Change In Western Europe—IV ALGERIA MILLSTONE OF “MIXED-UP” FRANCE

Press, Volume XCIX, Issue 29383, 9 December 1960, Page 16

Change In Western Europe —IV ALGERIA MILLSTONE OF “MIXED-UP” FRANCE

(By

COUN BINGHAM.

Associate Editor of ths "Sydney Morning

Herata ” who recently tnsited the major Continental countries of the Western Alliance]

In Germany and Italy one feels that if democracy were overthrown it would stay overthrown for a long time. But in France it is difficult to imagine that a people with such a tradition of individualism would accept a prolonged dictatorship. Nevertheless. democracy in France is today more menaced than in either of the other major Continental partners in N.A.T.O. In October the French Prime Minister, Mr Debre. described the new (1958) Constitution—under which the Government has often acted with secrecy and intolerance —as perhaps “for France the last chance of parliamentary democracy.” The growing political unrest has naturally affected the nerves of some sections of the business community, but to those who lived in, or frequently visited. France in the first years of the Fourth Republic, the economic strength of the country today represents an almost miraculous recovery. The credit for this only partly belongs to the Fifth Republic, although the financial reforms designed by Professor Rueff. and introduced by General de Gaulle nearly two years ago, helped greatly to increase the competitiveness of French industry. One is struck by the number of people—many of them in administrative jobs—who now go out of their way to emphasise how much of the foundation for French economic expansion had been laid before General de Gaulle returned to power.

Debt to Fourth Republic In the Quai d’Orsay itself I was told just how many things had been done by the despised Fourth Republic Governments to strengthen the French economy, even while colonial wars were imposing a. heavy drain on the country’s finances. The proofs of France’s achifevements during the Fourth Republic included the great hydro-electric works, the rebuilding and electrification of the railway system, and the reequipment and nationalisation' of the coal industry.

By 1953, the success with which a considerable sector of French industry had been modernised—as a result of heavy investment in the immediate postwar years was shown in an expansion of production as fast as that in Germany, and much faster than the American and British rate. From the index figures of 100 in December, 1956, French industrial production rose to 183 in December, 1959. and this figure has been roughly maintained in 1960 despite a decline of strength in some fields, notably in car exports outside the franc area.

It is not because of economic weakness—and certainly not because of shortcomings of one of the most advanced systems of social security in the world—that the number of critics of President de Gaulle and his policy is increasing. plots Against the Regime?

It is the Algerian problem—and none other—that one day may wreck the Fifth Republic just as it did the Fourth. In Paris, I was told by an acknowledged American expert in French politics that his telephone had been ringing all the morning with “information” on the latest plot against the regime. “I don’t know what is behind this new surge,” he said, “but most of these informants agreed that something had happened in the last 24 hours to accelerate the tempo and scope of the movement against de Gaulle.” I asked whether .it was really possible to find financial backing for such a. movement in a country where “big money” had benefited so much from the economic stability protected by General de Gaulle’s authority. His reply was: “There is always money in France for a campaign which has any chance of success. It’s a form of insurance.” Whether or not the telephonecallers of November 22 were "in the know,” demonstrations and outspokdn attacks against the regime, and significant changes of mind by individuals who once supported it, have increased remarkably. Loud Homage In his recent progresses through the provinces of France, President de Gaulle received vociferous homage from great • crowds, although some acirte observers declare that even among the populace the General has lost favour In Paris, I found many indications that the great majority of his critics were the “politicians, trade-unionists, soldiers and journalists” whom he has himself listed as the real “opposition” to his policy on Algeria. Outside these groups stand the millions of ordinary citizens who still believe that without de Gaulle the Fifth Republic would become as faction-ridden and as /utile as the Fourth was in its attempts to cope with the Algerian dilemma. And it is on them that the General will rely for support in his decision t<j implement his conception of an “Algerian Algeria”—revealed at last as probably, in its intermediate stage at least, a semi-autonomous republic—against the militant settlers and an apparently substantial section of the officer corps.

The view is strongly held in some quarters in France that General de Gaulle has been the victim of his own procrastination and "lonely grandeur.” “Monarchical” Presidency? The main reason why the General’s leadership. I was told, had received a severe check in recent months was his “monarchical” conception of the Presidencv under a Constitution he had himself fashioned. According to' this conception, he was not only "in a certain measure the symbol and guarantor of national unity.” but. in terms of political morality, a “clean” man standing above all groups and parties. From this noble altitude, he handed down policies, but refused to take part in the sordid business of politics. through which, in any country professing to be a parliamentary democracy, the proper support for his policies could alone be organised. That is probably one of the shrewdest assessments yet made of the President's failure to make

the best of the vast authority conferred upon him with national acclamation in 1958. “He has done much,” said a leading journalist, “to destroy the political consciousness of the country.” That may be an exaggerated charge, especially in the light of recent spirited, debates, in the National Assembly. But there are many in France who believe that if he had set out to strengthen his liaison with the elected representatives of the people, he could have forged ahead—after his epoch-making speech in September. 1959—with the very Algerian policy which, if he now attempts to force it. may meet with bloody resistance. His own "immobilism” after he had successfully dealt with the Algiers uprising in January this year did not mean that he became the “prisoner of the Army.” but its was certainly the need to keep the Army on side that made him mark time, thus drastically reducing the momentum of his drive for peace in Algeria. "Europe of Fatherlands’’

An article about the present state of France inevitably becomes an article about General de Gaulle. And any estimate of the French President's status must also include the effects of his policies—or. more accurately, his attitude —upon the affairs of Europe. There is an increasingly cynical reaction in European capitals to his insistence on the "glory and grandeur” of France in a Continent where national survival may depend upon the fullest international partnership. Those who for years have striven to strengthen the structure of unity resent a French governmental influence which now—in contrast with the earlier stimulus from French ideas and French organising genius—is tending to slow down the whole progress of integration. But the General’s Idea of a confederal "Europe of Fatherlands” instead of an integrated or federal Europe has earnest defenders inside and outside France.

The great virtue of confederation—as a French diplomat put it to me—was that it would preserve the national identity of the participating peoples within the framework of a less restrictive system than federation. “Integrating Frenchmen, Germans, and Belgians will not make them any the less Frenchmen, Germans and Belgians.” he said warmly. "Indeed, the heavier the institutional demands derived from a •paper’ Constitution, the more likely is it that, in a time when passions are aroused, the enforced ’unity’ will break asunder.” Threat to Co-operation

This debate on confederation v. federation in Europe may be made largely academic by the threatened disintegration of France's own political “Unity." It is not the future France alone which will be at stake if the campaign against de Gaulle’s Algerian policy gathers strength: the resultant conflict might easily break the present treaty-mould of co-operation which, in spite of reservation, the General supports, and in which is safely contained such a potentially dangerous force as German nationalism. After de Gaulle, who? The thought of a Soustelle or even a Pinay waiting in the wings is not reassuring. Meanwhile, foreigners may wonder at the natural richness of a country which—after years of exhausting colonial war, and with the Algerian millstone still around its neck—gives so many nroofs of progress. “Why sell France short?” asked Mr Rista. president of the French Chamber of Commerce in Australia, the other day. "Is it not the country of the fastest electric train, the best commercial jet, of the fastest plane, of the construction of the Hong Kong airport?” And of the liveliest intellects in Europe! .(To Be Concluded)