The Press THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1955. S.E.A.T.O. Conference

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27592, 24 February 1955, Page 12

The Press THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1955. S.E.A.T.O. Conference

The chief purpose of the conference in Bangkok is to provide some substance for the somewhat nebulous South-east Asia Treaty Organisation (5.E.A.T.0.). The collective defence treaty was signed in Manila last September under the shadow of the crisis in Indo-China. The treaty has since been ratified by all the signatory governments—Britain, the United States, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Siam. It is now necessary to begin the specific planning of

measures to secure the purposes of the treaty. No-one pretends that the treaty is ideal; too many nations which have, or should have, as much interest as the. signatories in the security of the region have declined to take part in the treaty arrangements, though it is reported that some are having second thoughts. The area covered by the guarantee of security is not wide enough to take in some of the territories most likely to be threatened by Communist expansion in the near fftture. The treaty is not a counterpart of the European defence arrangement, with which it has often been misleadingly compared. It does not operate automatically in the event of aggression; it merely pledges the signatory nations to consult immediately if one is threatened either by aggression or subversion. Bur in spite of its obvious shortcomings, the S.E.A.T.O. treaty can be moulded into at least a useful, and perhaps a powerful, influence towards stabilising South-east Asia and towards ensuring peace in the area. The organisation will attempt to meet the threat of Communist expansion in three ways—by erecting military, economic, and political defence systems. In the long run the econoAic provisions of the S.E.A.T.O. treaty. may be more decisive than the military; and they may in time persuade the Asian nations which so far have stood aside from the treaty of its pacific and beneficent purposes. But in the short run, political and military

measures must have first consideration. Foremost among the political measures must be efforts to convince both potential aggressors and

threatened nations that S.E.A.T.O. expresses more than pious hopes. Quite apart from the power at their disposal, the Communists have been assisted by the disunity and political weakness of their opponents in South-east Asia. Firm assurances

cf support and help from the stronger Powers will, tend to raise the morale of threatened lations and so make them less vulnerable to internal dissension and disruption. In the political field it will be necessary to set up a body to keep

a permanent watch for subversion and indirect aggression. Attention is drawn to the treaty obligation to protect member States against such developments by the concern now felt in Siam about the “Thai “ autonomous area” set up by the Peking Government in southern Yunnan, which will give Siamese dissidents a nearby base under Chinese protection from which to operate. But as “ The Times ” observes, it must be the military side of the discussions that will determine whether S.E.A.T.O. is ever going to emerge from its chrysalis. No massive deployments of armed forces Jn threatened countries are contemplated; but some military preparations obviously are essential if potential aggressors are to view S.EAT.O. as a deterrent ' and threatened nations are to see it as a bulwark. Though the Asian signatories appear to favour measures that would provide Si.A.T.O. with strong teeth, the general opinion is that the present conference will not go very gfar with military preparations. What can be done, however, is to set up a joint command with knowledge of what mobile striking force will be at its call. This is the least that should be done. The American commitment will, of course, be vital in both the military and economic spheres. American strength is essential to back the promise of collective resistance to direct aggression in South-east Asia; and American money is essential to the economic progress that will in the long run lessen the danger of aggression by subversion. Second to the American commitment will be the commitments of Britain and

the South Pacific Dominions. The conference will give New Zealand’s cfcief delegate at Bangkok (the new Minister of External Affairs, Mr Macdonald) first-class opportunities to study the present situation in the area, to appraise its dangers, and to learn the minds of New Zealand’s partners in SJS.A.T.O. Mr Macdonald’s chief contributions to the pre-conference publicity seem to have emphasised the smallness of ! New Zealand, and, by inference, the . smallness of the contribution New Zealand can make to S.E-A.T.O. : This cautious approach is justified, no doubt, by Mr Macdonald’s newness to his task in external relations. : But too -much caution would serve very badly the development of an i arrangement which, if pursued with : imagination and vigour, may ’ profoundly affect New Zealand’s future security. As the Australian 1 Minister of External Affairs (Mr Casey) said at Bangkok, so far the Communists have done all the thinking, “ and we have sat back, “more or less all of us”. The conference at Bangkok win justify itself if, as an outcome, the S.E.A.T O. signatories begin, to match the Communist initiative with j, effective counter-measures.