THE SHADOW OF BARBARISM UNITED NATIONS AND THE WEST

Press, Volume XCV, Issue 28179, 18 January 1957, Page 10

THE SHADOW OF BARBARISM UNITED NATIONS AND THE WEST

(By PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY. 0.M.. in the "Sunday Times."] i y (Reprinted bp Arrangement)

The League of Nations was pro-1 jected, towards the end of the, first world war. in the hope that] after that terrible experience, in which H-e winners had suffered almost as much as the losers/ every civilised nation would see the folly of attempting to make its fortune by winning a war. This hope quickly proved false. Not only Germany but Japan, too. saw that they were stronger than their neighbours and might well make their fortune by a brave stroke; and even Italy, finding herself surrounded on all sides by nations afraid, or unwilling, to fight, yielded to Mussolini’s daring adventure of attempting to recreate the Roman Empire.

The League of Nations, and the United Nations which followed it. were dependent for success on one condition —that either al! nations, or. at least, all the Great Powers, should be content to abstain from war. That condition, of course, has never been fulfilled. The Rule of Unanimity

The Security Council, which claimed such immense compulsory powers, was subject to a rule of unanimity among its permanent members; it could not act unless all of them agreed. This was practically a necessity because if one Great Power was definitely unwilling to do something there was no way, short jf a world war, to compel it. It soon became apparent that Russia meant to use this rule as an habitual veto, which meant that the Security Council was. for practical purposes, paralysed. Its resolutions carried with them the power to act, but then it could never pass a resolution. Was there any way round this obstacle? The General Assembly, consisting of all members of the United Nations, had a power of passing resolutions but no power of action, that is, of using force. An ingenious interpretation of the Charter was made, in November. 1950, by which, if some Power, or group of Powers, claimed that it was necessary to use force and two-thirds of the Assembly thought it was right in doing so, the Assembly, as representing world opinion, had the power of approving, that is, of practically legalising, the irregularity. The Assembly was to count as representing the conscience of the civilised world. One Nation, One Vote What was the weakness here? When framing the rules of the Assembly of the League or its successor, from 1917 onwards, statesmen were confronted by the difficulty of finding any reasonable method of voting. It had to be accepted that all nations were equal and one nation had one vote; thus, even at the beginning, we had to agree to make Haiti equal to the United States. That was absurd; but the rule did not become really dangerous till there arose the recent universal clamour for equality and the “anti-West” enthusiasm of nearly all Asia and Africa. Before 1914, and even in the early years of the League of Nations, the white or “Western’’ or “Christian” races had something like an authority over the world. It was a “white” or “Christian” civilisation. But, in the 1950’5, when the numbers of the General Assembly were greatly increased—to 79—the new additions consisted mainly of nations which rejected that authority and, in many cases, had not reached the standard of government that we call “civilisation”; and it was they who generally had a majority in the Assembly on their side. Most of Asia and Africa was “antiWest.”

When England and France made their daring attempt to stop the “anti-West” conspiracy of Nasser's usurpation they, perhaps, hoped that, in the long run, their action might be approved and. in a sense, legalised by the nations of the world. Whether this hope was reasonable or not in any circumstances, it certainly had no chance at a time when

I most of the 79 nations of the Assembly were anti-white or, at least, anti-colonial. Civilisation in Danger In the Covenant of the League there had been an Article (XXII) saying that “some nations were less advanced’’ than others, and that their “welfare and progress” were, therefore, a “sacred trust” of civilisation. That belonged to the age which still dared to say that unequal things were unequal and that the civilisation of Northern Europe was definitely superior to that of South-East Asia. It is not now permitted to say that some nations are less advanced than others, and the “sacred trust” of civilisation is resented as “colonialism.” It will be very difficult, in the Assembly, to admit any extra value between the great and the small nations, still more difficult between the civilised and the comparatively uncivilised: yet, if we continue moving blindly the same equalitarian direction that is now fashionable, there is real danger that not merely the' British Empire but the who;* “Western” or “Christian” civilis*. tion will become of less and less account. The enemies of what we Europeans call “civilisation” have always got a common cry of “Communism” and an extremely powerful leader in Russia. The two necessities of any civilised social order are, first, a general willingness to obey the law and, second, the absence of any one Power ambitious enough and strong enough to wreck the law. We still have. I think, a reasonably good civilisation. We older men whs were grown up or growing upj before 1914 know what a civilised , society really is; younger men , have known at least the remain* ; of it after 50 years of strain. The! great danger is that we may all \ look on and see the civilised \ world rebarbarised.