The Press SATURDAY, MAY 16, 1964. Uneasy Frontier

Press, Volume CIII, Issue 30442, 16 May 1964, Page 12

The Press SATURDAY, MAY 16, 1964. Uneasy Frontier

The exchanges between China and Russia on their frontier differences are couched in the turgid prose of theoretical communism. But there is nothing theoretical about a very practical dispute that would alone account for the bad blood between the Communist leaders. Independent Outer Mongolia lies as a buffer between the rivals; but north-east and south-west of the buffer Russia and China march uneasily together, as they have done for centuries. In the north, China claims territory in the Amur valley. Here, Russia has such key points as the naval base at Vladivostok, the nuclear research centre of Khaborovosk, and the important cities of Blagovoschenk and Komsomolsk. As long ago as 1960 the Russians, by implication, were accusing the Chinese of espionage in this area.

The roles are almost exactly reversed far to the south-west, because the Russians undoubtedly take advantage of the ill-defined border between Kazakhstan and Sinkiang to spy on the arid deserts where China is believed to test its atomic weapons and guided missiles. In this they enjoy the sympathy of a majority of the population. About five million of the seven million inhabitants of Sinkiang are not Chinese but Kazakhs, Tartars, and others closely related to their Russian neighbours. They are aware that their Russian cousins have a higher standard of living; and in 1962 rioting led to an open insurrection, which caused a big drop in oil production before it was put down. Refugees from Sinkiang continually cross the frontier, sometimes taking their herds with them. They receive a cordial welcome from the Russian administration.

Neither Russia nor China is yet prepared to go to war, any more than Japan and Russia were prepared to go to war on the Manchurian frontier before 1945. Neither can forget, however, the occasional heavy local fighting in Manchuria and the alacrity with which Russia seized the opportunity of the Japanese collapse. If they could reach a settlement both would be much relieved, in spite of their continuing doctrinal and personal differences. They began preliminary discussions last February, when Russian experts went to Peking to seek a basis for negotiations.

It is not surprising that they have made little progress. On the one hand, the Chinese declare that south-east Siberia and parts of Russian central Asia had been taken from them by the “ unbridled aggres- “ sion ” of the Tsars, and that they do not acknowledge frontiers based on “ unequal treaties ”, On the other, the Russians, accusing the Chinese of pursuing “ a “ very dangerous path ”, contend that south-east Siberia “ never really belonged either to the Manchus “ or to China They must also be aware of the strength of their own ethnic claims in Sinkiang. Russia probably would accept a more easily policed Kazakhistan frontier if the Chinese would renounce their Siberian claims. In its present mood Peking is not likely to be so modest. The frontier quarrel may be of more lasting significance than the internal struggle for the control of world communism.