PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2968, 4 January 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The proposal of the Daily Mail that the Salonika expedition should be partly or completely abandoned will undoubtedly create something of a sensation. That it will servo any more useful purpose we may take leave to doubt. Before examining the proposal on its merits it may be as well to enter a goneral reminder that the newspapers of the Northchefb group have established no title to dictate the policy of the war, though they have- at times done good service in exposing mistakes and shortcomings altd agitating ior reform. They undoubtedly took the right line at the time of the munitions crisis, and again in regard to the withdrawal from Gallipoli, but it does not by any means follow that the judgment of the Daily Mail or that of other newspapers of the group to which it belongs is invariably sound. That tho jjlokthcliffe papers outpaced public opinion and the action of the British military authorities in regard to Gallipoli is not more true than that thoy have in other matters gone seriously astray. Actual oxperience, in the war already goes a long way to demonstrate that their persistent advocacy of the claims of the West front to the almost total exclusion of the claims of other theatres is radically unsound. THAT.it must bo tho first concern of France and Britain to maintain and uso a great superiority of force in the Western theatre is admitted by all, but it is equally true that the war makes a demand which could not possibly or safoly bo ignored for Allied action in subsidiary theatres and at the.same time holds out prospects of material advantage in these areas and of developments which will toll potently upon the general trend of events. Only a few days ago somo extracts were cabled from an article in which Colonel Bepington, the military correspondent of the London Times, took as his text the contention that a great decisive victory was only obtainable on the West front. While favouring the complete investment of tho Central Powers, Colonel Eepington urged that chief efforts should be confined to the West front, and said it would be a> mistake to "transfer our main effort to distant theatres." Being rather overloaded with superlatives, these observations fall to some extent short of a clear expression of opinion (possibly the article was badly summarised for cabling), but presumably Colonel Eepinoton holds that Britain should if anything reduce her efforts in subsidiary theatres in order to concentrate the greatest possible force on the West front during tho 1917 campaign. If so, we have a logical, though possibly extreme, elaboration and application, opinion in the proposal now made by the Daily Mail.

Giving due heed to past events in the Balkans and in Turkey, and to the issues now open in these theatres, the conclusion is inevitable that the. policy of concentrating on the main front is subject to definite limitations. Up to the present the Allies have had one big failure in Turkey and no decisive success, and tf» present fate of Rumania is plain enough proof that they have yet to make their woight tell with full effect in the Balkans. But this is only one side of the account. It ia to be set down on the other side that, apart from tho dispatch of a small .Turkish force to the East front, the Allies have compelled Turkey to fight on the defensive and in her own territory, which they have materially invaded. The alternative would have been to let Turkey mass nndividedly against Egypt, and perhaps stir up a dangerous Mohammedan uprising, or send strong forces into Europe. As to the Balkans, if the Allies had not sent an expedition to Salonika Greece would certainly have joined the enemy, and Rumania, though her inclination would doubtless have been to remain neutral, might conceivably have been constrained to take the same course. Ignoring the prospects of future advantage that are before the Allies in Turkey and south-eastern Europe, tho policy of concentrating solely on the main front, and as far as possible neglecting Turkey and the Balkans, would certainly' have cost the Entente dear, and would have loft tho enemy in a position of advantage in these territories which would have very greatly strengthened his general position, and_ with additions to his strength which he is now denied.

Fkom one point of view, a> very limited point of view, it is wholly a matter for regret that tho necessity appears of diverting any considerable body of strength from the West front. But the only thing that really matters is that the necessity exists j and that it rests not merely upon! military considerations which are in I themselves adequate, but involves the question of good faith and of tho fulfilment of. sacred obligations to Allies who have suffered much in the common cause. It is asserted by the Daily Mail that the Salonika expedition is a burden equalling the Gallipoli campaign in playing the enemy's game, and weakening the Allies. According to the Noethcliffb newspaper the expedition ie achieving no good, and is _ using troops, warships, and shipping which are needed elsewhere; and the

malarious climale is prejudicial to the health of the troops. Even iE'all this were admitted, it is surely still necessary to ask whether Britain and tho Entente, would bo justified in deserting tie Serbians, tho Greek Voniaslists, who have dared and staked everything in reliance- upon Entente good faith, and Rumania. Our obligation to Serbia and to tho Venizelists does not need to bo emphasised. As to Rumania, if tho Allies now withdrew their forces from Salonika they would clearly bo open to the charge- of having brought her into the war on false pretences. The necessity of keeping honest faith with our Allies is in itself quite sufficient to determine tho issueraised, and it follows that as a matter of common honesty tho suggestion of a withdrawal from Salonika should never have been made. Apart from its detail and material results, and the havoc it would play with the present concord of tho tinientc, the withdrawal would, ol_ course, very greatly - hearten the enemy. Given such an unhoped-for gift of fortune, tho Central Powers would gratefully gather in Greece, turn new energy into their Rumanian offensive, and set themselves industriously to reanimate the energies of Bulgaria and Turkey.

It is quite true that troops, warships, and shipping , arc employed in, and in connection with, the Salonika expedition which could be usefully employed elsewhere, but there is no visible parallel to be drawn between the conditions of the Macedonian campaign and those which ruled in Gallipoli. In the last-mentioned theatre, after heroic and costly efforts, the Allies were left in a position which precluded any hope of advantage or success. The position in' Macedonia is very far from being hopeless, and there are reasonably good prospects that General Saerail will be able ultimately to develop his campaign in a fashion calculated to secure important immediate results and potently affect the general course of the war. It is incorrect also to say that tho expedition, even at its present stage of development, is achieving no good. Tho greater part of the Bulgarian army, with some German stiffening, has sustained a number of heavy defeats at the hands of General Sarjuil's forces, and is still held effectively in play, and it counts for something that Greece is cut off from tho Central Powers, with whom Constantine and the Eoyalist faction are so anxious to throw in their lot.

While it has perhaps been worth while to touch upon tho overwhelming considerations which dictate an active prosecution of tho Balkan campaign, there is happily no reason to suppose ■ that; the Allies are likely even to.considor a withdrawal ironi Salonika. According to a message from Rome, which is not in itsolf conclusive evidence, but quite possibly anticipates offioial news, Constantine has been constrained to yield to all tho Entente's demands, and is hastening their execution in order to secure a cessation of tho blockade. If this report is accurate, the Allies will have excellent prospects of converting Greece into a safer and more effective Base than. it is at present, and will be bettor placed to resist any attempt tho enemy may make upon their Macedonian front, jand to themselves develop offensive operations when the time is opportune. Late events in Rumania have their bearing upon the position in MacMonia, but have- certainly not eliminated the possibility of a successful offensive in that quarter, This will hold good even if the enemy should secure the advantage in tho great battle which is believed to bo imminent on tho Sereth front,- in Rumania, and contrive as a result to furthor extend his invasion of that country. Full command of the Danube would give tho enemy a powerful defensive line against attack from the noTth, and to this extent the prospect of effective cooperation by tho Busso-Rumanians in any move the Allies may make from Macedonia would be impaired. But advantage of position is not everything. Fighting strength in men and artillery is the vital factor, and though he has been able during recent months to mass_ a Buperor force (probably superior only in artillery) in Rumania, tho enomy is rapidly approaching a , time when ho will have to meet the attacks of materially superior forces in all theatres. The outlook in the south-eastern theatre, and elsewhere, is to be considered and estimated in light of this fact.

The truth is the last thing expected from Germany, and it is certainly a somewhat striking indication of her narrowing resources that a Gorman professor, writing in the Frankfurter Zcitung, has frankly admitted that Germany intended military aggression. To people outside Germany the fact is familiar enough, but the admission may be expected to fall with somewhat disturbing effect upon a nation which has been so often and insistently told by its Feaxicrs that the Fatherland is fighting a defensive war. It is obvious also ffiat the German public will derive little comfort from Prohessoe Sleinecke's further statements that the brilliantlybegun Gorman campaign collapsed at the Battle of the Harne, and that tie attack on Verdun failed. Standing alone, thcse_ statements might bo regarded as intended to prepare the German public for the approacEmg tkSb w&en their aTmVes will be falling back before the Allied offensive, hut it is not easy_ to understand what motive inspired tho frank admission of Germany's guilt in beginning the war. One positive purpose which Professor Meinecke had in mind, as appears from his_ references to the danger of touching the live wire of. the Central Powers, is that of intimidating auy neutrals who may be considering the advisability of joining the Entente or are suspected by Germany of such an intention.