STAND FOR PEACE

Dominion, Volume 31, Issue 70, 16 December 1937, Page 14

STAND FOR PEACE

Can Pressure Be Brought Upon Japan? BRITAIN’S PART Hr. W. Arnold-Foster, writing in the "Manchester Guardian” recently, gave his ideas on how the dispute between China and Japan can be brought to a close, and outlined ids fears in the event of a continuance of the present strife. He said: 1. Our proper objective. 1 suggest, should be to stop the aggresion; to stop it not by purely national pressure to defend self-judged national interests, but by collective action to defend the generally agreed rules of peaceful behaviour, and to stop it quickly and with the minimum of lasting injury, but without being deterred by the prospect of expediting the coming economic crash and political revolution in Japan.

This is the objective indicated by our Covenant. It is also the one prescribed by prudence and common sense if we want to be in the position to defend the scattered British Commonwealth. There are those who argue that if Japan is dangerously involved on the Asiatic mainland so much the better for the peace of Australia. There are still some who. even after experiencing the consequences of Sir John Simon [in the Manchuria incident, 1931-321. argue that it is safer not to try to divert the course of “dynamic history” as conceived by the authors of the Tanaka memorial of 1927. But this is not “realism”; it is just a dangerous miscalculation. If Britain were to shirk all share of responsibility for the restraint of violence in such a case as China’s the moral and material means of defending this sprawling Empire against violence will not be forthcoming. But it may be objected: Suppose that we have not sufficient power, .or sufficient resolution, for the big job of stopping the war, would not a lesser objective, the prevention or mitigation of the bombing of cities, be worth while?” Of course it would. But what are the conditions in which we could hope to achieve this more limited purpose? The Japanese Government has declared that its purpose is to “bring China to her knees.’ Aerial terrorism is naturally regarded by militarists everywhere as the cheapest, most effective method of doing whatever terrorism can do. It is conceivable that the Japanese army might be induced, to abandon this particular technique of terrorism; there are plenty of other ways of killing babies less conspicuous than this; but certainly they will not abandon or seriously modify it unless they have to reckon with a pressure so compelling and so quick as to make the gamble not worth while. If the Powers do limit their effort to the prevention of air bombing the result will almost certainly be another tragic exhibition of. selfdeception, worse than in the Spanish ease; Tokio will go on expressing its “solicitude” for civilians, the airmen will go on with their job of “destroying the moral” of the Chinese people, and we, keeping silence about the crime of aggression, .shall nevertheless repeat ineffectual protests', against violations of the rules under which aggression be conducted. Hong-Kong and Shanghai. 2. As for the risks, it is impossible for laymen, without access to the Government’s sources of information, to assess with any exactness the dangers at Hong-Kong and Shanghai, the danger to British ships in the East, and the possibly contingent risks in the Mediterranean. But we can be preUy sure of this: a Japanese occupation of the northern provinces of China, including Peking, would keep the Ear East in turmoil and prolong the paralysis of British trade in Chinese markets. A Japanese conquest would, in effect, make it impossible for us to stay in, or get out of, Hong-Kong except on terms dictated by Japan. As for the League, the risks of inaction. are certainly not less grave than the risks involved in a resolute effort to defend the Covenant by collective action. 3. As for the coercive power on the side of the Powers that might cooperate to restrain Japan, it is ample if oidj r they will use it. If! The British Empire, the United .States and the Hutch Indies between themselves have sufficient economic power in this case to be able to paralyse the war effort within a year without firing a shot. If the war goes on it will be because the British and Americans and a few others have preferred to make blood-money out of continuing to selb to the aggressor material essential for his war, such as iron ore, pig iron, crude and refined oil, nickel and rubber, or because they have gone on financing Japanese war purchases by buying Japanese exports. About half of all the Japanese exports are bought by the British Empire and the United States. It is untrue and unfair to say that we can do nothing because the Americans “won’t play.” How can we dare to say “the Americans will not cooperate” unless we have shown convincingily that we will take risks for “the peace of the nations”? American Feelings.

In February, 193”, at the time of Sir John Simon’s declaration that “however this m'iitter [Japanese aggression] is bandied, I mean to see to it that my country does not get into trouble.’ I was in the United States, and 1 was there again after the betrayal of Ethiopia for over six months, speaking; so 1 had many opportunities of learning how deeply Americans feel that we have let them down and let the League dowp. We cannot expect an American move towards co-opera-tion unless we revindicate our good faith in such a case as this, where American interests and sympathies are considerably involved. 4. What, then, should we do? 1 suggest. these items, as part of a programme to be attempted after due preparation :

(a) Join in noting and condemning the aggression.

(b) Maintain the existing pledges <>f non-reeognition of the conquests. (This must, of course, apply to Ethiopia as well.)

(c) Discuss possible action with the United States, making plain that, effective, restraint is impossible without her, but assuring her also that we shall do nothing which could lie regarded as leaving her "out on the limb,” facing Japanese hostility alone. We ought as far as possible to aet through the League without formally making our action contingent upon the United States following suit. That obviously involves a risk, but it is probably the only way now of recovering American confidence and making the co-operation politically feasible. (d) Withdraw Ambassadors from TokiQ, or, at least, mark the condemnation by a radical change in the style of diplomatic relations. No

more of tliose over-cordial speeches by Sir Robert Craigie.

(e) Work out aud push through at onee a really generous and farreaching scheme of assistance to China. Even if this were confined to purely humanitarian efforts, such as the supply of food and health services, it would be of great value, and such services, backed by the Governments of many nations, could hardly be resisted by the Japanese. The British Government ought to contribute. The American public would probably do so with the generosity it has so often shown in ..such cases. I think this is of enormous importance, morally and politically. In addition, we ought, of course, to send war material to China, but ibis involves much graver risks of clash with Japan.

(f) The League Powers should refuse all exports from Japan, probably without making this eoutingent upon previous American assurances of similar action.

(g) The League Powers should in any case refuse all exports to Japan of war, materials now on the licence list. If we fail to do this we are simply blowing our own Covenant to bits. In addition, they should, after negotiation with the United States, prohibit exports of the vital war materials sueh as iron, oil, rubber, nickel and textile raw materials, 'ifhi.s is the crucial point, the decisive pressure open Io us.