PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2693, 12 February 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

As might have been expected, Colonel Repington's recent estimate of enemy wastage _ has drawn a heavy fire of criticism in Great Britain, and has been attacked as being greatly under tho mark. Evidently the weight of opinion in this matter is against the. military correspondent of tho Times, and it may very well meantime be left at that. Some general considerations have been raised, however, in the controversy over enemy losses, which seem to call for remark. Critics, it is stated, admit _ that the whole policy of the Allies depends to an extent upon German manhood, by which is meant no doubt the number of men remaining available to Germany, since tho Allies, when they becamc capable of defining plans, deliberately embarked upon a war of attrition. This is a statement of the position which can bo accepted only tentatively, and with reservations. A war of attrition was imposed upon the Allies in the first instance by sheer necessity. No other policy was open to them by which they could _ hope to wear down the superior strength of the enemy and e*in time to build up their own effective strength. In a word, they adopted the natural policy of the side which for the time was the weaker, though it was capable of becoming the stronger. From this standpoint tho. war of attrition seems to have served its purpose so far as the Allies are concerned. They have now a considerable numerical superiority, and General Polivanoff's statement ihe other day suggests that the time is near; if it has not been reached, when they will face the enemy on terms of equality, or something more than equality, where munitions are concerned, in the Eastern theatre, as well as on the opposite main front.

Taking these facts into account, it would seem to he an over-bold assumption that the policy of the Allies in the hear future is likely to depend to any material extent upon the exact point to which the exhaustion of German reserves has been carried. That the Allies have now a superiority of force is a fact, and a dominating fact, whether the Germans have reserves for eight months or for only four at the past rate of wastage. Just what policy tho Allies intend to adopt is the secret of their higher commands, but there is no warrant for an assumption that the war of attrition is likely to be indefinitely continued, or that it represents a policy upon which they embarked deliberately when they were "capable of defining plans," which means, presumably, that they preferred this policy. .The truth seems rather to be that the Allies resorted to a war of attrition because they were too weak to adopt any other policy. With the now definite reversal o'f the balance of power in the war, it becomes at least an open question whether the Allies will choose any longer to continue the policy of attrition.

Certainly a point must bo looked for at which that policy will be dropped. in favour of the most vigorous action of which their armies are capable. It is most unlikely that this point will be determined by the consideration that Germany has a few hundred thousand men more or less' to draw upon. Some commentators hare enlarged upon an idea that the enemy is not likely to bo seriously shaken on any of his fronts until his reserves have been depleted,_ but the idea is essentially one which demands a practical test. Except under the grip of winter, and sometimes not even then, the Eastern theatre has never reproduced the immobile conditions of the war of positions on the. opposite main front. Last year, though the Russians wore desperately handicapped, the Eastern theatre witnessed a long suQcession of manoeuvre battles. There is no reason to suppose that the Germans and their Allies can now tie down the reinvigoratcd Russian armies to a war of positions, and a war of free movement in tho Eastern theatre should create conditions reasonably favouring a policy of vigorous enterprise by the Allies on the Western front.

* * * * One short message to-day, if it could bo accepted without question, would go far towards answering the question as to whether Rumania is likely soon to enter the war on the side of the Allies. It states that the Russians are sending enormous quantities of coal into Rumania. This is highly significant, if ib is true. Coal is a precious commodity in theso days of war, and one for which_ every belligerent country has almost unlimited demand. It is quite certain that Russia would not send enormous quantities of coal into Rumania unless she 'had received convincing assurances of that, country's friendship, and it is most unlikely that she would do so except in the 'expectation of ultimately greeting Rumania as an ally in the war,.

News from the Western front retains its lately normal character, which is to say that' it tells of bombardment and of local attacks by the enemy. In regard to recent events, satisfactory reports are given. German attacks in Northern France have been repelled, and at one point the Allies occupied the crater of a mine exploded by the enemy. At the same time German positions and depots in the Champagne and elsewhere have been effectively bombarded. Silence is still maintained, however, as to the outcome of the recent German attack south of tho Somme, and until silence is broken there is room for an opinion that facts, possibly material, aro being kept back by the consor.

The power with which Russia will be able to strike in the spring campaign soon to open up must' depend in no slight degree upon the freedom with which she is able to import war equipment and material from abroad during the winter months. There is evidence that her local production of these essentials is expanding rapidly, but her needs are immense, and it will probably be a very long time before supplies from abroad cease to figure as a factor of the highest importance in the development of her military strength. ! It is therefore interesting to learn that the channels through which Russia is able to admit war imports during these winter months of pro paration arc not so limited as was at one time supposed. That the single tra-ck of the Siberian railway has been worked at high pressure during the winter in the importation of war supplies is matter of common knowledge. Russia has no icc-frce port oil her Siberian coastline, but she'has been able to secure the use of Chinese ports which are linked up with the Siberian railway by branch 'lines. It is not perhaps so well known that Russia has bean abk ia make fairly, free uso right thromdi.

the winter of the double-track railway from Archangel to Moscow. This, however, is a fact. Archangel, of course, is ice-bound, but communications have been established, partly by railway and partly by sledges und motor wagons, between that port and the icc-freo port of Novo Alcxandrovsk, on the outer coast of the peninsula which closes' the White Sea on the north.

Novo Alexasdbovsic remains free from icc throughout the winter, because the section of the coast on which it stands is washed by the waters of the Gulf Stream. "Some time ago it was anuounccd that a railway was being rapidly constructed between Pctrogracl and Novo Alcxandrovsk. This is true enough, but if the Russians were under the necessity of waiting for the completion of the line before making use of their northern ice-freo port, the enterprise would havo little enough bearing upon the present war until next year at the earliest. The total distance to be traversed is estimated at 650 miles, and a great part of the route lies through swampy country, where the work of construction can be carried on qnly during the summer months. What the Russians have done in the meantime to utilise their open port is described by a correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, who evidently has an intimate knowledge of the facts. Quays and warehouses have been erected, not at Novo Alexandrovsk itself, but on the southern side of the bay on which it stands. From this point 150 miles of railway havo been constructed to Kandalaksha, at the western extremity of the White Sea. Between Kandalaksha and Archangel, a distance of close on three hundred miles, a capital transport route is available across the ico of the White Sea. In addition, communications arc maintained by sledge , and motor oyer the route from Kandalaksha to Rovaniemi, the nearest Finnish railway station. This latter route also is approximately 300 miles long.

Russia is thus very much better off than if she had to depend solely upon the long_ single track railway through Siberia in importing supplies from abroad during the winter. The route open from ths Arctic Ocean 'is shorter, and in somo respects more convenient, and except for a distance of some 300 miles it carrics a double track of railway. The total volume of supplies transported may be less than if the railway were continuous, but even this is not certain, for transport over the ico is capable of reaching a high standard' of efficiency, especially in a country like Russia, where climatic conditions give such methods a recognised standing. The cost of extra handling of goods is a small matter in view of the vital importance of securing a free inflow of supplies. Considering that the construction of a railwav between Novo Alexandrovsk and Petrograd would enable her to keep in touch with Western Eurone all the year round, and largely ""neutralise the, effect of the Baltic blockade; Russia's past neglect of the project is somewhat extraordinary. Novo Alexandrovsk was founded in 189.9, and the railway was then partly surveyed, but at that stage the project was pigeon-holed, only to bo revived when the war hacl revealed its importance. It must bo recognised that possession o£ this northern transport route, even in its present partly-developed state, materially brightens Russia's prospects in the coming campaign and iu the war.