PROGRESS OF THE WAR
It is plain enough that the position in Greece is still very serious, but at the same tirde to-day's messages suggest that the Allies are on the eve of taking steps calculated to materially amend the existing stale of affairs. From the terms of the Allies' latest Note, and from reports, it appears that Constantink has hot yet' rendered satisfaction for_ the treacherous attack on the Allied detachments landed at Athens on December I—an affair in which ho was at least implicated, if ho was not chiefly responsible—and has not yielded to the Allied demands that he should transfer his troops to the southern extremity of Old Greece. He is still indulging in hopes of a Bulgar-German. 'offensive against General Sabkail which if successful would enable him to link up with his taskmasters and offer what is left to him of the Greek army as a sacrifice to Prussian militarism. It is a strange ambition as the war is trending, but Constantine is above all things an obedient servitor of Germany. The enemy guns are still threatening against Monastir, and the possibility of an enemy offensive against the left wing of General Sarrail's army is still open. But though the position from this, standpoint remains critical, the extent to which the enemy is absorbed in his Kumanian adventure and other considerations make it seem less likely than it did some weeks ago that the enemy will undertake an offensive in Macedonia. If ho did it of course does not by any means follow that the enterprise would succeed and give Constantine his heart's desire.
Meantime matters remain at a standstill on the Macedonian front, and tho Allies are strictly enforcing a blockado which is certainly not without its effect upon Greeco. In addition it is said that they are about to take other measures calculated to notably : improve and strengthen their position in that country. A London report states that a strong Allied flotilla has entered the Gulf of Corinth, and according to the Paris Matin the Allies have notified Greeco that they intend to land troops at Itea, a small port on the northern shore of tlio Gulf, and use the railways to Salonika, thus reducing submarine risks to which transports are ■ exposed. The Gulf of Corinth and the Gulf of Patras, by which it is entered from the lonian Sea, all but completely divide Peloponnesus, tho southern section, of the Greek mainland, from the remaining area of the country. Tho Peloponnesus is connected with tho provinces to the north only by a narrow isthmus, at one point no more than six miles wide. As the Greek railways arc shown on available maps, Itea, on the Gulf of Corinth, is about sisteen miles distant from tho ' trunk railway running north, and there is a gap of about fifty miles in the railways round the Gulf of Salonika. It is possible that this gap has been filled in. As regards submarine dangers and other matters, the advantages of the projected arrangements are obvious. At present transports approaching Salonika have to thread their way through one or other of the' numerous passages of the Aegean Archipelago, which is an ideal hunting ground for submarines, and one l which it must be very difficult for the Allies to effectually patrol. Oα tho side of Greece there is a comparatively open sea approach to tho Gulf of Patras, which leads into the Gulf of Corinth. The narrow gulfs lend themselves to antisubmarine measures, and tho lonian Soa, between Southern Italy and tho western coast of Greece, no doubt receives tho unremitting attention of French and Italian patrol craft.
Enforcing their demand that the Royalist army should bo sent into Peloponnesus, the Allies will have ifc very securely bottled up. . The narrow isthmus mentioned could, of course, be very easily held, and the Allies command the sea. As yet, however, Constantine has not submitted to the Allied demands, and it remains to bo seen whether ho will be given such aid by his Allies on the Macedonian front as would enable him to prolong his resistance. As has been said, prospects of his being assisted on these lines appear to havo diminished, and unless the Bulgar-Germans succeed in breaking through the Macedonian {rout, blockade prcssuro and other measures will in the natural course of events enable the Allies to fully enforce their demands.
Britain has ta.kcn ao important J' step towards tho full recognition of» ;
the Venizelos Government, by accreditiug the Eatili ok Ghanville toifc as "diplomatic agent." To all intents and purposes this is tho appointment of an ambassador to act for Britain in dealings with tho Provisional Government. It is a step which will usefully emphasise the fact that Constantine and his policy have been, repudiated by a considerable section of the Greek population. That section also is growing, in spite of the brutal persecutions to which Venizclists in Old Greece have lately been subjected by Constantine and his creatures. lb is reported to-day that further Greek' islands have declared for M. Venizelos and the Provisional Government.
Within the last few days the Germans have directed three local attacks of some importance against different sections o£ the Allied front in the Western theatre. It can hardly bo supposed that these activities are intended to lead up. to offensive oporations on a materially greater scale, and the best available explanation is that they are inspired by apprehension that the Allies are about to striko anofcher blow in development of their offensive. Possibly the enemy hopes by a series of such attacks as he has lately made to spoil the Allies' preparations for an offensive stroke. Continued trench-raiding by the British troops also carries a suggestion that it may nob bo long beforo another battle opens in the Western theatre.
Matters arc- in such a state in Rumania'that it will evidently nob.be Jong before the defensive possibilities of .tho Trotus-Sereth line- are subjected, to a definite test. As most people know by this time, the Tro-tus-Sereth line slants south-east across Rumania from the Moldavian frontier to the Danube, where that river turns east to tho Black Sea, and covers most of Moldavia against invasion from the south. As reports stand, the Allies have not yet at any point' been thrown right back upon the River Trotus or the Diver Sereth. In particular they still hold a small area- of the Dobrudja south and east of the Danube (which turns from a northward to an eastward course iu this locality) and a limited area, of Wallachia west of the Danube and south of the Sereth. But to-day's news is in substance a story of almost general, though slow, retreat, which has brought the Allies very near to the cross-country river-line on which thoy may be- expected to make., a stand against the enemy offensive if they are to do it anywhere in .Rumanian territory. The enemy is keeping up a heavy pressure of attack along practically the whole Rumanian front, on the Moldavian frontier, across Southern Moldavia and 'North-eastern Wallachia, and -in the Dobrudja. And except on that part of the Moldavian frontier where his attacks, if successfully driven home, , would take the Allies' defensive line in rear, he doe's not seem of late- to have suffered more than local checks which, in the circumstances, must bo regarded as incidental to the general Russo-Ru-manian retreat. . i ■ ■
A Eussian official report states that the Allies have taken up new positions from Focsani to the Danube. Focsahi is on the central main railway, 22 miles north of the town of Bimnieu Sarat, which tho enemy entered a few days ago, and about eight miles from tho Sercth. In the area immediately west of the Danube the Allies have repulsed the enemy's recent attempts to close in upon Braila, which stands nine miles south of the point at which the Sereth enters the Danube. But on the other side of the Danube, in tho Dobrudja, the Allies have made a further retreat. Their foofchold in the Dobrudja must now havo been reduced to very small dimensions, and prospects of their continuing to hold a few square milea of the Dobrudja with a river like the' Danube immediately behind their fighting front cannot be called bright. ; # '.
■ So far as the front of from 40 to 50 miles between the central maw railway and the Danube is concerned, the position in brief is that about a week ago the Allies were in contact with the onemy on a lino in some places about thirty miles, and in others rather more than forty miles, south of the Sereth. Their present front from' the central railway to the Danube runs approximately parallel to the Sereth at a distance of eight to nine miles from that river. That is to say, on this section of their front-a section in which the configuration of the country offers.few obstacles to tho enemy's) advance—the Allies in the space of about a week have retreated from twenty to thirty miles. Tho front remains approximately straight, but it has been swung back over a greater distance in its eastern section, towards the Danube, than in tho region of the central railway.
West and north of the central railway (in South-western Moldavia) and along the Moldavian frontier further north the progress of tho enemy has been less rapid. The chief thing to notice meantimo about this section of tho campaign Is that there is an important distinction to bo drawn between the onemy's attacks on and inside tlio Moldavian frontier south of tho Trotus Valley and along the same frontier further north. The Trotus, it will be remembered, is an element in the defensive cross-country line which the Allies have prepared. Breaking through the Moldavian frontier in the regions whore he is credited with some recent success, the enemy is still confronted by this line. But if he broke through the mountain frontier north of the Trotus Valley ho would bo in position for a drive into tho Allies' rear and communications, and so would at once make their selected line untenable, even if he did not succeed in enveloping a portion of their forces. Up to tho present the Allies appear to have successfully repulsed all attacks upon the Moldavian frontier north of the Trotus Valley, and so are safeguarding their cross-country line against attack in rear. It* might have been thought that winter conditions would preclude- the possibility of operations on an important scale in the Moldavian mountain areas, but the continued progress of the enemy in the south-western valleys of the province does not sustain this view of the 'matter. It is evident that a vital struggle is proceeding on tho frontier of Moldavia, as well as across country to -the south and easfc.
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Bibliographic details
Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2966, 3 January 1917, Page 4
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1,802PROGRESS OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2966, 3 January 1917, Page 4
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