DIVIDED OFFENSIVES

Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 139, 9 March 1943, Page 5

DIVIDED OFFENSIVES

Reported Minimum Of Aid For Pacific (Received March 8, 11 p.m.) NEW YORK, March 7. “Both General MacArthur aud Admiral Halsey have been expected to do a big man’s job with a boy’s equipment,” writes Joseph Harsch, military correspondent of the "Christian Science Monitor.” “American and British service officials have realized this and would like to have sent both commanders greater forces thau they have been able to supply. "However, the Allied plan of strategy was worked out because it was felt that it was absolutely impossible to fight simultaneous offensives both in Europe and the Pacific,” adds Harsch. “To have divided the evenly would have meant futility in each.” Whether the decision to concentrate on Europe first was right or wrong, it had never since been possible to depart from it without jeopardizing everything everywhere. “The decision was made with the expectation that General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey would be able to hold the Japanese at bay while the other campaign was going on,” added Harsch. “There has never been any absence or realization of how much is being expected of them and appeals from ‘down under have beeu accepted as more or less in evitable. But these appeals have not been acted on beyond the minimum estimates of what was necessary to hold that front.

"While there is no doubt that the Japanese have been strengthening their positions throughout the islands north of Australia, these concentra-

tions are still considered in Washington'lto be short of a size sufficient for an offensive attempt against Australia. The assumption here is that the Japanese have decided to concentrale on defence so far as the Pacific islands are concerned.”