N.Z. TROOPS IN GREECE

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27018, 18 April 1953, Page 3

N.Z. TROOPS IN GREECE

Frey berg Called On To Face Inquiry

ACCOUNT GIVEN TO HOUSE OF LORDS

(Special Correspondent N.Z.P.A.)

LONDON, April 16. A member of the New Zealand House of Representatives made a charge against Lieutenant-General Lord Freyberg, V.C., of not being in control of the New Zealand Divisibn during the retreat in Greece. Lord Freyberg had to face a Court of inquiry in Egypt, which upheld him, but he was charged by the then Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, with failing the New Zealand Government by not giving it warning that the Greek campaign would be dangerous. These facts were given by Lord Freyberg. in his maiden speech in the House of Lords during the debate on defence, when he made a plea for a more complete study of the problem of command and integration of the Commonwealth armies in a large-scale war. He also referred to attempts to break up the New Zealand Division and to friction during the first two and a half years of the war in the Middle East that did harm to the war effort. Lady Freyberg was in the gallery to hear her husband, who was congratulated on his speech by subsequent speakers. After paying a tribute to the men who worked in Whitehall organising and planning the defence of the Empire, Lord Freyberg said: “Towards the end of the last war the Allied Forces Headquarters in the Mediterranean, of which the Defence Minister was Commander-in-Chief, sent a team of staff officers to study the methods

of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the operation on April 19 and 16, 1945, when we were crossing the Senio river and facing up to the river *Po. These staff officers had come to investigate our methods, and see how it was that we continued to get the good results we did. “We explained that our men and our officers were of a very high grade, but notwithstanding that it was with great satisfaction that we were able to assure these staff officers that we got our results by following to the letter the excellent doctrines, policies and instructions laid down by the manuals of the British General Staff as issued by the War Office. “No Departure from Normal” “We never departed from the normal. We would not alter or deviate by a single man from the organisation which the British General Staff h&d set up. We accepted their administrative system, their ration and even their much abused but excellent Navy, Army and Air Force Institute. As a result we finished six years of war as one of the best organised and best equipped and, though I say it myself, the best trained fighting forces in the field. “I tell your Lordships this because it should comfort us when we are carrying such a burden to realise that the money and manpower spent on defence is being well and wisely used.” Referning to co-operation within the Commonwealth and within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Lord Freyberg said: “With all respect and every wish to help, I would urge the Government that a more complete study should be made of the difficult problem of command and the integration of the armies of the Commonwealth in a large-scale war. “Speaking as one who has commanded a Commonwealth force for six years on active service, I know the problems and friction which have occurred, especially during the early years of a long war. I also know the mistakes I made and, with that experience, I feel I should not make them a second time. But I was not by any means the only one to make mistakes.” Many senior officers were passing on and their valuable knowledge was being lost, and that, said Lord Freyberg, was why he pressed the need to study this problem while these men were still alive.

Explaining the difficulties that faced him in going to the Middle East, Lord Freyberg said the New Zealand Government gave him full powers to equip and to train the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in Egypt, and when it was fit for war, he was to notify his Government, which would decide where f .jt was to be employed. “When France capitulated, Egypt became a theatre of war and Middle East headquarters sent me a message stating that they were splitting the New Zealand forces into six. Part were to go to each of the 7th Armoured, 6th Australian, and 4th Indian Divisions, part to the Western Defence Force, part to be in reserve, and part on lines of communication. Cynically, the New Zealand Force Headquarters were to remain in Cairo—in other words, my headquarters and my staff were to remain in Cairo whilst the rest of my troops were to be sent out to do battle m the Western Desert.

“Improper Order”

My lords, this cablegram profoundly shocked us. and we naturally refused to obey this improper order “We pressed the Middle East for a return of some of the units we had lent them because our division was together and we wanted to train as a division. There was an angry excl ange of letters, and from that moment our relationship deteriorated. “My Lords, that period in the Middle East was unpleasant, and things were said and done that cannot be too quickly forgotten. Naturally I kept the Zealand Government in touch with all I was doing, and they agreed entirely that the New Zealand forces should be kept together.” Lord Freyberg said the plan to go to Greece was made early in 1941 without reference to either the Australian or New Zealand commanders, which was quite in keeping with ordinary procedure. In Greece he found himself in a position that was anything but secure, and when the disaster of the Greek and Crete campaigns developed, nearly the whole of the New Zealand Division was lost. “If it had been lost there would have been very serious political repercussions in New Zealand. Mr Fraser flew to Egypt and interrogated all the men as they came from Greece and Crete. “These included six of the membersof the House of Representatives—all good men who had served through the campaigns. One of them made the charge against me of not having control during the retreat from Mount Olympus to the Thermopylae Line.

“After two months cf heavy fighting, on arriving in Egypt on June 2, I found myself facing a court of inquiry. The Court was a British Court, assembled by the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. They upheld my action. “The complaint against me was that I stayed with the rearguard instead of going to the beaches to organise the defence. My position was that I had my division together for the first time. We had not even had a signal exercise because our signals had been separated from us. In the state they were in I thought it would be better to stay with the rearguard and be certain we got them back rather than go back and find nobody coming back to me. The Court upheld my action, and gave me an unsolicited testimonial. “Prime Minister Dissatisfied” “I tell your lordships this because I want you to realise that when we came back my Prime Minister was dissatisfied with the way the New Zealand forces were being integrated into the Army of the Middle East. After the Court of Inquiry he sent for me and told me I had failed them, that I did not warn them that the campaign in Greece was a dangerous operation. I told him it was very difficult for a junior officer to disagree on major strategy with an Army Group Commander, and his reply was perfectly clear. He said: ‘No matter who is your Commander-in-Chief, or what his rank may be, it is your duty to keep us in touch with the situation.’

“I could see trouble ahead. What a Prime Minister says goes, and he is perfectly right to lay down any conditions he likes for his national affairs. I could see stormy times ahead, for he made two conditions under which I commanded my force. He said, first, ‘when you are ordered to take part in operations you will personally find out whether there is air cover for the operations anticipated, and you will communicate with us and tell us that you are satisfied’; and secondly, ‘your troops will not be exposed without tank support to a hostile tank attack.’ “I could see a great deal of trouble for my period in the Middle East. You

know the military mind. You have had a lot of military people here in this House—distinguished admirals, generals, field-marshals, and marshals of the Royal Air Force. They are men with hearts of gold, but your lordships will agree with me when I say that they dislike back-seat driving by a junior officer —indeed that is an understatement.

“They dislike the situation intensely and it is a very difficult position for a commander of a Commonwealth force.”

Evacuation of Greece “One of the things that shocked me profoundly was the evacuation of Greece,” Lord Freyberg said. “For the evacuation of Greece they had, in me, the most experienced man in running away, evacuating or retreating, that they had in the British Army. “I had evacuated Antwerp, Gallipoli, and several rearguards in France. I evacuated part of the rearguard from Mount Olympus to Thermopylae. But did they ask me one question? They never referred to roe. They handed me my orders.

“This problem of handling the armies of the Commonwealth has been facing us for many years—in fact, since World War I.”

Lord Freyberg said that he did not want the House to think he was in the running for any jobs during the war, because he was not. When he took over command of the New Zealand Division he agreed not to accept promotion, and three times he was offered the command of a corps. Describing how he reported to the New Zealand Government on the operations of the New Zealand Division Lord Freyberg said: “When a situation got particularly difficult I used to let them know what was happening on my side of the hill.

“I received a cablegram as we were moving out to battle, and it ran like this: ‘I hear you are on the move.’ It was from my Prime Minister. ‘We are not going to have another Greece or Crete. Wire me at once who your corps and army commanders are, and what you think of them.’

“My Lords, I sent the cablegram to the Commander-in-Chief and said: ‘Will you please brief me as to what I have to say in answer?’

“That is nothing. Perhaps your Lordships would like to hear my report op Field-Marshal Earl Alexander and Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery. Early in October, 1942, my Prime Minister said: ‘I hear you have a change of government in the Middle East. Wire at once what you think of the new arrangements.’

“Division Kept Intact” “On October 3, 20 days before Alamem, I wired: ‘Complete change in Middle East management has cleared the air. One good result is they now insist that the Division must be kept intact. The result of this simple decision will be manifest in our future battles. It makes the position here much easier, as for two and a half years I have striven to prevent the New Zealand Division being divided into brigade groups.’ “Ten days after Alamein, on November 3, I cabled the Prime Minister: ‘The present situation here is shaping well. I feel the future here is bright. I believe the German resistance was finally broken by the last attack. We shall push him back in the near future to the frontier and eventually clear of Africa.’ That was be .?m re we broke out from Alamein. “To me the most important job was keeping in touch with the New Zealand Government. My job in 1942 was to brief the New Zealand Government, to advise them whether they should keep the New Zealand forces in the Western Desert or send them to the Pacific to take part in the fight against Japan. I had a certain influence. They respected my opinions, and I maintained that my work in that field was very important. This problem of integration has a simple solution: It is the old story of the father not realising, and I believe, not wanting to realise, that his sons are grown up and want a full partnership in the family business.”