The Press FRIDAY. FEBRUARY 7, 1969. Mr Nix'n And N.A.T.O.

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 31907, 7 February 1969, Page 10

The Press FRIDAY. FEBRUARY 7, 1969. Mr Nix'n And N.A.T.O.

Immediate results, such as a renegotiated North Atlantic Treaty Organisation pact, need not be expected from President Nixon’s planned visit to Western Europe. There are so many issues at stake that his visit must be considered an exploratory mission. N.A.T.O. policy will itself have to be largely re-defined, aimed at a more reasonable sharing of the burden of preparedness, if the European member States are to persuade the United States to remain as a major participant. When he talks more or less informally in the European capitals Mr Nixon will want to know the extent to which the N.A.T.O. governments are prepared to commit their people and resources to the strengthening of a common defence system. Neither in London, nor Paris, nor Bonn nor, indeed, any other Western capital can it be pretended that the defence burden is being shared equitably.

When the N.A.T.O. defence ministers met in Brussels last year, after the Russians had smothered liberalism in Czechoslovakia, it was agreed that an entirely new situation had been created. Russian divisions, in overwhelming strength relative to that of the established N.A.T.O. forces, were brought to the frontier between West Germany and Czechoslovakia. They were not there before the invasion: and it was promptly argued in Brussels that Western Europe must have better-balanced forces, better training and reserves, better equipment and larger stockpiles of weapons and munitions. The British Defence Minister, Mr Healey, recognised this when he pointed out in Munich a few days ago that account must be taken of the growing strength of the Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe, now greatly superior to that of the N.A.T.O. Powers. The decay of the Russian empire in Eastern Europe, Mr Healey argued, could lead to further explosions like those which had occurred in East Berlin, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, “ perhaps “in circumstances which would pose a more direct “ threat to the stability of the European military “ balance

With the Russians, when the time comes to debate the growing nuclear challenge, Mr Nixon will face a ticklish and immensely difficult task. He is thought to base his hopes for agreement on what President Johnson’s Defence Secretary, Mr Clifford, called ” the stated willingness of the Soviet Union to “discuss with us the mutual limitation of strategic “nuclear weapons”. Mr McNamara, when Defence Secretary, had appeared to approve the principle that, in such weapons, Russia should achieve “ parity ” with the United States. Mr Nixon and his Defence Secretary, Mr Laird, have made it very clear that this will not be their approach. They intend to bargain from a position of strength—hoping, indeed, to maintain, and perhaps increase, America’s qualitative lead in nuclear arms.

It is difficult to see the Russians agreeing to negotiate on a basis which would require them to accept, as logical, American nuclear superiority. But an exchange of views can certainly do no harm; and the Russians, with their enormous commitments in several spheres, may well shrink from the cost involved in continuing the arms race at unabated speed. It may be that, when a showdown does come between the two super-Powers on nuclear arms, the hypothesis put forward by Mr Henry Kissinger—now Mr Nixon’s top adviser on foreign affairs—will prove sound. Mr Kissinger regards the Soviet Union as an opponent whose public pronouncements about the United States are “insistently hostile”. Yet, he reasons, the nuclear age “ imposes a degree of “ co-operation and an absolute limit to conflicts ”.