U.S. ELECTION GAME SOVIET PLAYERS MAY WANT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO FORD

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33515, 22 April 1974, Page 12

U.S. ELECTION GAME SOVIET PLAYERS MAY WANT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO FORD

(By

VICTOR ZORZA)

Could the Kremlin be considering whether to dump Mr \-xmi 1 favour of the Vice-President (Mr Gerald Ford)? In a remaik;ml( interview with John Osborne in the publication. “New Republic. \ Mr Ford now says lie intended should remain oft the leioid. u.e Vice-President has described the administration he might form it Mr Nixon should step down. If he became President, Ford might drop t t Secretary of Defence (Mr James Schlesinger), the man Moscow reg.,'.;-. as the Nixon Administration's evil spirit responsible tor blocking tun er progress on detente. The Kremlin is obviously reassessing its altitude to the Nixor Administration. The June summit in Moscow is still on. but the attitU'ie of the Foreign Minister (Mr Gromyko) in \\ ashington earlier t n- mom made it clear that no real S.A.L.T. agreement will be forthcoming.

The Kremlin’s study of! the options would presumably begin by asking whether Mr Nixon’s survival in office would still be to its advantage. Even if he sur- i ivives, his position would be [seriously weakened. He would no longer be able to conclude major agreements on arms reduction, trade, and the like, which have (made his Administration so (attractive to Moscow. But [Ford, as a new President, (could start all over again — and he has said that he, (would keep Dr Kissinger. I That would be worth a lot to Moscow. Mr Nixon has had to default on his political debts to the Kremlin, but Mr Ford would be able to repay some of them. Most important of all, Mr Ford would be a natural candidate for re-election in 1976. and this would make him more susceptible I to subtle pressures and bargaining offers from a Kremlin which now knows how to play the American election game. It was Mr Nixon whol taught the Kremlin how to! play the game, by intertwining his last election campaign with summit spec- ! taculars. The Kremlin now knows the value of a summit to a President who is also a candidate: The television coverage, the promise of a generation of peace confirmed by an affectionate send-off from Moscow, an agreement to limit arms. There was, of course, also the new structure of peace. But Mr Nixon got some votes, and Moscow got the American grain which averted possible food riots and [may have saved Mr Brezhnev.

( On this count alone, it 'would be clearly be in Moscow's interest that the man jin the White House in 1976 should be running for rejelection. But it would be 'doubly so if Senator Henry Jackson gets the Democratic nomination. The Soviet press is creating the impression [that, Senator Jackson and (Mr Schlesinger have already enough power between them [to bring the cold war back, (even if Nixon remains in the .White House. i Likely candidate ( Moscow press coverage ol .Senator Jackson suggests 'that the Kremlin sees him (as the most likely — and [most dangerous — Democraitic candidate in the next [election. It implies that Sen(ator Jackson as President [would not only bring back [the, cold war but even the .hot war. The Kremlin reigards him as so great a .threat that it cannot simply [sit back in the hope that [perhaps Senator Edward (Kennedy — whom it 'recently invited to Moscow in another anti-Jackson (move — will get the nomination. j One way to keep Senator Jackson out is to help get (.Mr Ford in now, and ‘ to [strengthen him for the election campaign by tacit electoral bargains of the kind the Kremlin made with Mr Nixon in 1972. The longer Mr Nixon stays now, the more likely Senator Jackson is to get in later. But can the Kremlin seriously believe that it could influence the American electoral process, with (all its vagaries? All we

know is that it has tried do so in the past. It does not need anyone to put ideain its head. Mr Nixon has himself r< marked that President Johnson’s rating in the opine, polls jumped up <harp after the 1967 Glassboro summit with Mr Kosygin . even though nothing of con sequence happened ai the meeting, and the Kremlin r. doubt took note of MNixon’s remark. In recon 'years, the Kremlin haplayed Western election pol [itic's by extending or denxling invitations, at the righ' time, to leading Western politicians. Kremlin politics I Long before Mr Nixon [went to Moscow to campaign fur re-election, he was preceded by Britain’s Prime Minister (Mr Harold McMil lan), and was followed bs President Pompidou bel’vn .last year's French election. ■Now. with Britain's Prime Minister (Mr Harold Wilsoni -preparing lor a possible [election, Moscow has been [dropping discreet hints that lit might let him make the trip, if he behaves, and (promises something in return. Mr Khnishchex used ;>> boast that he had helped John F. Kennedy win the Presidency, in a very cluse election, by timing the [release of the United States ■ airmen then held captive in 'the Soviet Union in a wa\ (designed to favour Mr Ken nedy. Mr Brezhnev helped (Mr Nixon. He will do anyithing to keep out Senator Jackson.

I So long as the Kremlin thought that Mr Nixon could pay his debts, it conducted itself in a way designed to 'help him against his critics [To reverse its conduct would [require no change of prin ciple, only a change in its estimate of whether Mr (Nixon can pay his debts, land it is now clear that he [ cannot.

The Kremlin knows that 'by refusing tn co-operate (with Mr Nixon on S.A.L.T., (the Middle last, and the (like, it is depriving him of his last line of defence, the .argument that he should be (allowed to remain in office to complete the structure of peace. Moscow cannot, by itself, dump Mr Nixon, but it can add materially to the pressure on defences that are growing weaker all the time.

Moscow’s motives in refusing to co-operate with Mr Nixon may be mixed. But if its un-cooperative attitude persists, it will be clear that the Kremlin has indeed decided to dump Mr Nixon and to help install Mr Ford, in the expectation that it can gain more this way.

(Copyright 1974 Victor Zorza)