Soviet tactics in Afghanistan change

Press, 18 May 1982, Page 20

Soviet tactics in Afghanistan change

From “The Economist,” London

With the snows melting in the high passes of the Afghan mountains and the trees no longer bare, the Mujahadeen are once again on the offensive. The Afghan guerrillas seem to be undaunted by the setbacks they suffered during one of the worst winters in memory. They have learnt much during their two and a half years’ fighting against the Russians and the Communist regime in Kabul, and are better equipped and better armed than at any time since the Soviet Army crossed the Oxus River. But the enemy they are marching over the hills to meet this spring is also a much more formidable force which has also learnt from past mistakes and adopted new tactics. Western .analysts say that Russian casualties last year were lower than the year before. Soviet troops were reluctant to leave their heavily fortified garrisons and preferred to move in convoy with armoured support They held the main centres of population and the key lines of communication. They preferred to leave most of the combat to the Afghan Army. But that Army had become a puny body of men, demoralised and weakened by massive desertions and obliged to resort to press-gangs to replenish its dwindling manpower. The Afghan Government’s soldiers have been all too willing to reach local non-aggression pacts with the neighbourhood guerrilla commanders; and in combat they have shown a marked lack of enthusiasm and a- distinct readiness to lay down their arms. The Soviet Army thus had the choice of remaining in its strongholds, leaving most of

the countryside not so much liberated as uncontested, or going on the attack itself. The signs are that this spring more Soviet soldiers will emerge from their lairs. The love affair between Soviet commanders and their, tanks has cooled. Tanks never were effective in the mountains and any psychological impact they had on the resistance has now waned. Their vulnerabilities are known to the lowliest guerrilla who is trained in how to lay a mine and wield a grenade-thrower. Their ominous growl gives advance warning of attack, their tracks are vulnerable on mountain roads, and their vision can be blinded by a smear of mud or excrement, deftly applied by a nimble youth. Tanks may still have a role in the plains around the big towns and cities but the com-, ing thing now in Afghanistan is the Hind helicopter • gunship. This ugly-looking bird bristles with 57mm rockets and cannon, and is capable of carrying 500 kg bombs and assault troops. A guerrilla who says he saw six Hinds flying abreast six metres off the ground firing at everything before them still shudders when he tells the tale. Hinds can deploy troops rapidly for sudden’search-and-destroy operations. They can bomb guerrilla strongholds in the mountains where low-flying ordinary aircraft are useless. They have given the Soviet forces the mobility they have lacked. The only problem for the Russians so far is a shortage of these wondercopters. The initiative given .to a captain or even a lieutenant in the British Army would be undreamt of in the Soviet Army, where orders and deci-

sions emanate from on high. But remote control is impractical in a fast-moving guerrilla war and there are indications that the Russians may now be revising their military command structure in Afghanistan. This and other lessons from the field may make their way back to the land army facing N.A.T.O. Reports from the Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan indicate that the Russians are also edging their troops closer to Pakistan, increasing the danger of hot-pursuit raids across the border. The recent anti-guerrilla operation in Paktia Province, which at times was within sight of Pakistani frontier posts, is expected to be the first of several attempts to seal off the Mujahadeen from their supply bases in Pakistan. The supply route through Paktia was used by several resistance groups, some operating deep within Afghan territory. During the operation the guerrillas took heavy casualties and the Red Crescent hospital for people wounded in the war reported a sharp increase in the number of Mujahadeen seeking treatment. Three guerrilla groups with headquarters in Peshawar in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province sent medical teams right to the border to deal with casualties as they were coming in. The Russian casualties are also thought to have been high. Their dead and wounded were evacuated by helicopter with unprecedented speed. For the Russians, such an operation has its drawbacks. The local tribes who had been living in relative peace rose up against the Russians, along with guerrillas. The two main tribes, the Jajji and Mengal,

buried a centuries-long feud to join forces, much to, the surprise of resistance commanders, and are no longer susceptible to seductive approaches from the Afghan Ministry of Tribes, which is advised by the K.G.B. The Ministry had been cultivating Pathan tribes right along the border; its failure may have led to the operation in the first place.

The Russians seem to be showing less reluctance to antagonise civilian communities these days. The savage bombardment of Afghanistan’s second largest city, Kandahar,

earlier this year was a calculated exercise in terror which did in the end lead to a request from citizens to the guerrillas to withdraw. For a while they did, although fighting is now said to have resumed in the city. Villages near strategic highways earn swift reprisals if they help guerrilla ambushes. Shops, houses, inns and trees which give cover to the Mujahadeen on either side of the highway have been bulldozed away. A village which recently gave refuge to Mujahadeen fighters found itself surrounded

by helicopters which disgorged troops. All guerrilla suspects were killed and then the helicopters swiftly took off, before anyone could spread the alarm. Although the rewards for cooperating with the Russians can be great, a hearts-and-minds campaign in Afghanistan is doomed to almost certain failure. The old bear will have to endure yet another summer in which it is bled of men and roubles, by a people it thought it could deal with in a matter of months when those armoured columns crossed the Oxus at Christmas, 1979.