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UNITY AMONG ALLIES

Secondary Reason For Talks

LONDON. May 21. President Eisenhower’s decision to confer with Sir Winston Churchill and the French Prime Minister in Bermuda goes deeper than the question of summoning a top-level meeting with Russia, says Reuter’s diplomatic correspondent. It is intended to make clear that the alliance of America and her war-time Western European Allies is as firm as ever. But it is clear there has been a divergence of approach between London and Washington on two questions —the usefulness of a meeting with the Russian leaders, and the best tactics for Korean truce negotiations. President Eisenhower’s invitation, on which Sir Winston Churchill acted with his accustomed speed, decision, and secrecy, was very welcome in Downing Street; indeed, in all the world capitals. Though no word of criticism has come from official quarters in London, there has been an impression abroad that Britain was considerably embarrassed by the recent United Nations move at Panmunjon to withdraw Korean prisoners refusing repatriation from neutral custodianship, and to liberate them on the spot in South Korea.

Sir Winston Churchill has repeatedly told Parliament that since the United States contributes the greater share of the blood and treasure in Koiea, Washington must call the tune in the truce talks. But he cannot fail to be sensitive to suggestions that there are limits beyond which the lesser United Nations combatants could not happily travel with the senior partner.

A move which appeared to undermine the current basis of the truce talks—the starting point of which was the Communist proposal to place disputed prisoners in neutral hands—might be those limits. The issue of the usefulness of a meeting with Russia is, in essence, the issue of whether the Soviet Government would in any circumstances abandon its apparent long-term aims of world control.

In their pronouncements on Soviet policy since the death of Stalin, President Eisenhower and Sir Winston Churchill are as one, but they are in some conflict with experts and advisers. They need to work out in Bermuda the actual conditions in which further East-West contact on the highest plane could be expected to be wise and fruitful.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19530523.2.87

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27047, 23 May 1953, Page 7

Word Count
357

UNITY AMONG ALLIES Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27047, 23 May 1953, Page 7

UNITY AMONG ALLIES Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27047, 23 May 1953, Page 7

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