The Dominion TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1925. THE CASE AGAINST THE SUBMARINE

Dominion, Volume 19, Issue 45, 17 November 1925, Page 8

The Dominion TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1925. THE CASE AGAINST THE SUBMARINE

Tragedies like that which has overtaken the British submarine Ml provide in themselves a potent argument in favour of the abandonment of naval underwater craft. The experience of the Great War suggested on the whole that submarines are not very effective weapons against surface fighting ships * Even in peace time, however, deadly risks certainly are faced by those who man and operate the underwater craft. ■ ■. Ml is the fourth British submarine lost with all hands since the war came to an end, and as the chairman of Lloyd s (Mr. Mackinnon) observed in a statement cabled to-day, all the great maritime nations have suffered heart-breaking losses of submarines. In September last, an American submarine was accidentally rammed and sunk off the Atlantic coast. In the same month an Italian submarine met with a similar fate in the Adriatic. Japan lost one submarine in August,' 1923, and another in March last year This is an incomplete list of submarine disasters since the war, but as it stands it indicates, very clearly that the percentage of these craft lost is very much greater than in the case of surface ships. It is only too obvious that the officers and men of submarines are engaged in a forlorn hope service and are liable at any time to be. overtaken by a terrible death. The elimination of submarines is advocated, not only as a means of averting a heavy loss of gallant lives, but on the broadest grounds. The total abolition of submarines was proposed by Great Britain at the Washington Conference in 1921. In supporting the proposal, Lord Lee (then First Lord of the Admiralty) pointed out that in the Great War German submarines had caused the death of a large number of innocent civilians, and had destroyed merchant ships and cargoes to an enormous value, but that no fewer than 15,000,000 British troops had crossed and recrossed the English Channel and not one man had been lost from action by submarines except on board hospital ships. , In fact (Lord Lee added) the U boat, whether considered as an offensive or defensive weapon against any sort of organised naval force had proved almost ■ ju light of the experience of the war, Loid Lee contended that since the submarine, as it was used by Germany, had been effective only against civilians, and not against naval or military foices, its abolition was demanded in the interests of civilised warfare. The British proposal was opposed by the representatives of France, Italy, and Japan. Mr. Hughes (then American Secretary of State) laid he was no l ready to announce the position of the United States, but read the report of an American Advisory Committee which favoured the retention of submarines. All the Powers represented at the Conference agreed, however, in denouncing such a use of submarines as Germany made in the Grat War. In his report to ’’ New Zealand Gover. v it, after representing this country at the Washington Conference, the late Sir John Salmond said that although the British arguments did not prevail at the Confeience, they made a considerable impression on public opinion, and it is not unreasonable to hope that at some future time, before the memory of the Lusitania lias faded from the public mind, the total prohibition of submarine warfare may find a place in the law of nations. In the meantime, although the unrestricted building of submarines is still allowed, severe restrictions upon the use of such weapons have been imposed by another of the Washington TlVtreaty to which Sir John Salmond referred is one of those since ratified by America, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan In this document the Powers named recognised the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in the recent war of 1914 18, the requirements universally accepted by civilised nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and non-combatants. Bor themselves, the five Powers accepted the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce-destroyers, and they invited all other nations to adhere to this prohibition. . Although the British proposal was rejected, the Powers were thus to a considerable extent in agreement regarding submarines at the Washington Conference in 1921. Experience since that time seems to give little support to the idea that submarines are valuable and indispensable weapons of naval warfare. Ihe nations are now concentrating with new faith and hope on the question of limiting armaments, and it seems possible at least that at another conference the decision of 1921 which permitted the unrestricted building ot submarines may be reversed.