The Dominion THURSDAY, APRIL 19, 1017. THE WAR OUTLOOK

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3057, 19 April 1917, Page 4

The Dominion THURSDAY, APRIL 19, 1017. THE WAR OUTLOOK

It "is necessary that certain broad •facts . ofthe war should be kept steadily in mincl if the real significance .of such events'as have lately been astir .in the Western theatre is to be intelligently grasped. To consider these 'events only in their immediate aspect is' to forget the place they occupy in a great military plan, ; and so to overlook their real significance. For instance, a popular, but erroneous, .way of measuring progress .in the Western campaign is to take account of the ground gained ,by the Allies and the consequent reduction of the area in German occupation. It cannot be too' often or too strongly emphasised that this point of vie\v is in many respects unsound, and that a much broader outlook is nccessary if the actual position reached in the war is to be appreciated. With an Al- : lied tactical offensive -in full swing in the Western theatre, and a' bat J tie, described in a German report as one of the greatest of this mighty war, and therefore in the history of the world,-in progress on the Aisne, it' is quite possible that the .enemy armies may be compelled to speedily yield further ground in order to maintain an unbroken front. The numbpr of square miles of invaded territory redeemed may be multiplied within, the next few weeks, but this in itself will not afford a measure of Allied progress. 1 On : the contrary, the success that has lately attended the Allied operations appears most notably not in their having compelled the enemy to retreat, the fact that they have forced him out of his fortified positions and impeded and delayed his retreat, compelling him to fight great battles which promise to extend and expand. A shortening of front in itself, and apart from the losses it entails, is advantageous to the enemy from a military point of . view. He would be in the best position on the West front' which his circumstances now admit if his armies had been withdrawn unbroken to the relatively short frontier line which is no doubt the_ goal of his hopes. As an English military writer remarked recently, it is a mistake to suppose that the disposition of the enemy's forces in the West, spread out along nearly five hundred miles of front, is for defensive purposes an advantageous disposition. It is to the last degree disadvantageous, alike from the length of front and its conformation. In fact, it must be assumed that but for the military peril the _ operation would involve, and the importance he attaches to tho factor of moral effect, the enemy, in face' of the increasing pressure from tho Allies, would long'ago have withdrawn his armies to a better defensive line. During tho last few weeks the progress made by the Allies has at times arrested attention, not because so much ground'has been won from the enemy, though this, of course, iB important enough, but Because the possibility has'appeared of an invasion of German' communications which would mean the envelopment of German armies. The possibility remains in sight, but whether or not a decision is hastened by an event of this kind the Allies are approaching a decision at a rate which is very far from being measured by the recovery of so many miles of territory from the enemy. Short of a decisive penetration of the enemy 'front leading to envelopment of his forces on a large scale the achievement of the Allies which counts and will continue, as their offensivo develops, to carry them nearer to victory is that of rapidly expediting the reduction : in' the enemy's effective strength which has been their aim since the war began. This will not seem a limited or narrow view to anyone who has grasped the broad features of the plan to which the Allies arc working. The task tbey have set themselves is not to advance - or gain ground at. any particular point. It is. in. one word to so weaken the great fortress which the Germans have established with lines thrown far forward into Allied territory, and 'to so distribute tho forces avail-

' able for its defence, that the structure will no longer stand. On this point a well-known authority has pointed out that Allied strategy, based on naval power, has from the first pursued on land a series of well-defined aims. The first was the division of the enemy forces. Not merely was that division speedily imposed, but as the war went on the enemy had no choicc but to adopt plans which have emphasised the division. To-day the division is more &ven and under the pressure of necessity more stereotyped than at any time. But division of the enemy forces was only a means towards the further aim of, wearing him down which the Allies have pursued on the whole consistently, and with only minor deviations, during the past two and a half years. The success of their efforts and the wisdom of their strategy are 'manifest in the fact that 'the -enemy's former superiority in embodied military power is a thing of the past "When his aggressive efforts to seize upon victory had failed the enemy fell back upon the hope that his fortified fronts would prove impregnable, or that the Allies would find it impossible to break them save at prohibitive cost. The fallacy of these-hopes has been exposed, not only in France, but in the Italian. theatre, and-notably in the great Russian offensive of last year. Events have very clearly demonstrated that no position will stand against a well-directed attack unless it is held by-a superior forco of men and guns. The enemy fortress has been proved vulnerable. Its garrison is desperately weakened and is less able now thanit has ever been to concentrate effectively in defence of any threatened point. The enemy his no hope of altering these conditions to his advantage, and there is no reason to suppose that he will .gain material relief by his campaign of frightfulness at sea. The inauguration of this campaign, with its total rejection of all civilised restraints, and its wild-beast defiance of the neutral world, in itself demonstrates how low Germany's hopes have fallen where land warfare is conccrncd. In the conditions that exist the enemy is manifestly in the position of defending a fortress doomed to fall. And although it is undoubtedly in the "West that the greatest and most effective blows will bo sti'U jk' by the Allies in the development of their tactical offensive, events in that'theatre must be considered; not' from, any local standpoint, but as they contribute to the conquest of the enemy' fortress as a whole. The enemy's defeat in the Western theatre, developing now in the greatest conflict the war has yet witnessed, is of far more than local significance. It betrays a general military decline /which spells opportunity for the Allies in all theatres, and in which the enemy's ultimate fate is very plainly written. At the same time it is necessary to recognise that the progress of thei Allies towards victory will not be measured by the speed at which the French 'and British' Armies approach the Bhine. If the Western Allies succced in a great enveloping manoeuvre the war will be shortened. Failing that achievement they will most rapidly approach decisive victory by compelling the enemy to fight at maximum intensity with, a minimum shortening of line. '