NEGLIGENT DRIVING PROVED

Dominion, Volume 28, Issue 256, 26 July 1935, Page 2

NEGLIGENT DRIVING PROVED

Death of a Pedestrian

SENTENCE TO BE PASSED THIS MORNING

After a retirement of an hour and twenty minutes, the jury in the 'Wellington Supreme Court yesterday returned a verdict of guilty against Patrick Thomas Syron, motor mechanic, charged with negligently driving a motor-car, causing the death of Norman Alexander Anderson. Prisoner was remanded until this morning for sentence.

The Crown, represented by Mr. P. S. K. Macassey, alleged that Syron drove hi's ear from Lambton Quay into Willis Street at an excessive speed and collided with Anderson, who died next day from the injuries received. The car proceeded on its way up Willis Street without stopping. Accused, it was alleged, drove to College Street and from there, it was suggested by the Crown, a friend of his drove the car to Island Bay. The next morning accused went out in a taxi, removed the car to Houghton Bav, and informed the police that it had been stolen. When interviewed by detectives he endeavoured to set up an alibi. His whole story, the Crown alleged, was a concoction of falsehoods. The Chief Justice (Sir Michael Myers) presided. More than a dozen witnesses gave evidence in support of the Crown’s case, which concluded yesterday morning.

The defence did not call evidence. Accused’s counsel, Mr. R. L. A. Cresswell, addressed the jury. Actions of Accused. “Before dealing with the charge against accused I desire to mention, and possibly at some length, one matter which, strictly speaking, has little bearing on the case, but which has been mentioned at considerable length during the evidence, and at such length that I feel, unless you are prepared to exclude it from your minds, except for the limited purpose in which it has a bearing, will prejudice accused’s right to have a fair and proper trial,” said Mr. Cresswell. “I refer, gentlemen, to the evidence of what took place after the accident—namely, the fact that accused failed to stop, and that subsequently he made false statements to the police, and endeavoured to conceal the fact that he had been concerned with the accident.”

Counsel said he submitted, subject, of course, to any direction to the contrary which his Honour might give, that the evidence of what took place after the accident was immaterial to the case in front of them except for two purposes only. Tho first of those purposes was how they might think it indicated, and to what extent it indicated, that accused was aware that he was at fault eo far as the accident itself was concerned. The second limited bearing of accused's subsequent actions was in respect to the degree of credibility that might be placed upon him as a witness, but as he had not given evidence the jury need not be concerned with that point. “Panic-stricken Passenger.”

There were circumstances connected with, his failure to stop and the giving of false statements to the police which showed that his actions, bad as they were, were not so blameworthy as they might possibly appear at first hearing. As to the failure to stop, counsel said, he desired to point out that there was evidence before the jury of a passenger in the car becoming panic-stricken. The passenger not only shouted more than once to accused to drive on, but apparently got hold of him by the neck with the object of enforcing his request. It was submitted that it was easy to imagine the effect of that upon a driver who had just had the tthock of knowing that his car had hit something and of tho windscreen being shattered directly in front of him. Not only Syron himself, but Taylor, another passenger in the car, was also affecteel. Taylor had put on the brake and had slowed down the car 4 no doubt with the intention of stopping it, but, apparently influenced by the passenger who had called out, he released the brake, AU those circumstances, counsel contended, had had the effect of causing accused to lose his nerve altogether and to proceed along the street. Once accused had not stopped immediately alter the accident, he had taken his first false step. He put himself completely in the wrong and the other actions, which had been detailed at length, followed in an endeavour to cover up the traces left by his first false move. Statements Withdrawn. The car was later taken to Island Bay and reported to the police as having been stolen. "You can see in that action, gentlemen. that the influence which it is suggested was over accused still extended to his subsequent actions,” said Mr. Cresswell. “Although the following morning the car was reported as being stolen, the police were obviously sceptical almost from the start of this story. Accused was questioned at great length. He attempted to keep the statement going and set uj> this alibi.” Mr. Cress-well pointed out that neither o£ the statements made ‘by accused were statements on oath; they were simply statements made to the detectives and signed by accused. Before he was questioned on oath at the inquest, he withdrew in a letter to the police the statements he had made to the detectives previously. It was suggested by the Crown Prosecutor, in his opening, that accused bad been influenced in that respect by the fact that the detectives had seen the taxidriver. There was not a particle of evidence before the jury that accused knew the taxi-driver had ‘been interviewed. Points foil- Consideration.

“I submit,” continued Mr. Crcsswell, ‘‘you are entitled to infer that 'ho had in the meantime, possibly after consulting a solicitor, thought 'better of his actions, and that he was not actuated by the motives suggested by the Crown Prosecutor. Although I have endeavoured to put. before you the reasons which actuated accused, I don’t in any way seek to defend his actions after the accident, nor do I propose to mention them further in any way, except incidentally; the charge against him which you have to decide is not whether or not he failed to stop after the accident, or whether or not he made false statements to the police, but whether he is or is not criminally responsible for the death of this unfortunate pedestrian. Counsel said his apology for referring nt such lengtli to the subsequent acts of accused was a tear that if the jury allowed a feeling that he should bo punished for those acts to influence them in any way in arriving at their verdict, an injustice might be done to accused. He submitted that before they could convict accused they must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that accused was negitgen t. Mr. Cresswell reviewed the, evidence, and submitted that the allegation of excessive sp"od mid of negligence had not been estn'b’is'hcd. The jury retired at 1.15 p.m., and returned at 2.40, with a verdict of guilty.