The Paris Deadlock

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31729, 12 July 1968, Page 10

The Paris Deadlock

United States and North Vietnamese diplomats held their twelfth meeting in Paris on Wednesday to discuss terms for ending the bombing of North Vietnam. Since the talks began two months ago the two sides have conceded nothing on the bombing issue—the only issue formally on the agenda. The talks therefore remain deadlocked. The United States delegates have sought from the North Vietnamese some assurance or action to show “restraint” to match an end to American bombing below the 20th paralleL The North Vietnamese demand an unconditional end to the bombing. The talks are not, however, hopeless: to the chagrin of the Chinese, and with the probable encouragement of Russia, the North Vietnamese at least showed their interest in negotiating an end to the war when they agreed to have talks in the first place. The exchanges in the last two months suggest that the North Vietnamese are keen to keep the talks going and most commentators seem agreed that Hanoi will not make an important move at least until after the political party conventions in the United States next month, perhaps not until the American Presidency has been decided. Weight was lent to this view when the chief North Vietnamese delegate, Xuan Thuy, appealed directly to the American people last week to compel a change of United States policy. Instead of working forward from agreement on the bombing, the delegates appear to be trying to work backwards from positions they might ultimately accept The revival at Wednesday’s meeting of President Johnson’s rehabilitation and development plan for South-East Asia was another stroke of the brush to fill in the post-war picture. When other matters have been settled the bombing keystone may be dropped into place. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese are pressing for military and political gains in South Vietnam. From Hanoi’s point of view this strategy makes good sense: if the bombing stopped now, and matching concessions were agreed to, the pressure on the Americans and on the South Vietnamese Government would be eased. Hanoi’s chances of winning higher stakes at the talks would be reduced. Even now the North Vietnamese could give the United States sufficient evidence of “restraint” by agreeing to talks on reducing their present level of forces. They have avoided doing this and have talked of a political settlement when the bombing and other acts of war against the North have stopped. Such a settlement would require a broadlybased Government in Saigon incorporating the National Liberation Front or its offshoots, fresh elections for a new National Assembly, and a neutral South Vietnam which would unite gradually with the North without outside interference. The proposition should not be wholly unacceptable to the United States; it is not calculated to appeal to the Saigon Government. Indeed, the promotion of friction between the United States and the South Vietnamese appears to be a primary aim of the North Vietnamese delegates. This form of settlement is roughly akin to the American view of a return to the Geneva agreements of 1954. The Chief United States delegate, Mr Averell Harriman, said last week: “ We will support “any political settlement for the reunification of “ Vietnam that is based on the free choice of the “ people of the North and of the South.... But surely “ you will see that reconciliation will only be possible “ under conditions of peace ”. At an earlier meeting, Mr Harriman’s deputy, Mr Cyrus Vance, told the North Vietnamese: “If you “ desist in the use of force the United States would “ have no cause for military presence in Vietnam ”. This statement was notably different from the communique after South Vietnam’s allies met in Manila in 1966. The communique required the North to withdraw its forces—not merely to stop fighting. Mr Vance did not speak of a gradual American withdrawal to match the reduction in the level of violence. The prospect of a political settlement, however dim, means that the South Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front must eventually be drawn into the talks. Recent Government changes in Saigon and evidence of the more liberal attitude of Tran Van Huong, the new Prime Minister, suggest that South Vietnam may adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the North if the fighting can be stopped. President Thieu and President Johnson are due to meet later this month; both will be eager to define Saigon’s position in the event of genuine peace talks beginning. Although North Vietnam appears to be relying more heavily on Russian military aid, Russia has been actively urging on both sides the need for a settlement. This may be the most hopeful sign yet to emerge. ,