The Dominion THURSDAY, APRIL 18, 1918. THE DEVELOPING STRUGGLE

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 179, 18 April 1918, Page 4

The Dominion THURSDAY, APRIL 18, 1918. THE DEVELOPING STRUGGLE

Most of yesterday's reports denting with the battle area in Northera France and Flanders were decidedly optimistic in tone, and indicated a general belief that the second great thrust of the German offensive had expended its force. The impression thus created iB much modified by the news that the Germans have captured ■ the greater part of tho Mcssines Itidgc, together with a limited area of rising ground further west, from Bailluet to Ncuve Egliso. Prior to those events the enemy's failure to advance from low to high ground wan a conspicuous feature of the situation, and ono that heavily discounted his success in penetrating tho British line. Ho had driven forward a, deep salient, with its apex no more than five miles distant from the important road and railway centre of Hazebrouck, but the neck of tho salient was menaced 011 either side by commanding bastions—on tho north by the Mcssines Ridge and on the south by the Vimy Ridge and tho adjacent defence* which curve round west of La Bassoc. So long as these conditions were maintained the enemy was at a somewhat serious _ disadvantage, whether from the point of view of continuing his thrust or of resisting an Allied counter-stroke. Confined to tho low ground, lie was to some extent handicapped in using his artillery, and the British forces retained almost a monopoly of the advantages of artillery cover and observation which go with the possession of dominating elevations. It is plain enough that by his latest achievement the enemy has in certain directions altered these conditions to hiis own advantage. Ho lias widened and strengthened his salient and correspondingly improved his prospects of extending his advance. The Messines Ridge is of capital importance in the Flanders campaign. It constituted a powerful pillar in the enemy's defensive front until it was' stormed last year by the British Second Army, which then included the New Zealand Division, in one of tho most brilliantly-conducted battles of the war. Its recovery by the enemy means not only that, 'prospects of a successful thrust against the northern flank of his salient have been lessened, but that he is very much better placed' than he was to undertake an extended invasion of the iow country in rear r ! the Flanders ridges which remain in British hands.

To look at matters only'from tins standpoint, however, would almost certainly be to reach a false conclusion. It is manifest that if the Allied armies fully extended, and with all available reserves in action, had sustained such a reverse as is implied in the loss of the Messincf, Ridge, the outlook would be dark indeed. But this is far from being the actual state of affairs. As inlormation stands the enemy in this battle is using a very much larger proportion of his total forces in attack than the Allies are using of their total forces in defence. Certainly, desperately as the battle is being contested, the Allies arc not as yet throwing anything like their full weight "into the balance. For the time being it is left to a part of the British Army to deal unaided with the enemy's savage thrust towards the railways to the coast. Practically the whole French Army is momentarily standing fast, and the, same holds good of a not inconsiderable part of the British Army, together with whatever American forces are as yet available,' and the Belgians. Leaving aside the- question of relative strength,- in regard to which no really conclusive evidence is available, it is obvious that if the Allies regarded it as absolutely vital 1.0 stem the enemy's present offensive at all costs they

would before now have thrown much greater forces into the scale. That fheyjiavc not done, so suggests possibilities and a. point of view clearly stated to-day by a. Renter correspondent. He observes that Gkneral Foch, in the closest co-opera-tion-with Sir Douglas Haio, ; s aiming not only at arresting' the enemy but at a counter-attack which shall defeat the Germans. Therefore, within certain limits, it j s sound policy to allow the Germans to spend their surplus power as lavishly as possible until they are reduced to equality or even inferiority. There is much in the existing situation to give weight to these suggestions. The British forces in the battle area arc subjected meantime to an appalling strain—its nature is indicated by Sir Douglas Haio when he observes in a message to Loud French that they are sustaining a conflict against ''overwhelming odds"—but it does not rest finally with them alone to cope with tho enemy's onset. Sooner or later the Allies will throw their whole weight into the scale, and, while the outcome is not to be foretold, it is evident that the more deeply'the enemy is involved in his attempt to crush the British Army the more vulnerable will he be to the Allied counter-stroke "when it develops. At the moment everything depends upon the valour and endurance of tho British troops opposing the enemy in Northern France raid Flanders, but more than their valiant resistance stands between tho enemy and the goal of his desires. As the correspondent just quoted remarks, the Germans have thrown down their cards, but Foch has yet" to show his hand. What his hand contains events must show, hut meantime, while we are bound to recognise. that the situation in tho northern battle area looks desperately critical, it counts for much that the Allied Generalissimo, with great forces at disposal and not at present activoly engaged, is calmly awaiting his momenjp-