PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 77, 24 December 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

a A military commander is no moro immune from criticism than any other servant of the State, but lie ought in justice to bo immune from irresponsible criticism, moro especially since ho docs nob enjoy the freedom accorded to a politician in replying to critics or detractors. Apart altogether from the Question of justice to an individual _ commander, it is extremely undesirable that any attempt should be made except on serious sufficient grounds to shako the faith reposed in him by the armies under his command and the nation which bo serves. Apparently these very important considerations wore ignored by Commander Wedgwood, M.P., in the attack on Sir Douglas Ham which is reported to-day. The incident would probably deserve little notice but for the fact that an unthinking section, to be found in every community, is always ready to give ear, particularly in critical times such as we are now experiencing, to disparaging criticisms d men who carry a heavy load of responsibility. Criticism in itself unwarranted, and falling far short of its target, may yet do a considerable amount of harm in undermining public confidence. In the present case it is the business first and foremost of tho British War Cabinet to determine whether or not Sir Douglas Haig is worthy of continued confidence, and obviously the functions of the.War Cabinet should not be invaded except on very dofinite grounds. Instead of providing such grounds, Commander Wedgwood, as he is reported, relied on unconvincing generalities which distinctly exceed tho bounds x of legitimate criticism. In promising to bring the "points" raised by Commander Wedgwood to the attention of the highest authorities, the Parliamentary Secretary to the War Office made a reply presumably intended to be conventional and non-committal. Any impression that tho War Cabinet is exercised in mind over the question of leadership raised will be corrected by recalling that Mr. Lloyd George took occasion not long ago, as liead of the War Cabinet, to express his complete confidence in the leadership of Sir Douglas Haig. It may be said confidently, and without in any way overlooking late events on tho Cambrai front, that there is not the slightest reason to suppose that anything has since occurred to cause the War Cabinet to deviate from the opinion thus emphatically expressed by its presiding head. 1 *, * * * The first contention raised by Commander Wedgwood—that Sir Douglas Haig is wrer-optimist-ic— is presumably a reference to the unrevised intervicw_ with the Com-mander-in-Chief which was published in the early part of this year. The leading prediction made by Sir Douglas Haig on that occasion was that this year would see the military defeat of the enemy made manifest, and in spite of tho defection of Russia the prediction has been verified. It is now abundantly clear' that the Central Empires have lost the war unless the Allies weaken in their present determination. Sir Douglas Haig 1 , it is true, spoke of the possibility that the year of victory might also be tho year of peace, and, while this statement was guarded, there is ni Hflbt tTiat he looked to larger

results than have actually been achieved. If in this lie was unduly optimistic, he erred in company with Mk. Lloyd George .and most others who were in a position to found an opinion on seemingly reliable e.vidcnco before Russia fell out of the fight. The statoment that, as a cavalry officer, Silt Douglas Haig believes ft possible to uso cavalry in breaking through the enemy lino hardly seems to deserve much attention in view of the magnificent achievements of the British infantry and artillery under his command. Tho principal armies engaged in this war all include a strong forcc of cavalry, and there is no evidence that in the British Army cavalry has been increased to tho detriment of other arms. Commander Wedgwood's final pointthat when a largo army did not fulfil expectations the best way to restore its morale was to change its head—must be condemned as a grossly unjust and unmerited slur, not only upon Sir Douglas Haig, but unon the armies lie commands. The British armies in France and Flanders_ have in fact accomplished marvels in spite of tho addition of unforeseen difficulties to those which were in sight when the year opened. The facts aro epitomised by Mr. Lloyd Geokge in the speech reported to-day. Observing tnat it would bo idle to pretend that hopes entertained at the beginning of the year had been realised, he adds that "the disappointment was attributable entirely to the Russian collapse." Made as it is with full authority, tins statement is in itself a very * complete refutation of Commander Wedgwood's fault-finding and ungenerous criticism.

It is probable that tho inspiration of the attack now made upon Sir Douglas Haig was supplied not by the general course of events on tho Western front, but by the _ recent operations opposite Cambrai, In its total scope the Battle of Cambrai was an important British victory, but some of its developments _ lend themselves to exaggerated criticism. In the first phase of the battle tho enemy line was penetrated deeply and at remarkably light cost. _ At the present moment the British troops are in full possession of ths enemy's main and supporting defences opposite Cambrai—a junction only less important, amongst those which closely support tho German front, than Lille—and the enemy is loft to improvise positions, and defend them, in unfavourable ground, much of it under dominating fire. Yet because the Germans contrived to recover some of the initial British gains—at first by a surprise counter-stroke which gained local and temporary success, and subsequently by a series of exceedingly costly counter-attacks^—all sorts of suggestions have been made that the battle went badly from tho point of view of tho attacking army. These suggestions aro not in harmony with visible facts. Whatever may bo truo in regard to details, the balance of advantage in this great battle turned heavily and unmistakably in favour of tho British, and in its bearing on the broad development of tho Western campaign it confirmed tho ruling trend 1 'in which Germany is travelling stead-, ily towards defeat. **.*■*

At time of writing the course of events between the Brenta and tho Piavc, whore the Italians have for weeks been stubbornly defenrt/ing a narrow belt of mountain country on the northern flank of their line, is not quite clearly defined. Some days ago tho AustroGermans captured a mountain position in this area—Monto Asolone— which, according to Mr. Ward Pkice, represented a step towards outflanking the Grappa massif, a vital bulwark to the Italians, and also onablcd tho'enemy to overlook a section of tho Italian communications. A Rome message quotes the Minister of Munitions as announcing tho recapture of Monte Asolone, but the latest Italian communique in hand states only thai portion of the ground lately lost in this region has been recaptured. It is clear at all events (in spite of enemy denials) that the Italians are' .counter-attacking with some success in the area in which the Austro-Germans have recently developed their heaviest attacks. »** . *

The interesting point about today's news from Russia is the general agreement of correspondents that Lenin, Trotsky, and their anarchist comrades have almost reached the end of their.tether. There is io reason to doubt that a counterrevolution is in prospect. Lenin and" his faction got into power hy making • extravagant promises,_ and are now faced by a disillusioned and starving populace. It of courso adds to their difficulties that portions of Russia' in which_ food is fairly plentiful aro defying their authority. Any new Government will inherit most of the difficulties which promise to bring disaster to the Bolshcviki, but the removal of the schemers who have _ acted throughout as Germany's instruments would be a decided gain.

No big events are reported today in the Western theatre, but a noted French writer adds, another to tho numerous predictions made of late that Germany will presently attempt a great offensive on the West front. It is a point worth considering in this connection that such a move by the enemy would strikingly vindicate the policy under which the Allies have concentrated all possible force in the Western theatre. This policy has been criticised at times and with somo apparent force as unduly narrow, and in some respects shortsighted, but if the enemy can make no better use of tho relief he has gained in Russia than to attempt a contest at unequal odds in the Western theatre, the policy of the Allies will be justified in its results. There are in fact, however, many other possibilities of enemy action in sight than that of a forlorn-hope offensive in the Western theatre.