Soviet youth thaw unlikely

Press, 2 April 1985, Page 21

Soviet youth thaw unlikely

NZPA-Reuter Moscow Mikhail Gorbachev, the youngest Kremlin head for more than half a century, seems likely to push a stern line on youth policy even though his age and experience might make him more in touch with young Russians. He will need to combat what even the official press admits is an ideology crisis among young people, reflected in growing political apathy, obsession with Western culture, materialism,

and interest in religion. His few statements to date, and his commitment to pursuing reforms initiated under the late Yuri Andropov, suggest he will try to tighten control over young people through the Communist youth movement, the Komosomol. He began his party career in Komsomol work in 1955, holding an influential post overseeing ideology before heading the movement in his home region of Stavropol, northern Caucasus. In an important ideological speech in December, seen then as confirming his stature as Kremlin number two, he emphasised the educational role of the Komsomol, saying it should have “an active influence on the creative forces of the individual.” Mr Gorbachev said “consistent class approach,” “political vigilance,” and “intolerance of alien views” were the tools with which Moscow should combat

propaganda from outside. In recent months, the Soviet news media have repeatedly asserted that the West is waging a campaign of “psychological warfare,” aimed particularly at young people, and the Kremlin has voiced concern over the subversion of youth. The Young Communist daily “Komsomolskaya Pravda” said: “Some young people begin to grumble and even become indignant . . . One sometimes comes up against questions like: How come? Why is Socialist reality not as ideally good and harmonious as we were taught at school? “Why do shortcomings, disproportions, contradictions and conflicts exist under socialism? Why are we unable to meet all our needs directly and why are our aims not always realised, or realised not quite in the way we wanted or dreamed of?” Youth leaders were instructed in an official de-

cree from the Supreme Soviet, the top State body, to teach greater patriotism and respect for communist ideology and to combat the growing influence of Western fashion and music. Western visitors to Moscow are often asked for jeans, records and tapes and there is a growing black market for such goods, regarded as symbols of prestige among young Russians. The Soviet authorities are also worried by a revival in religion seen not only in western areas with strong historical links with Catholic Poland or eastern republics bordering on Islamic countries. Official unease, is growing as the Church prepares to mark the 1000th anniversary of Russian Christianity in 1988. Throughout the Soviet Union, young people are looking to pre-revolution history and tradition, with which the Russian Orthodox faith is strongly bound.

Newspaper articles reflecting Kremlin policy have called for “more active propaganda of scienti-fic-materialist opinions” and greater attention to atheist education.” Gorbachev’s acceptance speech reaffirmed orthodox ideological lines and many Russians feel that in spite of his image as a reformer with a more modern proach to Soviet problems, nothing much will change.