Korean Truce Talks

Press, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 26728, 12 May 1952, Page 6

Korean Truce Talks

After negotiating in secret for more than a month, last week the United Nations negotiators ended a news black-out on the Panmunjon talks and made public the fact that negotiations had reached deadlocK op the single issue of the involuntary repatriation of prisoners. After the negotiations had dragged on for nine months, recourse to negotiating in private was taken to search for possible compromises over negotiable points. It was felt that points on which “ face ” was involved might be negotiable in private. If the Communists really desired a settlement of the Korean war then the cloak of privacy would make it possible for them tp enter into a compromise which they would probably find embarrassing in the full glare of publicity; it would not have been impossible to work out a face-saving formula on even the vexed issue of prisoners. During the private negotiations the United Nations negotiators declared themselves ready to abandon their earlier insistence that airfields would not be constructed in Northern Korea during an armistice, provided a satisfactory solution could be found on other outstanding questions. As Mr Eden told the House of Commons, ithis was a very considerable concession op the part ef the United Nations commanders, who are

responsible for the security of the United Nations position after the conclusion of an armistice. On their side, the Communists indicated their willingness to withdraw their proposal that the Soviet Union be a member of the armistice commission. This proposal was introduced by the Communists late in the negotiations. It was thoroughly unreasonable, since the Russians have not been neutral in the Korean war; they have supplied most of the heavy arms on one side. It was unnecessary, since the United Nations were willing to accept Czechoslovakia and Poland on the armistice commission; the Communists’ interests would be well looked after by these Moscow puppets in the neutral teams. The “ Manchester Guardian ” has pointed out that the Americans were not, *' as some muddled if well“meaning persons” were thinking, refusing the Russians something they asked for themselves; the Americans recognised their own status as combatants and suggested Sweden and Switzerland to complete the team of four neutrals on the armistice commission. Thus, there was no very great concession in the Communists’ willingness to withdraw their claim that Russia should be on the armistice commission, with power to inspect and interfere behind the United Nations lines during an armistice. The Communists were willing to make absolutely no concessions on the question of prisoners; they continued to demand the return of all the prisoners in United Nations hands, regardless of the wishes of the prisoners. On this issue the United Nations could not yield, as matters of vital principle are involved. It is the United Nations position that human beings have a right to say something about the society in which they Jive; they still have an elementary freedom of choice. To return unwilling persons would be a flagrant violation of that freedom. In this instance, unwilling prisoners returned to the Communists would be marked men because of their own actions. On behalf of his country, President Truman has said that the United States would not “ buy ” an armistice in Korea by turning over human beings for “ slaughter or slavery ”. This attitude has been firmly endorsed by statesmen speaking for other members of the United Nations. Since the Communists have refused to look for compromise in private negotiations it seems quite evident that a truce is not of first importance to them, though it appears that they are not anxious to break off negotiations completely. The Unitec} Nations have conducted negotiations at Panmunjon for nearly a year now with patience, perseverance, and readiness to compromise. They will not be keen to cut off talks even now. But the latest break must give Western statesmen and strategists reasons for deep thought and perhaps new decisions. What will be decided, it is impossible to say. However, it is apparent that the .latest, private, phase of the negotiations has produced valuable moral advantages for the United Nations. It has been clearly shown that the United Nations have been willing to make concessions to a limit beyond which concession would be morally intolerable.