The Press TUESDAY, MAY 4, 1965. Local Body Ombudsman

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30741, 4 May 1965, Page 16

The Press TUESDAY, MAY 4, 1965. Local Body Ombudsman

Should the powers of an ombudsman be extended to the administrative decisions of local bodies? The present Ombudsman is an officer of Parliament; and as a matter of principle the central government interferes as little as possible in the affairs of local authorities. Yet the Ombudsman himself has seen a need to pose the question. The many appeals to the Parliamentary Commissioner suggest that his office inspires public confidence, first in the usefulness of the office itself, and ultimately in the fairness and reasonableness of the administrative decisions of central government. The public will be more tolerant of genuine mistakes, misjudgment and even unreasonable decisions, if there is some guarantee that they will be rectified. The extension of the system to local bodies is no simple matter.

In attempting to correct wrongful or unreasonable administrative acts by local bodies an investigator might be concerned as much with decisions made at the council table as with those made at office desks by local authority servants. This is where the fundamental difference between the Parliamentary Commissioner and a local body ombudsman really lies. The Parliamentary Commissioner reports to Parliament; he does not criticise its decisions. A local body ombudsman would report his findings to local bodies; but he would be bound, in some cases, to criticise their own actions. The ombudsman could publicise his recommendations and the local authority would be faced with the persuasive force of public opinion in determining whether to act on them. In practice, this would give ultimate power to the ombudsman, a power which the Parliamentary Commissioner does not and should not possess. Public opinion, though not readily ascertainable in such circumstances, would almost inevitably follow the decision of the ombudsman; Parliament, on the other hand, can assess the wisdom of its commissioner’s decisions by re-examining the facts of a case. Experience so far suggests that reluctance by departments to co-operate will be so rare that the ultimate authority of Parliament will seldom be invoked. No such case has arisen since the office was established. There seems to be no reason to suppose that local bodies would accept the guidance of an ombudsman less willingly, for his examination of both justified and unjustified complaints should help public and officials alike. The influence of Parliament in a dispute between a local authority and the local body ombudsman would therefore be exerted only in the most rare and difficult situations. The deliberative powers of Parliament would be a proper safeguard against error by the ombudsman. The ombudsman should have the confidence of local authorities. He could be appointed on their nomination. The acceptance of the final authority of Parliament in this delicate field of determining what is fair and reasonable administration —not of policy decisions — would be no serious infraction of local autonomy.