The Press WEDNESDAY, JULY 22, 1953. Korea and Collective Security

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27098, 22 July 1953, Page 8

The Press WEDNESDAY, JULY 22, 1953. Korea and Collective Security

It is too soon to be sure that President Syngman Rhee’s action in contriving the escape of North Korean prisoners has had no worse effect on the Korean armistice than to delay it for a few weeks, for many difficulties remain to be

overcome. But the accumulating evidence that President Rhee has done no irreparable harm to the prospects of an early armistice will be received with relief on the United Nations side, which for more than two years has worked earnestly for the armistice that the Communists, for their own reasons, now seem to favour. Yet in the Western world, relief must be tempered by the realisation that President Rhee’s action raises a fundamental question which demands the earnest attention of all nations, large and small, which are interested in collective security. The thoughts of many persons were summarised by the “ Economist ” recently when it asked: “When a dozen nations or “ more unite to carry out their “freely accepted task of rescuing a “small country from aggression, “what obligations does this action "impose on the rescued? In particular, have the rescuers any “ redress if the small country in “ turn disturbs the peace? ” As the “ Economist ” says, history can show many examples of the embarrassment a brash protege can cause to the Powers that had supported it or created it; and in the bad old days of naked power politics if was normal for a great nation to name, in advance, a stiff price for its aid to a weaker neighbour. But the founders of the United Nations sought to establish the principle that any victim of aggression should be defended without fee, arguing that its defence was, in fact, an interest of all nations. It is unhappily apparent that neither part of that premise has worked out satisfactorily in this, the first time that collective action against aggression has found effective expression. A distinction has become clear between those nations that are expected to take up the burden as a matter of course, and those unprepared to shoulder a scrap of it; and it has been embittering to those carrying the burden to find that criticism has been loudest from some among the nations standing prudently aside. However, those deficiencies in collective security have been apparent for some time. The major deficiency exposed by President Rhee’s action is that in its liberal concept of collective security the United Nations Charter, while emphasising the moral and constitutional duty of member States to unite for the defence of any invaded country, lays no corresponding obligations on the victim. This is the practical point that arises in Korea. By releasing the prisoners, President Rhee clearly violated a pledge to place South Korean troops under United Nations command; but it would be difficult to say what he was violating if, after an armistice, he withdrew his troops from the United Nations command or otherwise disrupted the process of settlement. Some would say that the charter should be redrawn to comprehend actions suth as President Rhee’s. Such legislation could be effective only to the extent of the mood to obey it; and contemporary history shows that President RKee is only one among several national leaders not in the mood to accept restraint and discipline when these come into conflict with sentiments of intense nationalism. The “ Economist ” says that the South Korean President has, in fact, merely carried to their illogical extreme the doctrines which many other nations practise less blatantly. The lesson they have to learn from President Rhee, the “ Economist ” concludes, is that small nations have as full a share of responsibility for the maintenance of world order as have the Great Powers. If they do not learn this “ they will continue “to endanger the success of the “ whole contemporary experiment “in the strengthening of world “ order, an enterprise to which some “of them owe their existence. If “ it collapses, the Great Powers will “ not be the only ones to blame ’’.