Gorbachev puts his mark on Eastern Europe

Press, 13 December 1985, Page 18

Gorbachev puts his mark on Eastern Europe

From

JUDY DEMPSEY,

in Vienna

“Gone are the days of uncertainty” was how one senior Hungarian official recently put it when asked about the relations between Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Gorbachev’s impact on Eastern Europe was almost immediate when he came to power. During the funeral of the former Soviet leader, Konstantin Chernenko, Gorbachev met and spoke to all the East European leaders. He then quickly moved to have the Warsaw Pact Treaty renewed and signed for another 20 years on 26 April. He called several C.M.E.A. (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance — the Soviet trading bloc organisation) meetings, often at ministerial level. The meeting in Warsaw of Prime Ministers during the summer of 1985 was particularly abrasive, the Hungarians and East Germans criticising what seemed to them the unfair pricing system operating within Comecon. But the Soviet message was becoming quite clear: closer coordination of policies — and this included defence, economic* and ideological — were now on the agenda. The first noticeable changes affected the Warsaw Pact itself. On July 13, commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSF£L), Army General Mikhail Zaitsel, who controlled the WOO

Soviet troops which form the core of the Soviet military power in Eastern Europe, was replaced. The commander of the Moscow Military District since 1980, Army General Piotr Lushev, was named the new commander of the G.S.F.G.

Changes also took place in Czechoslovakia, again strategically important for the Warsaw Pact defences. Colonel General Ivan Voloshin was replaced by Colonel General Nikolai Zotov. East Germany and Czechoslovakia have had Soviet missiles deployed on their territories. There were also military changes in Hungary. Gorbachev also made it plain that he expects more and better quality goods in return for guaranteed supplies of Soviet energy. The Hungarian Communist Party leader, Janos Kadar, when he visited Moscow in September, apparently got the brush-off from the Soviet leader when he suggested that Hungary reduce its percentage of hard currency payments for a certain amount of Soviet oil, that it reduce its contribution to the overall Warsaw Pact defence budget, and that perhaps Hungary could do with a little more Soviet oil in tte future. W

Sources in Budapest and Moscow suggested that, if anything, Gorbachev indicated to the Hungarians that he expected more goods in return for Soviet oil.

This places Hungary in a difficult position. Over 60 per cent of its trade is tied to the West. Any reduction of those precious hard currency earnings could affect Hungary’s ability to repay its large hard currency debt of more than $BOOO million. Things may become a little difficult for Bulgaria as well. The first inklings emerged when the Soviet Ambassador to Bulgaria, Leonid Grekov, in an unusual gesture, published an interview in a Bulgarian monthly which questioned the quality of Bulgarian exports to the Soviet Union. When Mr Gorbachev met Warsaw Pact leaders in Sofia in late October, he pointedly stated that “more efficient, bolder, and more flexible methods ... were needed in Bulgaria.” The language of efficiency has reached the Polish leadership, too. Here, it seems that the choice of Zbigniew Messner — an economist from the heavy industry region of Silesia — flanked by three deputy

prime ministers who are also economists, places more of a technocratic accent on the running of the Polish economy. But as one Polish economist put it: “In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev is still arguing for the principle of reform, let alone the method of reform ... In Poland, we push simply to become more efficient. Efficiency is not synonymous with reforms.”

Which is probably why the Czech leadership, almost politically and economically immobilised since 1968, is content to promote a language of efficiency rather than a language of reform. The areas of certainty seem to fall into two categories: a greater stress on foreign policy and defence co-ordination and a tighter economic co-operation within the bloc.

Another important certainty is that Gorbachev is much more willing to inform his allies on EastWest relations in general and the arms control talks .in Geneva in particular. His lengthy consultation with Warsaw Pact leaders in Prague the day the summit ended suggests that Gorbachev is adopting a new approach to the Eastern European allies. Copyright — London Observer SerWce.