OUR ARMED ALLY. (From the Saturday Review, June 12)

Daily Southern Cross, Volume XV, Issue 1167, 3 September 1858, Page 3

OUR ARMED ALLY. (From the Saturday Review, June 12 )

Down to the middle of the present week, the Commission for enquiring into the best means of manning the navy was not yet issued ; and if the Channel Fleet is to take the sea this summer, the existing machinery must be made to serve the neeessaiy purpose. It is not surprising that a feeling of ahinr, which may soon become a pauie, should be rapidly spreading; for the majority of naval officers would probably be ready to avow that France at this moment holds the keys of the Channel. At Cherbourg and the other military ports of France, a force greater, perhaps, than our own is far more readily available. The French ships are fully equipped, tJio supplemental crews are collected in barracks ; and at a few hours notice they could be placed on board in perfect secrecy and safety. The increase of the army, the completion of the Cherbourg railway, and the recent summons to the seamen of the mercantile marine, are all circumstances which, in connection with the unsettled appearance of political affairs, naturally tend to excite uneasiness. The inscription of sailors has been suspended, a«d there may be no present reason to apprehend a rupture or an invasion ; but jt is no tiifling evil that in a time of apparently piofound peace this countiy ihonld be compelled to consider the prudence of arming. The Government may probably have received assurances and explanations which are necessarily unknown to the community at large ; but unless the preparations of the other side of the Channel are speedily discontinued, it will be indispensable, even for the purpose of restoring public confidence, to make considerable additions to the strength of the navy. If a conflict should at any future time unhappily take place the ultimate maritime superiority of England will be conclusively pioved. To a ceitain extent, and in the absence of immediate menace, it may be better to Tely on the consciousness of superior strength than to incur expense and provoke hostility by the constant display of force , but occasion fiom time to lime necessitates precautions against the hu miliation and temporary disaster which might follow a surprise, and the English Government ought to place the country in such a position as to ensure its supremacy at sea on the veiy shortest notice. The political danger may be overrated, but it can scarcely be called imaginary. With our fleet in an efficient staie, Englishmen might look Calmly for the results of movements which are perhaps unintelligible rather from confuiion of purpose than from any inscrutable profundity of design. The apparent understanding between France and Russh, the wilful revival of disturbances in the Turkish provinces, and the French armaments which have been in preparation by land and sea, will be interpreted by different observers in a more or less alaiming sense, according to their various temperments , but the recent policy of the Imperial Government, whether it is significant or unmeaning, is undoubtedly a series of blunders. The French nation was willing to hope that the loss of liberty and of self-respect would at least receive some compensation in the maintenance of confidence and peace , nor is there any population in Europe less willing to incur additional burdens to gratify the ambition of its rulers. The indistinct menace of war, in itself disquieting, will provoke contemptuous indignation if it proves to be idle and ineffective , yet, on the other hand, it is evident that peace can only be disturbed by some wanton and deliberate aggression. The enemies of the Emperor probably do him injustice when they allege that he is obliged to humour the in«olent caprices of the army ; but the letters of the French Colonels, and the assassination of M. de Pene, prove that military license, though it may not be tolerate as a necessity, is kept alive as an available instrument of power. The public feeling is entirely averse to gratuitous schemes of conquest, and national vanity will certainly not be flattered by the exhibition of an aimless and ficlitions pugnacity. The foreign policy of the Empire has been puerile in its unsteadiness since the conclusion of the peace. By skill and good foi tune, France had raised herself fora moment to a position in which she appeared the arbitress ofEuiope; but, although courted by Austria and supported by England, instead of persevering in the policy of war, she suddenly threw herself into the arms of Russia, and began to tamper with the independence of Turkey. The new system is one which has often been recommended by French politicians, but it involves a condemnation of all the expense and loss which were incurred before Sebastopol. France has nothing to offer to her new ally except facilities for conquest in the East ; and yet even the unintelligible efforts to favour the' Belgrade fraud, and to dstach the Principalities from the Ottoman Empire, were but an insufficient compensation for the conquest of Sebastopol and for the treaty of Paris. Russia was perfectly justified in welcoming the new alliance, but France has no eqvivalent to receive for the prostitution of her influence in the East. In peace, the new political combination excites suspicion in every part of Europe, and in the event of a general war, it girdles the Fiench territory with alarmed and irreconcilable enemies. The renewal of the policy of Tilsit would necessarily revive the coalition of Aspern and Wagram ; and perhaps the best proof that no invasion of England can have been contemplated at Paris is supplied by the menacing movements which have placed Germany on its guard. Louis Napoleon's present diplomatic game is a waste of time, as there is unfortunately no stake on the board, but it does little credit to the skill of the player. If the Western alliance, which, according to official statements, is still cordial, were dissolved, there is little doubt that England cpuld select her confederates at pleasure

among the remaining Powprs of Europe ; for even R>nsia would not hesitate to court the friendship of the Stnta which has the greatest opportunity of checking or promoting her aggrandisement. It is not pleasant to discuss the mode of guarding against the hostility of an ostensible friend and ally, but discussions on the national defences become necessary when Fr»nch ships appear in the Adriatic at thn same time that new fortifications are constructed along the Mediterranean coast. It is also destra^e to protest against any ex unrated panic, and it nny safely be averted that no Fiench. Government, except under the influence of madness or of desperation, would, under present circumstances, attempt an invasion of England. If the attack were "made, the result, according to all calculable probability, woald b? to replace the rival nations in the same relative position which they occupied on the morrow of Waterloo. Die strength and resouices of the British empire have been tried on many fields of battle in almost every part of the world, but no nation can put forth its whole energies, except in defence of its noir soil. With the largest inilit.iry and. naval force of volunteers which exists in the world. Engl.uid sometimes presents a disadvantageous contrast to the Continental Povvers fiom the absence of compulsory powert o1"o 1 " enlistment; but if any foreign enemy desires to reliev* us of a self imposed restriction, it is only necersary that his forces should threaten our shores. The first rumours of invasion would give the Government a conscription of a million of men. The sight of a hostile fleet offour dockyards would revive, or rather suoersede the power of impressment; and two hundred thousand trained seamen, on. board innumerable vessels, would laugh at the puny preparations of an enamy who, by making all his maratime resources habitually available, would have exhrusted them in a single campaign. There are steamers enough in the harbours of Great Britain to patrol the Channel as closely as the best watched streets hi London. There are tools, and skilful arms to wield the n, which could convert any fatm in the southern counties in^o an impregnable fortress in a week. Military men may be correct in their opini n that an invading armament might effect a landing ; but little skill or knowledge, except a confidence in tl c apint of the country, is required to prove that every portion at the force would have ultimately to choose between dpafh and surrender. Since the close of the great European war, thhere has never been so large a force of regular troops as that which is now collected within the United Kingdom. The militia regiment still under arms would supply a body of more than 20,000 excellent soldiers, and a large number of those who were recently disbanded might, under the piessure of an invasion, be recalled to their standards in a week. The country which, after forty years of peace, within eight months from a wholly unexpected rupture, landed 54,000 unequalled troops on an enemy's coast 3000 miles from home, would assuredly not fail to defend its own shores in half the time witli double the number of men. It is difficult to dwell on the certainty, not of freedom from invasion, but of victory, without giving way to the tempation of unseemly boasting ; but the enumeration of English resources is an argument in favour of the probability of unbroken peace. The ruler of France is not, as far as he has yet shown, an enemy, nor is he a fool or a madman ; and he is perfectly familiar with the military and naval statistics of all his neighbours and allies. If he is indifferent to the ruin ot his finances, and to the probable overthrow of hhi dynasty, ho may possibly commit the crime of involving Europe in war ; but when his leg'ons demand with, ineristible vehemence employment and plunder, a prudent leader would direct their march North, East, of South, but assuredly not to the inhospitable coasts of the Biitish Channel Thexe are conquests perhaps to be made, or contributions to be exucted, on the Continent, and there is, in case of misfortune, a retreat ; but the narrow seas would, for a defeated army, be harder to recross than the Rhine. q _____