be a repiesentative system established for the -whole Empire, and dealing with all subjects ; or the old constitutions might be letained for local pui poses, and a cuntral repiesentative body might meet to decide Imperial questions. The objection to the first was that it was only another phrase for doing away with the Empire. The objection to the second was that a constitution that had no historical foundation would never inspiie confidence in its own vitality, and that there were no men in the country with sufficient political experience to work a bran-new constitution to advantage The third opened a way by which the Empire might be pieserved and yet its kbeities depend on an hibtoncal basis, and by which time might be given for the growth of a good central repiesentative body. The great objection to it was that, as it avowedly speculated on the gradual results, of time, the period that was necessary to let the Bystein ripen might be used to upset it altogether. The Empeior, instead of giving the Council of State year by year a more populai character, migha trick Ins confiding people, as he and his ancestors have tricked them before, and make that body more and more a nonentity. The Hungarians have sought to guard against this danger, and then past experience of Austria may make their apprehensions seem pardonable. But when once they can feel secuie, they must show some reason why they Bhould not adopt the best plan for organizing the Austrian Empire that can be suggested. The cry for the historical Constitution is justifiable if it is to be taken as an expression of their determination not to be taken in ; but it will be censurable if it be protiacted after the fate of the Empire is really in their hands. The example of Italy ought not to delude them. Italy has formed a great State, not broken one up. It has established a settled Government where terror and tyranny created and repressed anarchy. The best thing that can happen both for Austria and Europe is, that on the first meeting of the Hungarian Diet, Austria should come to an equitable and unequivocal arrangement, by which the claims of Hungary hhould be conceded to the utmost limits consistent with the preservation of the Empire, and that guarantees should be given for the speedy formation of a real real representative body at Vienna. Hungary may then repay the debt she will owe to Italy for helping to frighten Austria into good conduct, and may insist so publicly and solemnly on the advisability of ceding Venetia that the Imperial Government will have no choice but to acquiesce. It lies with Hungary, far more than with Austria or Italy, to take oare that this is the issue of the present crisis ; and she will deserve the severest reprobation if she allows passing passion and the excitement of momentary tiiumph to tempt her into a wilful obstinacy that will throw Europe into confusion, and expose herself and her friends to the risk of losing all the advantages of their present position.