TERRORISM RETURNS OMINOUS SIGNS OF AN OLD DISEASE THAT DOGS MALAYA

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32702, 3 September 1971, Page 14

TERRORISM RETURNS OMINOUS SIGNS OF AN OLD DISEASE THAT DOGS MALAYA

(By

IAN WARD

1 in Kuala Lumpur, writing to the "Daily Telegraph," London)

(Reprinted by arrangement)

At the turn of the year, . Kuala Lumpur officials talked confidently of reduced Communist terrorism along the Thai-Malaysia border and even ventured predictions that the threat from the Peking-oriented Malayan Communist Party was finally abating. By May, however, all optimism had been abruptly tempered. The dynamiting of a bridge on an important norihern rail hnk, followed by clashes with guerrillas in the border state struggle Pr ° Vlded ommoU3 evi dence of the Communists’ continuing

Less publicised were increased sightings of armed guerrilla bands moving in all four border States. At least two of these sightings were in the vicinity of the joint Malaysian - Australian Air Force base at Butterworth, on the Malayan peninsula’s north-west coast, opposite Penang Island. . It seemed the Communists might have initiated a significant southwards movement from the Thai border redoubts into which they were driven during the final days of the 1948-60 emergency, and on June 14 security forces stumbled on a terrorist training camp nine miles from Ipoh, tiie second largest city in the peninsula. Some days later a grave-faced Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, announced the Communist threat to be “serious.”

Curfews imposed

Curfews throughout the countryside north of Ipoh were imposed to facilitate troop operations. In a series of skirmishes a security force Officer died. Although the alert continues, the Communists, in true guerrilla tradition, appear to have melted into the jungle without trace. The training camp discovery has brought a flurry of anti-Communist psychological warfare activity. Government information units are now travelling -to remote kampongs, settlements and rubber estates distributing lectures aqd leaflets, along the “Help us to help you” theme. With these goes a revamped list of rewards awaiting those with information leading to the capturing, killing or surrendering of Communist terrorists or the taking of their arms and ammunition.

It is fair to say that this is the first time since 1960 that anti-insurgency experts and knowledgeable observers have seriously begun contemplating the possibility of a second emergency.

The belief is that the structure of the Malayan Communist party may have undergone some important reorganisation. There may be new blood at the Politburo level, and possibly even a fresh face to replace the legendary Malayan Communist Party leader Chin Peng, whose forces at the height of thejr activity during the emergency years tied down no fewer than 100,000 British and Commonwealth troops to a wearisome jungle campaign. Chin Peng will undoubtedly be retained as the movement’s all-inspiring, figurehead, however.

I Any movement south by . the guerrillas would presum- . ably be carefully pre-calcula- ■ ted on the basis of available manpower and the likely J receptivity of the areas into . which they intended to infil- . trate. This being so, either the Communist calculations 1 are wrong—and . they have . certainly been wrong before —or the over-all prospects for revolutionary warfare in independent Malaysia have improved.

Hard-core guerrillas

In terms of numbers the . Malayan Communist Party , hard-core guerrilla ranks i have swelled in the past . decade. Today the hard-core strength is placed at something between 2000 and 2500 —on paper, not a very startling increase. But • these figures fail to take into account the number of recruits lured into jungle camps for training and, after completing their courses, sent back to their villages and towns to await the call to arms. Nor do they give any reading on the spread of the political apparatus that must thread its tentacles throughout the countryside if military activities are to .have direction and purpose. Nor, indeed, do -they give any indication on the fundamental factor—public sympathy. During the last emergency the Malayan Communist Party was essentially a Chinese organisation, although efforts were made to give it a multi-racial facade. It remains predominantly Chinese though the past two years has seen great emphasis placed on recruitment of Malays. Intelligence reports credit the party with some success in this field especially in the depressed border kampongs in Kelantan and Perak. I But few experts regard the . Malayan- Communist Party’s , multi-racialism as anything more than a pose, that could be quickly dropped should party objectives become too difficult to define in the face of the Government’s appeal 1 across the racial spectrum, at which point the Malayan 1 Communist Party would: emerge as the voice-piece of 1 the politically hobbled Chinese, the hope of the second- 1 class citzen. This is more likely in the light of Communist China’s new-found , respectability and the fact that Malay leaders were the i first in the South Asian region actively to court their opposite numbers in Peking. Despite official platitudes on the effectiveness of ThaiMalaysia co-operatibn in . anti-insurgency efforts along the common frontier, these have, in fact, been a dismal failure. Intelligence, when

received, is guarded with such nationalistic pride that if it is ever employed in an operational context it is usually obsolete. One basic issue dominates any discussion of the current Communist threat in Malaysia: the traumatic racial riots of May 13, 1969. Although completely unrelated to Malayan Communist Party activities at the' time, Kuala Lumpur’s bloody street battles between Malays and Chinese have produced perhaps the only comparative measure of performances by the Government and Communist sides. As far as the Communists were concerned, the rioting substantiated beyond doubt the existence of a massive well of political frustration involving large segments of the Chinese population. At a moment of crisis the ruling Malays were found flatfooted. The aftermath has been a crucial testing period for the Government, which, after nearly two years of emergency rule, has returned to a Parliamentary system. The recent five - year development plan provides that the “have-nots” of all racial streams and not just the Malays are the beneficiaries. Properly implemented, the plan will prove that the Government has not only regained ground lost in May, 1969, but advanced considerably Political experts are forecasting that the plan will swiftly emerge as a priority target for the Communists. Government strategists have also sensed this

trend and harsh legislation is in store to counter any forms of economic sabotage.

Thrust split

Signs that the Malaysian Government’s enlightened economic policies could be forestalling political subversion are more encouraging than the military outlook. Here the thrust is already split between anti-insurgency campaigns in the East Malaysian State of Sarawak and the northern sectors of West Malaysia. The result is heavy pressure on two lengthy lines of logistical support. Has the recent crash programme of expanding military ranks meant a lowering of combat effectiveness? Certainly the recruiting drive failed to attract more than' a trickle of Chinese. On top of this, veterans of the 196365 confrontation campaign against Indonesia are phasing out. What is the calibre of their replacements?

An equally unknown quantity is the present operational standard of the Special Branch police. More than any other single Government department, the Special Branch was instrumental in breaking the Malayan Communist party’s grassroots infra-structure during the late 19505.

Since its functions are essentially clandestine, its key officials used to be inevitably Chinese. Several major Special Branch appointments have gone to Malays in recent years. As with the Army, its highly professional old guard, trained under the British, are retiring. Are the prospects offered by the branch these days inviting enough to attract the necessary level of Chinese talent and dedication? The coming months should provide an interesting insight, one way or the other, into many -of these questions.