The Press TUESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1960. Algeria And The Fifth Republic

Press, Volume XCIX, Issue 29112, 26 January 1960, Page 12

The Press TUESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1960. Algeria And The Fifth Republic

After Mr Antoine Piney’s dismissal as the French Minister of Finance, “ The Times ” observed that “in France today “ only one man is indispens- “ able ”, Recent events have left that one man—General de Gaulle—lonelier than ever in his Presidential eminence. The news from Algiers is disturbing; and the future of Algeria, the Fifth Republic, and the Gaullist cause is shrouded in uncertainty. From the start, President de Gaulle’s Republic has been a creature of paradox. The President has been driven by the state of the institutions he himself called into being to act most autocratically in pursuit of his most liberal policies. His pronouncements on Algeria have been made on his own authority alone. They have cost him support, most notably among those who contrived his return to power. His highmindedness and other estimable qualities have not been matched by a capacity or desire to mollify his critics and consolidate his position. General Massu, a central figure in the latest Algerian troubles, was prominent in the dramatic manoeuvres of May, 1958, that brought General de Gaulle from retirement to “save” France. But General Massu is only one of the May revolutionaries in whom disillusionment has been bred by the President’s policies. When the Fourth Republic was destroyed, nobody—probably not even General de Gaulle—was very clear about how the grand objective of rebuilding France would be attained. Everybody, especially in Algeria, saw a prospect of personal advantage in General de Gaulle’s return. Political differences were submerged beneath the wave of nationalist sentiment; only with time have the customary frictions been renewed. In 1958 some of the Europeans in Algiers supposed that, as their will had prevailed, so their influence would in future be a factor to be reckoned with in French politics. The May rebellion seemed to cast the Army in a political role, founded on its ability to establish closer contact with Algeria’s Moslem masses than any civil administration. Among the Moslems themselves the rebellion fostered confidence that a new era of understanding between European and Arab

had indeed begun. All these partisan hopes have been dashed; and the Algerian war continues.

From the beginning of his regime, it was doubtful how General de Gaulle could continue to govern from a firm base of popular consent. On Algeria, the most critical issue of French politics, he began by being adroitly non-committal. But on September 16 last year he announced his policy of allowing the war to die and Algerians to choose their future constitutional arrangements. To the horror of the die-hard French colonials, he has occasionally referred in recent months to a “ peace of the brave a negotiated settlement with the F.L.N. rebels. The initiative, however, must come from the rebels themselves, not from the French Government. This apparently humane treatment of Arab intransigents has angered European extremists in Algeria and Metropolitan France. The French colonists have been alarmed, too, by a recrudescence of terrorism in Algerian urban centres. They have blamed the relaxation of security measures, and have contrasted the results of General de Gaulle’s peaceful overtures with those obtained by General Massu’s strong-arm methods. Patiently and tenaciously, General de Gaulle has developed his scheme for social, economic, and political advances in Algeria; but, so long as he serves a seriously-divided nation, his success must be limited.

The President may consider the time opportune for trying conclusions with the Algerian extremists. Reports from Algiers almost certainly give an incomplete picture of the disorders there. General de Gaulle has made an impassioned plea for unity; and his decision to visit Algeria on February 5 is unchanged. Because of the weakness of French Parliamentary government, the President must largely rely on his own prestige to secure popular consent for his programme as well as administrative obedience. Though he may be able to afford the loss of administrators such as General Massu, he could hardly withstand indefinitely the whittling of his heroic influence upon Frenchmen in Europe or North Africa.