1972 may test Vietnam

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32676, 4 August 1971, Page 15

1972 may test Vietnam

(By

BRUCE KOHN.

I. N.Z.P.A. stag correspondent)

WASHINGTON, August 3. International - affairs analyst* see 1972 as a crucial year for both military and political developments in IndoChina.

Many believe, and the Pentagon agrees, that the next dry season there will provide an acid test for the Nixon Administration’s “Vietnamisatlon” programme. The Pentagon itself is confident that South Vietnamese forces will give a clear demonstration that they can hold down “in strength” enemy operations. There is a belief that in Cambodia they may even be capable of destroying the effectiveness of the three North Vietnamese divisions based between Phnom Penh and the western border of South Vietnam. ELECTION YEAR

This military optimism about future developments, in Vietnam has proved illfounded before. Some officers concede this, but still adhere to their hopeful view. Should their assessments prove correct President Nixon’s intention to Withdraw ail but a comparatively small residual force before August 1 next year will be met with little difficulty. Even if they are wrong it Is difficult to see how the Administration could, in a'Presidential election year, slow down the withdrawal rate. But then the military outlook 1 for South Vietnam, Cambo- < die and Laos would become i bleak. .□ i Diplomatic authorities see

1972 as the year when the shape of the eventual political outcome of the conflict will become clear. There is considerable doubt within the Administration that Peking could, even if it so desired, help settle the war except on terms stipulated by Hanoi. The recent opposition expressed by Hanoi towards any “big-Power” solution was seen as an indication, that this may prove to be the case.

! ROLE OF ELECTIONS Nevertheless the results of . the dialogue opening up bei tween Washington and Pe- . king are considered certain i to influence North Vietnam s 1 assessment of the type of i settlement it may .hope to r win, short of a military or . political take-over of the r South. _ . . ; From Washington’s vlew--1 point, ideal developments in i coming months would be successful South Vietnamese presidential elections, with a minimal number of votei rigging charges, and a strong i showing by the Saigon forces in the dry season. i American troop withi drawals could then be accompanied by convincing Adi ministration claims that the ; commitment to give South Vietnam a fair chance of t survival against aggression i had been fulfilled. i The Pentagon believes , that the second hope prob- , ably will be achieved. . Administration sources re- . fleet nervousness over the ■ first. Against the murky background of South Vietnamese political and military activities few experienced analysts would bet that events Will work out as the Administration hopes.

There is widespread agreement, however, that a successful showing by the South Vietnamese military late this year and early next year is essential for die Administration’s negotiating position and domestic political strategy..