Hope on arms control

Press, 5 March 1987, Page 20

Hope on arms control

The Soviet Union proposed at the week-end that it would remove all nuclear missiles from Europe if the United States did the same. The United States responded at the beginning of the week by saying that it would propose a draft treaty. It suddenly begins to look as if the two super-Powers mean business on arms control. Another round of nuclear missile talks in Geneva, due to end soon, has been extended.

The removal of the missiles from Europe would not bring to an end the threat of nuclear annihilation by the super-Powers, because strategic nuclear forces, including land-based, sea-based, and air-launched ballistic missiles,’will still exist. Yet the world would be a slightly safer place. The intermediate-range nuclear missiles based in Europe are particularly dangerous because of the brief time that is allowed for assessment of what is happening before they would strike their targets. Six minutes is the usually accepted time. Previously, the Soviet Union insisted that progress on the missiles in Europe must depend on a halt to the development of the American strategic defence initiative. It has now separated the issues.

A host of problems have to be surmounted before anyone pulls the first nuclear weapons out of Europe. There may even be some discussion about what is meant by “Europe.” The Soviet Union certainly includes the missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and seems to be meaning an area as far east as the Ural Mountains. If Western Europe can still be threatened from an area just to the eastern side of the Urals, there will be a reluctance to conclude a treaty.

The withdrawal of the intermediate-range missiles would still leave the shorter-range nuclear weapons as a threat. The United States has these weapons in far greater numbers than have the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. However, the Soviet leader, Mr Gorbachev, is reported to have told the Prime Minister of Iceland, Mr Hermannsson, that he wanted to get rid of the short-range weapons as well. This Kan advance on the earlier ' Soviet position. Previously it wanted a freeze on the numbers.

Europe has long shown a reluctance to abandon nuclear defences altogether while the Soviet Union has much greater conventional forces. That problem remains in spite of the week-end proposal. Talks about reductions in conventional forces are being conducted at Vienna. If these, too, showed signs of progress, there would be good reason for real hope.

Another problem lies in the Soviet attitudes towards the British and French nuclear forces, which proved something of a sticking point in the attempts to reach agreement before the Pershing and cruise missiles were deployed in Europe. The Soviet Union had wanted them counted. The United

States took the view that they were not part of N.A.T.O.’s defences and they could not therefore be held to be part of what was negotiable by the United States. It is being assumed that the Soviet Union is ignoring these weapons in the present proposal. The Gorbachev proposal would allow the Soviet Union to retain 100 warheads on intermediate-range missiles, say about 33 missiles, in Soviet Asia, and the United States to retain the same, probably stationed in Alaska. Those missiles in Asia will be of great concern to Japan and China, as well as to the United States. However, the numbers would be a substantial reduction on those at present stationed there and, while Mr Gorbachev is in the mood, he might be prepared to make the removal of those weapons the subject of another treaty.

The difficulties are surmountable and, if there is a genuine will, it should be possible to see an end to missiles in Europe before the end of 1987. Some members of the Reagan Administration have shown scant sympathy for moves towards arms control; but others have been interested and it seems probable, considering the political circumstances of the moment, that the arms controllers have a chance of carrying the day. Mr Reagan has lost popularity because of the arms-for-Iran affair and, unless he does something impressive, his Administration will lose momentum. An impressive move would include a major advance on nuclear arms control. Besides that, his second Administration has always had the expressed intention of making progress on arms control. There will be suspicions about Soviet intentions, but a distinction needs to be made between motives and timing. The Soviet Union’s timing seems good; that is, the offer is a help both to President Reagan and to Mrs Thatcher, who will face an election in Britain soon. This raises the appearance of opportunism; however, the timing is probably related more to the chances of getting an agreement at all in the next few years. If the offer came later, it would become entangled ' in next year’s Presidential election and once a new President is installed it might be years before he could get an arms treaty through Congress.

President Reagan, on the other hand, has been the most anti-Soviet and conservative President since Richard Nixon and the Congress would be more inclined to accept an arms treaty from him. The last important series of arms control measures came during President Nixon’s Administration. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was negotiated during President Carter’s time, but has never been ratified. So the timing seems right. It has been clear for a long time that Mr Gorbachev wants the Soviet Union to modernise itself. Avoiding the crippling expense of another arms race must help him in this. Arms control, not expansion, may yet be seen before the end of the 1980 s.