MESOPOTAMIA BLUNDERS

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3122, 28 June 1917, Page 5

MESOPOTAMIA BLUNDERS

REPORT OF ROYAL COMMISSION AMAZING MUDDLEMENT DISCLOSED TRENCHANT CENSURE OP THOSE RESPONSIBLE THE KUT DISASTER (Rec. JiMie 28, 0.10 a.m.^ London, June 27. The report o{ the Mesopotaraian Commission, constituting anothor historic war document, has been issued as ft Blue Book, consisting of 188 pages.' It deals comprehensively with the operations through tlio various stages of the advance on Bagdad, and incidental happenings, and examines at length the C[ues-' tions which havo given rise to public criticism. Tho Main Report, embodying the findings, conclusions, and recommendations, is signed by all the coiumissioners except Commander Wedgwood, M.P., who presented a dissentient report Justifiable Enterprise. Tho commissioners find that the expedition was a justifiable military enterprise, but the division of responsibility between the India Office and the Indian Government was unworkable. The scope of the expedition's objective had never ■been sufficiently defined in advance, lhe report also criticises the Commander-in-Chiefs or his representative's' failures periodically to visit Mesopotamia, .lhe advance on Bagdad in October, 1015, was an offensive movement based on political' and military miscalculations, and attempted with tired and insufficient forces and inadequate preparation.

Who was Responsible for Kirt? It Tesulted in the disaster at Kut-el-Amara. The weightiest shnro of the responsibility for this untoward advance lies with Sir John Nixon, whose confident optimism was the mainl cause fortbo decision. Others responsible in the order of sequence, were the Viceroy (Viwount Hardinge), the Commander-in-Chief (bir Beauehamp Duff), the Military Secretary to the India Office (General Sir Edmund Barrow, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, the AVar Committee, and Cabinet, llie Commission points out that the last two were responsible as political heads, who cannot secure complete immunity through adopting their expert subordinates wrong advice. The general armament and equipment were quite insufficient to meet the needs of the whole system. Ino commissariat was tally organised during the period of the Indinni Government's responsibility, though there was no general breakdown. The Simla anthopties bestowed meagre attention and llliberaL treatment to the expeditions wants during 191M5. The supply of reinforcements was not sufficient. The Relief Operations. In connection with the advance on Bagdad and the Kut-el-Amara relief operations, the Indian military authorities did not sufficiently realise from _the first the paramount importance of river and railway transport in Mesopotamia, and their responsibility is grave. Sir John Nixon is responsible for recommending the 1915 advances with insufficient trans-, port and equipment. The- transport shortage at the beginning of 191G rendered the TCut-el-Amara relief operations fatal. -. . • Dealing with the medical provision, the Commissioners declare that this was not sufficient from the beginning, and ultimately resulted in a lamentable breakdown after the battles of 1915-16, and most lamentable and severe suffering The Brighter Side. The Commission, in apportioning blamo to the Indian Government for, its inefficiency in the management of the Mesopotamian campaign, recognises thenanxieties in other quarters. The Commissioners declare that notwithstanding the jieriod of reverses, the success of the campaign as a whole has been remarkable It asserts that in many parts of the world in which the Allies are engaged no more substantial results or more solid victories have been achieved. In conclusion, 'the Commission seriously censures the Indian Government for its lack of knowledge and foresight, as shown in the inadequacy of its preparations, and its laok of readiness to recognise and supply the deiiciencies.-Aus.-N.Z. Cable Assn.—Renter.