"Fundamental Issue”

Press, Volume XCIX, Issue 29222, 4 June 1960, Page 13

"Fundamental Issue”

(Rec. 11 p.m.) MOSCOW, June 3. Mr Khrushchev told other heads of Government in separate messages accompanying his latest disarmament proposals that the question of disarmament is the fundamental issue today. Tass, announcing the messages to Mr Macmillan and Presidents Eisenhower and de Gaulle, quoted them as saying the new Soviet plans take into account some considerations of Russia’s partners in the disarmament talks.

“Specifically,” they took account of the French Government’s suggestion that measures should be taken at the start of the disarmament programme to destroy the means of nuclear delivery, the message said.

Mr Khrushchev said in his messages that account was also taken of proposals submitted at the Geneva 10-nation disarmament conference, but added that Russia “has grave doubts about the Western Powers represented on the 10-nation committee really desiring disarmament.”

He said his impression was that they were not prepared in effect to carry out the resolution on general and complete disarmament which they voted for when it was approved by the United Nations General Assembly. ‘The Western Powers, in effect, propose control without disarmament, and to speak frankly, such control is nothing but intelligence, espionage. “No Government concerned for the sovereign rights of States can agree to this," Mr Khrushchev said. “Brooks No Delay”

Later, when addressing 400 correspondents at a rare Kremlin press conference, Mr Khrushchev reviewed Russia's revised disarmament proposals and said: “The problem of disarmament brooks no delay. It persistently knocks at the door. A further delay in solving this problem is fraught with tragic consequences in the present age of atom, intercontinental rockets and electronics.”

He said that the investigations now being carried out by the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee “again most clearly confirms that the wrecking of the summit conference was planned and carried out by the United States Government— Herter, Nixon and Eisenhower.

“Unfortunately, the United States Administration, by its provocative actions, w’ecked the summit meeting and we did not succeed in discussing at Paris the question of general and complete disarmament and other important international questions” Mr Khrushchev said the Soviet proposals were drafted by the Government to be submitted and discussed at the Heads of Government conference in Paris

“We prepared for the summit meeting with the most serious and good intentions and did not travel to Paris with an empty portfolio,” he said 'The Soviet Government had expected that it would be possible at the conference to make progress in solving the most important and Pressing problems of our time, including the main problem of the day—the problem of general and complete disarmament." The Soviet leader said the abolition of all types of carriers of nuclear weapons in the first stage of general and complete disarmament ‘would create firm guarantees against surprise attacks ”

"When disarmament measures •re implemented." he said, “there w ill hardly be any objection to flying over the territories of countries with the object of Photographing any points from any altitude. For then no-one could use the data obtained to the detriment of the security of any State.” Mr Khrushchev said the Soviet Government had carefully studied f_■ considerations put forward by the Western Powers on the necessity of setting up international armed forces. ”We drew the conclusion,” he •aid. "‘that the only realistic pos

sibility in present conditions would be, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, when necessary, to place police (militia) detachments which would remain at the disposal of States after the implementation of general and complete disarmament . . .

at the disposal of the Security Council to ensure keeping the peace.” After the Soviet disarmament plan had been put into effect, Mr Khrushchev said, President Eisenhower, Mr Herter, Mr Douglas Dillon, the United States Under-Secretary of State, and others—and especially Mr Nixon. —could then fly over any part of the Soviet territory they wanted to, and “we would wave to them from below."

The flights would not then be a threat to the security of the Soviet Union. Mr Khrushchev said.