PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3005, 16 February 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

$ .In its details the statement by Sir Douglas which is tlio chief item of news to-day, calls for littlo comment. Whatever the 'Commander-in-Chief's immediate motive may have been for speaking so frankly, his words will carry weight wherever they penetrate; certainly they will carry weight in neutral countries, and perhaps not least in the countries of the enemy. .TTor ptacjiicai purposes the _£iiߣ.

that chiefly matters is that tSiti Douglas Haici would assuredly not have spoken as he has done without feeling very sure of his ground, i His assurance- that the German lino will be broken at many points, and that the trained armies and the cavalry ol the Allies will convert the eiicmy defeat into a rout, is based upon an accurate knowledge of the situation in all its details, and may be accepted accordingly in full confidence. It is to this end that the Allies have shaped their plans since tho early days oE the war. Tho dominating fact of the situation is that the Allies, thanks to the development of superior resources, are capable of an expanding effort upon which GcrmaDy cannot possibly retort in kind. Germany has staked her fortunes, not upon an expanding effort, but upon tho resisting, power of a fortified front. In itself this front_ is tremendously formidable; but its fall, which we are now told on the best possible authority is in near prospect, will mean to her ruin and defeat, while to tho Allies it will mean the restoration of a war of movement and tho dawn of victory. It hardly needs to be emphasised that an army which has concentrated its whole energies upon an attempt to hold a fortified lino will necessarily bo in the worst possible condition to continue the contest when that line is broken and overthrown. The Allies, on tho other hand, have shaped their plans for this event, and in their case the restoration of a war of movement will bring scope; and opportunity which they arc prepared to turn to full account. • * •» » ' *

A year ago tho news of troop movements in Germany, and, of measures that are being taken to restrict ordinary services and suspend ordinary passenger services on the German railways, would havo indicated that Germany was on the eve of some great military adventure. Possibly oven-at this time it points to some new move in contemplation. But if there is one thing more certain than another, it is that Germany can no longer alter the general military situation materially to her advantage by any transfer or redistribution of her available forces. Interior lines are always an asset, but in the case of Germany and her. allies they are an asset which has lost inuch of the value it held in trio earlier days of tho war. In some respects, of course, the value of interior communications is permanent. Tho German armies in Russia, for instance, are in much closer- and more convenient touch with their bases and depots than are the Russian armies to which they stand' opposed, so far as the latter armies are dependent upon external supplies, from Western Europe and. from America. But tho days have ended when Germany was free to concentrate at will in one main theatre or the other and from this point of view the value of her interior .communications has largely vanished. It is not of much use to have means of rapidly transferring troops from Russia to France, or vice versa, if an imperative demand for reinforcements exists simultaneously in both theatres. To this condition Germany was reduced as long ago as last summer. Her reply to the great Russian offensive was feeble and ineffective, for the good and sufficient reason that long before the Russian effort waned tho Allies had loosed their thunderbolt on tho Somme. This year the Gorman armies will be oven more effectually immobilised than they were last summer, and no amount of transport activity, real or pretended, will alter the fact. If Germany, is intent upon making the first move in the West, we havo Snt Douglas Haig's word for it that the Allies are ready for her and will make her pay dearly for her folly.

An appreciation of tho enormous expansion in the British production of munitions and artillery, to which Sir Douglas Haig alludes, is assisted by some particulars which wero published at the end of December by tho London Times. Tho following quotations speak for themselves:

Wo are now manufacturing in 81 days the number of 75 millimetre (18-poundor) shells which wo were producing during lho s first year of tlio war—August, 1911, to August, 1915. The same quantity of projectiles for field howitzers is being supplied in eisrht days; of projectiles for medium guns and howitzers in 54 days, and of projectiles for heavy guns and howitzers in a. little moro than one day. TJio number of shells completed or tilled during tho week November 10-26 this year (1916) exceeded by about thirty per cent, tho stock of munitions held in reserve at tho outbreak of hostilities. . < Dealing with guns in tho samo way it is found that, representing the number of guns manufactured (luring tlio first year of war by 100 tho following splendid result 'has been secured:— Four niths. First Second to Nov. year. year. 29,1916. '■ISpdr WO 2-tfl *5. 4.5 in 109 651 101 Medium (60-pdr. ' - and 6in.) 100 . 18-18 1200 Heavy (over 6m.) 100 623 363 Tho manufacture of 18-poundcr guns has had to be slackened during the last period, the equipment of the British Armv in. light field pieces being approximately complete. . . . The establismont of pieces of '1.5-inch eulibro is also complete. Tho improvement in the manufactureof machine-guns, rifles, grenades, and explosives has been cuuully satisfactory. If the total number of machine-guns delivered to the Army during the first year of tho war bo represented by 100 tho total could bo represented relatively by 1250 at the end of the second year and by 2000 on December 2, 1916. Taking as a base the weekly production of macbinoguns in November, 1915. and representing it by 300, the corresponding figure for tho weekly production in November, 1916, would bq «0. Tho increase m the manufacture ol oxplosives lias been extremely rapid. For every ton of explosivo employed m September 1914, 350 tons were employed in Julv 1015, and from 11,000 to 12,000 toils in iTulv, 191(5. , •Between May, 1915, and May, 1916, there was a 33-fold increase, in bombs ami a 150-fold increaso in tho weight of the contained explosive. #

The production of artillery and munitions on the scale demanded by tho war was taken in hand in France at an earlier date than in Great Britain. In Italy also the development of war industries is far advanced. Russia, though an industrially backward country, has made great strides in tho homo production of munitions, and is importing enormous supplies from abroad. These facts, in conjunction with # the progress of British production, leave it in no doubt that the Allies have established a lead in the matter of material supplies which tho enemy will never overtake, and which will be a big contributing factor to his defeat. Of all the Allied countries, Russia alone is at. a certain disadvantage where material supplies are concerned, and in regard to Russia Gbnbrai.-Brusi-r,oFK stated not long ago that her armies would this year meet those of the enemy on a footing of equality in the matter of material. Ibia statement mas, palljor zeserva-

lions in regard lo heavy artillery and some, other items, but if Germany opens this year's campaign in the East with a superior forco of heavy artillery she will probably do it at a sacrifice, of fighting power in the Western theatre which she can ill afford.

Almost the only important episode in the land war reported at time of writing is an outburst of fighting in the mountain country of Southern Bukowina, which has resulted for the time in a limited loss of ground by the Russians. In this region the 'latter have closely approached the main range of the Carpathians. The Kimpolung-Jacob-leni road, mentioned in a cablegram,' crosses the range- from Bukowina into Hungary. The powerful enemy attacks before which the Russians fell back two-thirds of a mile may be regarded as an attempt to stave- off the danger of an invasion of North-eastern Hungary. An invasion in this quarter, as it developed, would threaten the communications of the enemy armies operating in Rumania, and. no doubt the enterprise has attractions from the point of view of the Russians. At tho same time they are hardly likely to seriously embark upon an invasion of Hungary from Bukowina until tho enemy is heavily engaged elsewhere.

A certain amount of fighting has lately been reported on tho Macedonian front, but it docs not seem as yet tp have developed upon a scale at any great importance. A German report on tho subject today is chiefly interesting as liientioning_ the presence of Italian troops in the Cerna salient, cast of Monastir. This section of the front was formerly occupied mainly by Serbian troops, supported by French artillery. If it has been taken over by the Italians, the implication would be that the latter have been •considerably reinforced and have been enabled to take over a longer section of the Macedonian front.