THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 1985. Mr Gorbachev’s opportunities

Press, 13 March 1985, Page 16

THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 1985. Mr Gorbachev’s opportunities

Countries seldom get a swift second chance to rectify their political policies. To get a third chance is a rare luxury. With the death of Konstantin Chernenko the Soviet Union has its third opportunity in less than three years to seek new directions after the long inertia of the later Brezhnev years. When Mr Yuri Andropov became leader in November, 1982, he brought high hopes that a breeze of reform would ruffle the entrenched habits of the Soviet bureaucracy. A start was made with a drive against corruption and with policies intended to give Soviet farms and factories more say in what they produced, in the prices they charged, and in the manner in which they paid their workers. But in 15 months Mr Andropov was dead and Mr Chernenko, his 72-year-old successor, marked a return to inertia.

Not that the reforms of Mr Andropov were undone, but they languished for want of vigorous direction. In poor health, Mr Chernenko was never regarded as anything more than a compromise leader. Behind the scenes differences between the old guard supporters of Mr Brezhnev and the younger men who had backed Mr Andropov continued. With the emergence of Mr Mikhail Gorbachev yesterday as the new General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, the younger generation of reformers again have a leader from whom they can expect support. Mr Gorbachev is only 54. He is young by the standards of Soviet leaders, young by world standards. He could hold high office for another 20 years, time to consolidate changes. More than that, Mr Gorbachev is a reminder that much time has passed since the great events of Russian history in the twentieth century. He is the first Soviet leader born after the revolution of 1917, the first who can have no recollection of the worst years of the Stalinist terror in the 19305, the first who is too young to have played a part in the defence of the Soviet Union in World War 11. He is a product of the Cold War years, of the growth of the Soviet Union into a world Power. If he lacks memories of the ideological fervour of the old Bolsheviks, he is a product of times when the survival and expansion of Soviet power have seemed unquestioned.

Not that he starts with a clean slate on which to write more modern ideas in a society long dominated by old men in poor health. The majority of Mr Gorbachev’s colleagues in the Politburo are still a generation older than he is. Gradually they can be replaced with people of relative youth and vigour, but the process will take time. Beyond the centre of power, the Soviet Union is still a vast territory. Directives from Moscow do not automatically bring changes in conservative communities thousands of miles away. Whatever plans Mr Gorbachev has for his country, getting them accepted and acted upon will be a slow business. For the rest of the world, Mr Gorbachev

has begun well. In spite of his country’s mourning for Mr Chernenko, the arms limitation talks in Geneva began today as planned. Nothing could better serve to indicate a readiness to get on with the job, to continue business as usual. This readiness suggests considerable political maturity in the Soviet Union. Whatever differences exist among the country’s leaders, they are not spilling over into uncertainties about what to do next. They are differences of detail, not of fundamental directions. Soviet leaders no longer appear like the Tsars of old. Death of the leader does not necessarily bring down his courtiers. Determination to press ahead with the arms talks is also an indication of how seriously the Soviet Union regards the negotiations with the United States. Several reasons can be adduced; all suggest a growing sense of realism. President Reagan’s “star wars” proposal — to protect North America with an anti-missile umbrella in space — still looks far-fetched. The mere suggestion was sufficient to jolt the Soviet Union into talking seriously about arms limitations.

Mr Gorbachev has the added incentive that economic progress in the Soviet Union will depend on finding more money for industrial development and modernisation. If spending on arms can be restrained, ordinary Soviet citizens will be better off. But he can expect powerful opposition from Soviet military leaders, whose positions of dominance depend on the importance of the arms race. Therein lies a glimpse of the greatest barrier to change in Mr Gorbachev’s Russia. The Soviet Union has become an enormously conservative country, resistant to change for more than 20 years since the flurry of activity that marked the end of Stalinism in the 19505. The Soviet Communist Party has become a machine rooted in the special benefits it confers on its members. It has been described as a “priviligentsia” built on stability and patronage. It will resist attempts to move its members from familiar ways.

Unlike his predecessors, Mr Gorbachev has relative youth on his side. He has time to move slowly and he gives the impression of an intelligence and a sophistication that should encourage younger Soviet citizens to welcome proposals he might make. Mr Gorbachev is a product of the Soviet system. He can surely recognise that the system now is firmly enough in place for the old rigidities and controls to be unnecessary. The Soviet Union is not going to collapse from within; it is not going to be overwhelmed from without.

Given its enormous resources, the country has no need to lag behind its East European neighbours, let alone behind the West, in the comforts and diversions it contrives for its people. With time, Mr Gorbachev has an opportunity to give communism the human face that until now it has seldom dared to display anywhere in the world.