SHEDDING COLONIES RIVAL NATIONALISMS WILL BE PROBLEM FOR PORTUGAL

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33625, 29 August 1974, Page 12

SHEDDING COLONIES RIVAL NATIONALISMS WILL BE PROBLEM FOR PORTUGAL

(By

CHRISTOPHER MUNNION

in the "Daily Telegraph. )

(Reprinted by arrangement)

Recent developments in Angola and Mozambique must have dispersed any lingering hopes in Lisbon that post-revolutionary Portugal might gracefully and painlessly cede suzerainty over its seven per cert oi the African continent. Racial bloodshed in Luanda and a one-sided unofficial ceasefire in northern Mozambique have served to underscore the dangers of rapid decolonisation. A et, despite the rhetoric from Lisbon, there is no disguising the haste with which the new Portuguese Government wishes to shed responsibility for the overseas territories.

What was not so clear, certainly to the people of Mozambique and Angola to whom I have spoken, was (precisely how, when and to whom independence would be granted. From Europe, the concept of a different solution for each of the African territories might appear to be sound enough. Angola, and Mozambique have widely differing geographic, economic and ethnic structures. In an African context, however, any radical difference in the formulae for self-rule is likely to aggravate rivalries. If Frelimo, for instance, achieves an unqualified and rapid take-over of power in Mozambique, can the Angolan movements be expected to settle for anything less?

Both vast territories exemplify the eccentricity of Africa’s national boundaries, arbitrarily drawn by colonial civil servants who paid scant heed to tribal, religious and ethnic differences of the inhabitants.

Angola, 14 times the size of Portugal itself, has more than 80 tribes and 11 different language groups among its six million people. Tribal and religious loyalties have played a large part in separating the ranks of the three main rival nationalist groups who have been organising guerrilla warfare in the territory for the past 13 years.

Roberto Holden’s Kin-shasa-based Liberation Front draws heavily on the northern Bankongo people, many of whom share with their leader a strong Protestant conviction. The second largest group, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, has confined its activities to the eastern regions and the Cabinda enclave. It numbers many Roman Catholic intellectuals among its leadership. Recent efforts by African heads of State to re-unite these two movements have met with little success, not least because of factional problems within each of the groups. A third movement, Jonas Savimbi’s Unita, though small, has secured an effective political foothold in the south central region — and Savimbi has signed his own peace pact with the Portuguese.

Future rivalry

A bitter foretaste of this divisiveness has manifested itself in Luanda early this month. Although sparked off by clashes between poor whites and blacks in the shanty townships of the Angolan capital, the violence which has claimed more than 50 lives was sustained by pitched battles between supporters of the two largest nationalist groups. This rivalry apart, Angola’s transition to independence is certain to be further complicated by the territory’s economic potential. American, British and South African companies have substantial investments in Angola’s mineral resources, notably diamonds, copper, iron ore and the oilfields of the Cabinda enclave wedged between the sea-boards of

■ Zaire and the Congo Repub I lie. i Cabinda alone has the (potential of becoming t (flashpoint in the count-down ito independence. It supplie* i all of Portugal’s oil needs (plus a surplus and is going (to be jealously guarded b\ (whatever African govern, (ment emerges. | Other forces are alreadj (at work. Quite suddenly there has emerged a Cabinde secessionist movement, demanding autonomy for the enclave and apparently I enjoying the support of a I Portuguese Governmenl which has promised military (support in return for oil i concessions. I Angola has the seconc | largest white population in (Africa (after South Africa). The semi-official estimate of 600,000 is excessive but the community is large enough to demand, and expect, some representation after self-gov-ernment. Decades of dictatorship, however, have left the whites with as little political awareness as the majority of blacks. Memories of the (1961 rebellion in Northern | Angola, in which 2000 i whites were massacred, have I been sharpened by the 1 recent disturbances in (Luanda and the prospect of la mass exodus of whites from the territory cannot be overlooked. The large-scale departure of whites from Mozambique since the April coup in Portugal shows every sign of reaching exodus proportions. Unofficial surveys estimate that between one-third and one-half of the 180.00 C whites have definite plans to leave, or have already done so. This despite repeated assurances from the leadership of Frelimo, the Tan-zanian-based Mozambique Liberation Front, that white rights would be guaranteed under an independent black majority Government. Frelimo’s power Frelimo, with some justification, regards itself as the only real contender for power in an independent Mozambique. It has proved itself to be the best-organ-ised and most effective of all African guerrilla movements, having made considerable gains in its 10-year-old war against 50,000 Portuguese troops. Political opposition to Frelimo, within Mozambique or outside, has been inconsequential and Portugal’s new rulers have recognised this by offering the movement substantial representation on a pre-independence provisional Government. So far, this incentive has not been sufficient to persuade Mr Samora Machel, Frelimo’s Marxist leader, to order an official ceasefire among his 10,000 guerrillas. While the Portuguese army in Mozambique has all but laid down its arms, Frelimo units in the northern war zones are still active. Several Frelimo field commanders, apparently on their own initiative, have negotiated truces, emerging from the bush in such places as Tete and Vila Pery, to wine and dine with Portuguese officials and army officers and generously pinpoint mined roads and tracks, but

i-1 soldiers and civilians are still dying. e The trans-Zambesi and a Beira-Umtali railway lines n are still being sabotaged s with monotonous regularity sland some of the smaller g I White communities in the y(north are being terrorised by '■‘marauding bands of (Africans, who, while not y necessarily aligned with Fre y| limo, are taking advantage a of the disarray. ’ The situation is not helped e . by the fact that Mozambique (* ! has been without a governa | ment of any sort for a A month. The post-coup provisional administration of Dr ‘Soares de Melo resigned j when Lisbon announced that nl the territory was to be ruled i by a junta — but the junta f'has still to be appointed e l Meanwhile, a wave of industrial unrest affecting the e | ports and railways, and a . rapid retreat of South African commercial and i ( tourist confidence, have e brought Mozambique to the I brink of bankruptcy. f There is some evidence to e suggest that the cautious Mr a Machel would rather like a D substantial Portuguese force eto remain in Mozambique e during the transitional inden pendence period to help f'keep in check dissidence or si reaction. ei Disaffection with Frelimo lis most likely to erupt in e jthe northern Quelimane and e Nampula areas where the ‘I three-mill ion-strong Macua ■ tribe, the largest in the • country, has a traditional antipathy towards the Makonde people who form the bulk of Frelimo’s fight- ’ ing force. j White reaction. in- > substantial in practice but ‘ feared by Frelimo, is centred e mainly on the activities of e Mr Jorge Jardim, the Beira ■j businessman and dabbler in political adventure, whose machinations caused Portugal to break relations with Dr Banda’s Malawi. There, it was suspected, Mr Jardim j was sponsoring a force of ' mercenaries. Analogies with t the Congo of the ’sixties j spring too readily to mind. . While General Spinola and f the Lisbon junta are no . doubt sincere in wishing to . dismantle with decorum Africa’s oldest colonial . I empire, it is difficult to (appreciate what braking (mechanism they might have ■lat their disposal should the • i decolonisation process accelerate out of control.

Ban on boating

The spread of a weed, Elodea canadensis, in Lake Mapourika, has prompted the Westland National Park Board to impose a ban on all power-boating on the lake. The spread of the weed is accelerated by power boats, which are also usually responsible for its introduction, according to the chairman of the board (Mr J. A. S. Shaw). The weed, he said, now covered all the bay where the jetty is sited and also a strip two chains wide along the shores of the lake. The board would carry out a spraying programme in midsummer. The effects of the chemical to be used is said to be very slight, as it dilutes away from the applied area.