The Press MONDAY, JUNE 23, 1941. GERMANY ATTACKS RUSSIA

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23362, 23 June 1941, Page 4

The Press MONDAY, JUNE 23, 1941. GERMANY ATTACKS RUSSIA

The German Government’s declaration of war on Russia will strengthen the belief which is at the back of the minds of most Germans that their nation is no longer guided by sane men but is in the grip of a blind frenzy which is hurrying it on to destruction. That belief is not far from the truth. Hitler’s plans of conquest have now the shadowy vastness of megalomania and are a sure promise to the German nation that it will be destroyed unless it can rid itself of its present leaders. But it is necessary for the rest of the world, and for the British and American peoples in particular, to’ remember that madness has a rationality of its own. The German attack on Russia Is not the outcome of a sudden, unthinking impulse. All the evidence goes to show'that it has been planned with customary German deliberation and thoroughness and with a minute calculation of the probable military, economic, and diplomatic consequences. The move reveals madness not because it is illogical but because it bears the marks of a mind which has lost ■that hold on normal, human values which constitutes sanity. The point is well illustrated by the statement in which Hitler announced his decision to extend the war to the east. It is not Hitler’s occasional lapses into bombast which show him as a madman; rather is it his crazily logical presentation of his case. The German Dilemma This latest and most startling reversal of German policy is, on the military plane, the outcome of a dilemma which has faced the German high command ever since the conquest of the Balkans. Germany now has mobilised an army ,of about 260 divisions. With the overthrow of Jugoslavia and Greece, she won the last victory against Great Britain and her allies in which she could use her advantages of overwhelming numerical superiority and •inner lines of communication. To open another major offensive against Great Britain she must either win a decisive air victory in the region of the British Isles or find an effective counter to British sea power in the Mediterranean, The prospects of an air Victory are even more remote than they were in 1940; indeed, the Royal Air Force’s supremacy in the west is becoming more decisive every month, in the eastern Mediterranean, in spite of the reverse in Crete, British sea and air power Is still able, by attacks on lines of communication,- to prevent any substantial increase in the German force in North Africa. Problems of the Axis in this theatre of war have, moreover, been further complicated by the heavy losses inflicted on an already meagre supply of shipping. It may be assumed, too, that the German Government now knows that America is determined at any risk to carry out her promises to Great Britain and that therefore the battle of the Atlantic must go against Germany and may indeed have the effect of forcing America into the war. It is primarily the need to make use of her vast and inactive army, combined with the certainty that American aid will ultimately give Britain superiority in arms and materials, that has 'drawn Germany into war with Russia, At first, no doubt, there was some hope of persuading Russia by a mixture of threats and blandishments to join the Tripartite Pact and allow Germany to participate in the exploitation of her material resources. There is - Some support for this assumption in Hitler’s complaint that Russia showed no gratitude for his work in promoting a Russo-Japanese agreement. The German Government seems, however, to have been as well prepared, fpr war as for a peaceful settlement. Its military objective, clearly enough, is to control of the resources of the Ukraine, which may involve a revival of earlier German schemes for a Ukrainian nationalist State under German patronage. The diplomatic objective is hinted at in Hitler’s announcement that German troops will be fighting not merely to protect the Fatherland but to save civilisation from Bolshevism. Against any such attempt to “switch” the war the governments and peoples of Great Britain and the United States are adequately prepared. Although there will be little sympathy for the .present rulers of Russia, who have brought about this disaster by their own short-sighted opportunism, there will be no disposition to regard the German invasion of Russia as anything but a further proof that National Socialism is a menace which must be destroyed. A mad dog is not less dangerous because h£ bites someone who deserves to be bitten. Far Eastern Consequences The impact of the Russo-German conflict on the situation in the Far East will be studied closely in the British Commonwealth and in America. Only two months ago Mr Mateuoka Was in Moscow, where he signed a non-aggres-sion pact with the Russian leaders. Since then the line of the Mongolian frontier has been settled by Japanese and Russian army commanders. While neither of these agreements substantially altered the situation in the Far East and thus left Japan with the “China incident” no nearer solution and with Russia’s Far Eastern Army to watch, the delicate relations existing between Germany and the Soviet Unionmust have been known When the Japanese commanders went to the bother of concluding the frontier Settlement. If Japan wishes to strike at Soviet Russia, then the hour has struck. But it is difficult to see what gains would accrue to Japan from this course. On the whole, it seems that the Moscow Pact was a neutrality pact without! secret clauses, and that It is to the advantage of both Powers loyally to observe its terms. No mention was made in the pact Of Soviet aid to China and there is no (evidence to show that it has been stopped* .will cease now, remains to be ♦seen."'Even if it does, China’s war effort will not be vijfclly impaired because the flow of Russian ! aeroplanes, munitions, and equipment has been on a IsnißU smaller than the British and American aid that has been reaching China by the Burma! Road. There can be ho question, however, that the full engagement of Russia’s military machine in the West will make Japan freer to Interest herself iri’southr.eastem Asia. Russia’s Far Eastern units are indeed organised as fcn entirely separate army wittu its own high command, food;: manpower and industrial reare thug likely to retain their

aggressive power whatever happens In Europe. But it is most unlikely that the Soviet Government would feel free to profit by a Japanese excursion into the south when it was defending its position in Europe against a strong German attack.