‘A.N.Z.U.S. framework intact and N.Z. punished’

Press, 18 February 1986, Page 36

‘A.N.Z.U.S. framework intact and N.Z. punished’

NZPA staff correspondent Washington The United States principal aim of punishing New Zealand while keeping the A.N.Z.U.S. framework intact has been successful, whatever the shortcomings of its handling of the crisis, according to an Australian academic.

“New Zealand has been isolated and its example has not been followed by Other allies,” writes a University of New South Wales political scientist, Mr F. A. Mediansky, in the latest issue of the “Washington Quarterly” published by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. In an article entitled

“Nuclear Weapons and Security in the South Pacific,” he argues that while the A.N.Z.U.S. crisis has not undermined the prevailing Western dominated regional order, it has shed instructive light on the dynamics of the alliance relationship. “In the first place, the crisis revealed the Administration’s temper towards one of its weaker allies. It took no more than one serious difference between Washington and Wellington for the latter to be virtually cut out of the alliance.

“The episode is the more instructive because United States sanctions were triggered by symbolic and political considerations more than by

tangible strategic interests of the United States in the South Pacific,” he said.

Mr Mediansky said that Washington’s treatment of Wellington severely undermined simplistic arguments often put about of the existence of close bonds within A.N.Z.U.S. which were said to be based on shared values and historic experience. /

New Zealand’s military contribution in the world wars, Vietnam, Korea and in other confrontations could not override the difference between it and the United States. This was so even though the Labour Government was elected democratically with its nuclear policy

and though it did not “impinge on the United States military posture in the Pacific”, the article said.

Mr Mediansky said another assumption undermined was that the alliance was some form of “organic whole” which could not be separated without affecting the overall relationship. "This view of the alliance has been much favoured by some politicians in Australia and New Zealand who recognised that such an interpretation could absolve them from having to justify difficult individual decisions (the United States facilities'in Australia for example) by linking these to A.N.Z.U.S. obligations.”

However he said the A.N.Z.U.S. dispute had clearly illustrated the flexible nature of the alliance and the ease with which it could be disaggregated and reshaped.

“Thus, it took Washington less than a month to cut New Zealand off from some of the most vital and longstanding elements of the alliance without disturbing its security links with Australia. “Likewise, Canberra has found that it could easily adjust its bilateral security links with Washington and Wellington while isolating itself from the most serious dispute yet between its two closest security partners,” he said.