The Press THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1968. More Talks About Suez

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31568, 4 January 1968, Page 8

The Press THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1968. More Talks About Suez

It was remarked recently that Israel’s insistence on

direct peace talks with the Arab Governments had almost acquired the immutability of an eleventh

commandment It remains to be seen how far President Nasser is prepared to go towards meeting the basic Israeli requirement when he attends the fifth Arab summit meeting at Rabat. The United Nations Secretary-General’s special representative, Mr Gunnar Jarring, has already had exploratory talks with Israeli and Arab Ministers, mainly concerning prospects for reopening the Suez Canal. Nothing positive is expected, however, before the Moroccan meeting. It would be characteristic of President Nasser to seek to evade even the appearance of concession to Israel Compromise would presumably be another matter —if, for example, the Arab Heads of State decided that an approach to Israel could no longer be delayed in the interests of stability in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, nothing that the United Nations says or does about the Middle East has any significance in Cairo. Egyptian intransigence, rooted in what seems a fundamental urge to destroy Israel, has so far denied any hope of agreement for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied areas, particularly the Sinai desert. Not surprisingly, Israel is not prepared to make any commitments in advance. Arab good faith is not taken for granted in Tel Aviv. The British resolution which the Security Council adopted unanimously on November 22 would require an Israeli withdrawal in return for a negotiated settlement Such a settlement would meet Israel’s insistence on direct talks; and an Arab instruction at Rabat would presumably override Egyptian objections to an Arab-Israeli meeting. President Nasser has substantial reasons for wanting to restore traffic through the Suez Canal. The blockage is costing Egypt an enormous amount of money—including, apart from dues paid by shipping, an estimated £lOO million a year from tourists. There is, moreover, no certainty that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya will accept indefinitely the heavy burden of payment to Egypt in lieu of tolls—a total of £95 million a year. There is at least some hope, therefore, that President Nasser will go to Rabat in a more accommodating frame of mind than he has revealed so far, particularly as he has already discussed the Security Council’s resolution with the British Ambassador, Sir Harold Beeley. Rabat might produce a formula to enable talks to begin without requiring the Israelis to jeopardise their own security. President Nasser is known to be seeking other decisions at Rabat, apart from any affecting the canal. He wants to revitalise the Arab League. Cairo has been working on a new charter, which would make the league an authoritative body, its decisions in some categories binding all the Arab Governments. He wants also a unified Arab command; and the June war will surely have demonstrated the need for that. Above all else, he wants to rebuild his own prestige, which might involve making concessions to other Arab opinion. The Suez darkness might yet be relieved by a glimmer of light—provided there is recognition at Rabat of Israel’s permanence as a sovereign State, not something “ separate and alien ” in an Arab hinterland.