THE TWO EISENHOWERS: MAN VERSUS POLITICIAN

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27098, 22 July 1953, Page 8

THE TWO EISENHOWERS: MAN VERSUS POLITICIAN

DIVIDED WHITE HOUSE

[By

JOSEPH and STEWART ALSOP

in the "New York Herald

(Reprinted by Arrangement) “

Washington.—There is an increasingly sharp' split in the President’s entourage between two opposing schools of political strategy. On one side are most of the members of Eisenhower’s personal staff, who would like the President to assert his mastery in his ownAouse. More garticularly, this schoor holds that isenhower must assume personal leadership of the Republican Party, even at the cost of open conflict with the party’s powerful anti-Eisenhower factions. On the other side are a much smaller group of White House staff members, conspicuously including the Congressional liaison man, . MajorGeneral Wilton B. Persons, with most of the Congressional leaders and professional Republican politicians. They want party harmony at all costs, even if the pursuit of party harmony requires tne President to make the most humiliating surrenders to his enemies. The thus far, has largely centred on what the White House calls “the McCarthy problem.” The first real turning point, it is now clear, was the fight over the confirmation of Charles E. Bohlen as Ambassador to Moscow. On that occasion, the White House and the State Department, being cornered, had to fight Senator McCarthy. Bohlen was confirmed. Yet the real victory went to McCarthy. The Word Is Spread In particular, when the Bohlen fight was over, the Republican Senate leaders went to the White House to declare that they “didn’t want another Bohlen case.” The President gave pledges of future co-operation. And General Persons hastened to spread the happy word on Capitol Hill that Senator McCarthy and his ilk would thereafter enjoy a virtual veto on all Presidential appointments. This was the real explanation of the recent case of Paul H. Nitze. As first revealed in this space, this brilliant State Department official was nominated for a high Defence Department post by the White House itself. These reporters were incorrect in stating, however, that Nitze’s appointment had then been vetoed by Senator Robert A. Taft. This was the official, but false, version of events, given to the Defence Department by the White House Congressional liaison, perhaps because the true version was much more embarrassing. In brief, it was Senator McCarthy who protested against the Nitze appointment to General Persons. It was in response to Senator McCarthy’s protest that General Persons raised a warning signal. And it was because they “didn’t want another Bohlen case” that the Senate Republican Policy Committee then ’requested the cancellation of the Nitze nomination.

Not Taft, but McCarthy, had it, posed the veto. The President mitted with hardly more than a J mur of regret. ” This episode is only one of • l series of similar surrenders sii them highly uncharacteristic of v hower the man, but seei?* standard practice for Eisenhows/I politician. The question is these surrenders gain the Pr 3 anything more than the u porary peace and quiet that 1« « reward of appeasement. > Votes Through McCarthy? General Persons, of course tor such surrenders because hst been the Army’s Congressional I<J ist for so long. All service lobbyist evitably acquire the outlook o! w worn pieces of chamois Equally, most of the Republican: fessionals plead for such siirnUJ because they do not want trouble: hope that Senator McCarthy and ? facHon will make Republican votes * The trouble is, however, that u Carthy-made votes will be anti-mJ hower votes for anti-Eisenhower a publicans, whose elections will furtk weaken the President’s authority iS in his party and in the Congress S should be plain enough, after th« ln cent Wisconsin Republican conventi! which Senator McCarthy and t friends transformed into a bln,, anti-Eisenhower rally. The climax of the Wisconsin vention was the public and formal™, sure of Senator Alexander Wile, t opposing the Bricker amendment i the Constitution [limiting the SJ dent's treaty-making powers! at s urgent and personal request of S President. Wiley stood up and tanks on the President’s behalf. But J the President has cut the ground under poor Wiley by another of b so-called harmony gestures—the tu den offer to compromise on the BritE amendment. President Must Fight Soon Even now, in short, the habit s yielding is spreading to issues of vis national policy. In the present Cm gressional session, the President ; going to pass a minimum leirislaS. programme, not without many did culties with the hostile groups in t! own party. All sorts of larger, thorn) and more controversial issues ha been put off until the next sessin Then will come the real test of n President’s authority. In the next session, the Preside will find that his authority has bta altogether lost, unless he is willing I start fighting for it pretty soonTl oldest rule of politics is that nooni wins a prize that he is not readvi fight for.