PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3004, 15 February 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

A point seems to have been reached in Mesopotamia at which tho enemy is imminently threatened with a heavily damaging defeat. l''or some weeks the British offensive has been developed methodically, and with continuous success, and an official message to-day states that a Turkish force has been completely hemmed in and driven back to its last lino of trenches in a bend formed by tho Tigris west of Kut-cl-Amara. Tho bend extends from Shumran to Xut. These places are five miles apart, in a direct line, but the river between them follows a course of nine miles. Measuring five miles across from east to west, tho area within the bend has a maximum depth of about three miles from, north to south. Tho right flank of the British force rests on the Tigris opposite Kivb. Its left flank also touches the south bank of the river,' apparently in tho vicinity of Shumran. It will be noticed that the official report states that a direct hit was registered upon an enemy bridge at Shumran, and some shipping was sunk. Presumably tho bridge was destroyed. This is not the first timo that tho Shumran bridge has been the object of a British attack in tho present stage of the campaign. Writing from Mesopotamia on December 17, Me. Edmund Oandlby, described a night march in which the British advanced across the Shatt-cl-Hai, south of Kut, and pushed their cavalry outposts to within a few hundred yards of Shumran. Bombs were dropped on tho Shumran bridge by British aeroplanes (on the night of December 14-15) as it was being towed upstream in sections. Pontoons were cast adrift and scattered, and during the next day tho Turks were unailc to transport troops across the river except by ferrying.

The advance to Shumran in December was an ■ affair of flying columns, and was not developed in full power, and apparently tho Turkish bridge was subsequently reinstated. But tho position to-day is that the British line is firmly established from point to point on tho river, and the Turks in the bend west of Kut have no bridge- by which to retreat. Any who escape from the trap will be lucky. It is likely, also, that tho British will before long force the passage of the Tigris at Shumran or further west. As has been pointed out recently, this would enable them to cut across tho communications of tho Turkish forces holding Kut and entrenched positions on the north bank some, distanco downstream from Kut.

It is impossible meantime to form any definite opinion as to how far or how rapidly tho Mesopotainian offensive is likely to- bo developed in the near future. Much must depend in the first instance upon the progress made with tho railway which is being constructed' to supplement the uncertain river comfJiuriications. Taking the recent speedy construction of. railways in the Sinai Peninsula as a guide, it is_ quite-possible that the Mesopotamian railway has by this time been carried to tho near neighbourhood of Kut-cl-Amara. This apart, the development of the Mesopotamian offensive is no doubt largely contingent upon events in other theatres. Given sound communications to Kut, the floods which usually begin in April would not necessarily hinder au advance to Bagdad or further north, and it is by no means impossible that such an advance may coincido with a forward movement in Armenia and the Balkans. At its present stage, the campaign gives Britain' a firm hold upon a territory she- cannot afford to neglect, and is likely to keep permanently under control, and occupies a considerable Turkish force, which is probably handicapped by even more ucriems transport difficulties than those of tho British expedition.

. The increasing concern with which the enemy regards tho continued penetration of his defences in tnc Ancro valley is indicated in the repeated, but unsuccessful, counterattacks south of Serrc, which Sir Douglas Haig reports to-day. These attacks represented an attempt to broaden out the salient in which Scito is now enclosed, and'as information stands they completely failed. Successful British raiding on an extensive scale is now xu\ ported in the region of Souchczand Neuvillc St. Vaast (south-west of Lens), a section of the front on which the Allies developed their offensive in tho early months (if 1015. This front, facing' tho railway uetwork south of Lille, is ono of which a, great deal is likely to be heard as tho Allies develop their offensive.!

A DEitATK in the Mouse of Lonla, on Hit , , submarine question, which is reported to-day, deserves particular iittentiori. The speeches supply a comprehensive review of the scope and results of the underwater campaign lo date, ami a noteworthy point is flic confidence, displayed by those who speak with knowledge anil authority in the ability of the. Navy to defeat and checkmate Uio. German raiders. Loud Behkskoiid spoke in critical vein, but his criticism related chiefly to past failures and mistakes, indeed, lie declared his belief that within six weeks or two months the submarine menace would be well in hand. This is an encouraging prediction, and it carries, c>t course, much more, weight than tho comments mado iu sonic, messages upon tho drop in tho rate of destruction which has been observable during the last day or two. Fluctuations of this kind carry littlesignificance. The results of the counter-campaign must be looked for in tho statistics oE a, more extended period. Lord Beresvord's prediction deserves attention because he no doubt knows a great deal about tho nature of the problem to be solved and the measures taken to solve it. That the counter-campaign is producing positive results is not a matter of conjecture, for Earl Curzon was able to state that Sir John Jellicob and tho Admiralty were not dissatisfied with what had been dono iu tho past fortnight, or with the number of ■ submarines which would never return to Germany. While he did not go into details, Earl Curzon said that results thus far attained gavo increased confidence for tho future.

Tub tonnage figures quoted in tho debate relate not only to losses by submarino attack, but to shipping casualties from all causes. _ From Lojij) Bekesi'ohd wo havo it that four million tons havo . been lost sinco the outbreak o£ war, and three-quarters of that amount has been replaced. Tho figures cited by Eaklj Cukzon havo an' even, closer interest, for they .relate to vessels of 1600 tons and upwards—the oceangoing fleet. This fleet has suffered a net reduction from all causes, iu thirty months of war,i of between five and six per cent. These particulars must bo read with the fact in mind that Britain has only recently been able to bring her resources in anything like full measure to bear upon tho problem of maintaining and protecting hc-r mercantile fleet. Not only_ is the anti-submarino campaign being developed with redoubled vigour, but shipbuilding, which was arrested, is proceeding apace, _ measures ol economy aro being instituted, and substantial incentives aro being offered to neutral ships to bravo the dangers of the so-called German blockade. A feature of the situation upon which too much emphasis cannot bo laid is tho gallantry with which British merchant seamen are facing the heavily increased dangers and privations of their calling.

A statement by "a well-informed expert," as to the methods by which Germany has. contrived to increase the- effectiveness of her submarines, probably throws a certain amount of light upon this question. It makes, indeed, no sensational revelation. That Germany has resorted to standardised construction of submarines, and to tho systematic training of crews may lie taken as a matter of course. It is also well-known that her later boats carry guns of afcjoast four inches calibre. Tho statement that the submarines are equipped with nctshcaring apparatus must be taken for what it is worth. No certain information is available on this point. It may bo assumed, however, that the chief factors which have enabled the underwater craft to embark for the time upon an extended career .of destruction are expedited construction, and improved measures for evading detection and capture. It is upon its powers of concealment that the submarino chiefly depends, and tho present burst of activity certainly suggests that the enemy has discovered means of checkmating some of the anti-submarine devices which were formerly effective. Whether ho has; solved the net problem is, however, an open, question.